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ABSTRACT

MAMMOGRAPHY EXEMPLARS IN ONLINE NEWS COMMENTARY:
PREVALENCE OF EXEMPLARS, EFFECTS ON RISK PERCEPTIONS AND
MAMMOGRAPHY INTENTIONS, AND MECHANISMS OF ACTION
Holli Hitt Seitz
Joseph N. Cappella
Multiple prior studies have examined the nature of news coverage of
mammography but have neglected comments generated by readers. However, comments
on online news stories have been shown to affect readers’ beliefs and behaviors.
Understanding the potential effects of user-generated comments and comments with
exemplars, in particular, is necessary to fully understand the effects of online
mammography news on media consumers.
Study 1 describes the prevalence, content, and representativeness of
mammography exemplars in comments on online news about mammography using a
content analysis of mammography news articles (n = 71) and comments (n = 5,858)
appearing on The New York Times website from November 2009 to December 2014.
Study 2 tests the effects of comments on risk perceptions and mammography intentions
and mechanisms of these effects using a randomized online experiment with a sample of
U.S. women between the ages of 38 and 48.
Of comments on news articles about mammography, 31% included a
mammography exemplar. Of those, 41% included a mammogram-detected breast cancer
vi

exemplar and 19% included a false-positive mammogram exemplar. Additionally,
articles with mammography exemplars were more likely to have comments that included
mammography exemplars.
In Study 2, when compared to comments without exemplars, comments with
exemplars did not produce effects on mammography intentions or risk perceptions.
Compared to comments about false positives, comments about mammogram-detected
breast cancer led to higher intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years, lower
intentions to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram, and higher breast cancer risk
perceptions. Effects were moderated by participant education level, family history of
breast cancer, history of prior mammography, and time spent reading the experimental
manipulation. Some effects on mammography intentions were mediated by changes in
attitude toward waiting until age 50 to have a mammogram.
This study adds to evidence suggesting that comments appearing with news
articles have effects on readers. Those who share content online and allow usergenerated comments should consider potential effects before allowing comments to be
posted.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
“My mother skipped mammograms in her 40's and she died. I did them
and I lived.”
– L. H.

“I had a mammogram that came back with ‘suspicious calcifications’ in
one spot. I went back in for more views, and an ultrasound. I had needle
biopsies. Still nothing conclusive. I remember a doctor suggesting that I
have the area surgically removed. I took the ‘watch and wait’ option
instead. I've been waiting now for 12 years and nothing has changed - in
fact the ‘suspicious calcifications’ area seems to have disappeared. I'm
told that I should feel lucky and grateful that I didn't have breast cancer
after all that. Strangely I don't feel lucky.”
– A. M.

The topic of mammography has been frequently covered by the news media,
particularly in recent years. A change in mammography recommendations in 2009 by the
U.S. Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF) triggered a wave of mammography
media coverage (Squiers et al., 2011), and new screening technology, studies on the risks
and benefits of mammography, revised breast cancer screening guidelines issued by the
American Cancer Society, and celebrity breast cancer diagnoses have kept
1

mammography in the news. While news stories undoubtedly have an effect on the beliefs
and behaviors of news consumers, these news stories do not operate alone. Often, online
news stories are accompanied by reader comments (Weber, 2014), which means that
readers’ beliefs and behaviors are being influenced not only by the original news article
but also by any commentary that they consume along with the article. When commenting
on articles, readers regularly illustrate their points with personal stories and individual
cases, or exemplars. As seen in the examples above, these mammography exemplars can
be vivid, emotional, and persuasive. In fact, prior research shows that exemplars can
have greater effects on risk perceptions than statistical information (Zillmann, 2006) and
narrative evidence can have a greater effect on behavioral intentions than statistical
evidence (Zebregs, van den Putte, Neijens, & de Graaf, 2015). Thus, exemplars in
comments could potentially have more powerful effects on intentions and risk
perceptions than the information in the articles with which they appear. Unfortunately,
the frequency with which exemplars appear in comments is not well-known. In fact,
prior content analyses of mammography coverage have not included an examination of
user-generated commentary. This general lack of understanding of the composition of
comments on news stories about mammography leads to the following research
objective:
Objective 1: Describe the prevalence, content, and representativeness of
mammography exemplars in comments on online news about mammography.
Objective 1 is addressed in Study 1, a content analysis of online newspaper articles about
mammography and the user-generated comments appearing with these articles.
2

There has also been little research to date on the effects of online news comments
on readers and even less research on the effects of comments that include exemplars.
Prior research has shown that exemplars in news stories can have effects on behavioral
intentions (Kim, Bigman, Leader, Lerman, & Cappella, 2012) and risk perceptions
(Zillmann, 2006), and there is reason to believe that exemplars in comments on news
articles can have similar effects. In general, exemplars and other forms of narrative
evidence are known to be persuasive, particularly in the cancer context. Green (2006)
argues that narratives can change beliefs and behaviors by reducing counter-arguing,
modeling behavior change, providing cognitive rehearsal of behaviors, and creating
strong attitudes. Given the dearth of prior research in this area, this dissertation addresses
the following research objectives related to the effects of comments:
Objective 2: Test the effects of comments with exemplars on risk perceptions and
mammography intentions.
Objective 3: Explore the mechanisms of action underlying effects of exemplar
comments on risk perceptions and mammography intentions.
These research objectives are addressed through an experimental study of the
effects of comments on readers. Study 2 addresses Objective 2 by testing the effects of
comments with exemplars on risk perceptions and mammography intentions, including
how effects differ for different types of mammography exemplars that appear in
comments (e.g., false-positive mammography results, mammogram-detected cancer,
etc.). Study 2 also addresses Objective 3 by testing predicted mediation paths to explain
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the effects of comments with exemplars and testing potential moderators of predicted
effects.
With the growing prevalence and importance of user-generated comments in
online news, and media in general, understanding the effects of these comments on
readers is crucial for those who wish to understand media effects. The results of this
research may have important implications for news organizations or others who allow
online comments, including organizations and federal agencies with public health
functions.
Dissertation Overview
This dissertation addresses the research objectives above through an evaluation of
the media environment surrounding mammography in recent years and an online
experiment to test the effects of different types of user-generated comments on readers.
The content analysis includes newspaper articles about mammography appearing
between November 2009 and December 2014 and associated reader commentary, with a
particular emphasis on the presence and representativeness of mammography exemplars
in user-generated comments. The experiment examines the effects of these comments,
specifically comments with false-positive exemplars and mammogram-detected cancer
exemplars, on readers.
The experimental design necessitated that a content analysis first be undertaken to
gauge the prevalence and representativeness of mammography exemplars in comments
appearing with online news articles. The content analysis provided the stimuli for the
experiment and enhances the ecological validity of the experiment by closely replicating
4

the nature of comments as they appear in online news settings. Chapter 2 explores prior
literature on content analyses of mammography news coverage and research on usergenerated comments. It also outlines the rationale for the content analysis and the
specific research questions addressed: 1) How was mammography covered in the news
from 2009 to 2014?; 2) What is the nature of online reader commentary for these
mammography news stories?; and 3) What is the nature of mammography exemplars in
user-generated comments on online news articles about mammography, specifically in
regards to prevalence, type, and representativeness of actual mammography outcomes?
Chapter 2 goes on the present the content analysis methodology, results, and discussion.
Chapter 3 outlines the literature and theoretical background of the main
experiment. Specifically, it reviews prior literature on the effects of media coverage of
breast cancer and mammography and on the effects of news commentary. The theoretical
background includes a review of the effect of exemplars on behavioral intentions and the
effects of exemplars on risk perceptions. Chapter 3 goes on to set forth hypotheses
regarding the effects of user-generated comments on readers’ breast cancer risk
perceptions and mammography intentions, including specific predictions about the effects
of comments with exemplars versus comments without and the effects of false-positive
exemplars versus mammogram-detected cancer exemplars. It also includes predictions
about possible mediators of the effect of exemplars on risk perceptions and
mammography intentions.
The main objective of Chapter 4 is to provide a detailed description of the
experimental methods used to test the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 3. A randomized
5

online experiment assigned participants to one of eight conditions, with conditions
varying on the presence or type of comments displayed: 1) no information control
(NoInfo), 2) no comments control (NoComm), 3) false-positive comments without
exemplars (FPNoEx), 4) mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with no
exemplars (BCNoEx), 5) false-positive comments with exemplars (FPEx), 6)
mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with exemplars (BCEx), 7) false positive
comments with exemplars removed (FPExRem), or 8) mammogram-detected breast
cancer comments with exemplars removed (BCExRem). Chapter 4 also presents an
overview of experimental measures, stimuli, and an analysis plan. Full survey
instruments and sample stimuli are available in the appendices.
Results presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 address both Objective 2 and
Objective 3. Chapter 5 presents the results of the experiment testing the effects of
comment conditions on mammography intentions (i.e., the intention to have a
mammogram in the next two years and the intention to wait until age 50 to have a
mammogram). It also presents results from moderation and mediation analyses that
attempt to elucidate the mechanisms of action underlying predicted, unexpected, and
failed effects of comments.
Chapter 6 presents the results of the experiment that address the effects of
comments on risk perceptions, including perceived risk of developing breast cancer,
perceived risk of a positive mammogram, and perceived risk of a false positive
mammogram. It also includes results of moderation and mediation analyses of the effects
of comments presented.
6

The final chapter, Chapter 7, provides a summary of the results of the dissertation
and a general discussion of these results. This chapter includes an overview of the
strengths and limitations of the research, a discussion of directions for future research,
and an overall conclusion.

7

CHAPTER 2
EXEMPLARS IN USER-GENERATED COMMENTARY ON MAMMOGRAPHY
NEWS COVERAGE
Introduction
Routine mammography is recommended as the primary breast screening modality
for average-risk women between the ages of 50 and 74 years of age (U.S. Preventive
Services Task Force [USPSTF], 2009; USPSTF, 2016). The American Cancer Society
recommends beginning routine screening even earlier, at age 45 (Oeffinger et al., 2015),
making the topic of mammography one that is pertinent for a large segment of the
population and also somewhat controversial. Research suggests that the benefit of
mammography for young women is quite modest and that regular mammography
screening before age 50 may put women at high risk for false positive results,
overdiagnosis, and overtreatment (U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, 2009; Pace &
Keating, 2014). In fact, Pace and Keating (2014) estimate that if 10,000 40-year-old
women are screened annually with mammography for 10 years, 3,680 (37%) will have
normal mammograms all 10 years, 6,130 (61%) will experience at least one false positive
(including 700 or 7% who will have an unnecessary biopsy), and 190 (2%) will be
diagnosed with breast cancer (including between 1 and 16 women, or 0.01% - 0.16%,
whose death will be averted due to mammography screening). Despite the significant
risks, women continue to overestimate the benefits of mammography (Domenighetti et
al., 2003), and the general public remains enthusiastic toward screening (Schwartz,
Woloshin, Fowler, & Welch, 2004). In addition to the role played by medical
8

professionals, professional medical organizations, and advocacy organizations that
continue to promote screening, media coverage may be partially to blame for this
mismatch between perception, attitudes, and reality.
Prior research has shown that mammography behaviors are influenced by media
coverage (Yanovitzky & Blitz, 2000), but this research does not take into account the
effect of comments generated by readers in response to mammography news presented in
an online context. The presence of comments on online news stories is increasingly
common (Weber, 2014), and research has shown that comments may affect readers’
opinions and perceptions (Lee, 2014). Unfortunately, little is known about the nature of
comments that are generated in response to mammography news coverage. Specifically,
though we know that exemplars, or “illustrative individual cases” (Brosius & Bathelt,
1994, p. 48), are present in user-generated comments (Holton, Lee, & Coleman, 2014;
Len-Rios, Bhandari, & Medvedeva, 2014), little is known about how accurately these
exemplars represent the typical mammography experience, including the ratio of falsepositive results to mammography-detected cancer. Exemplars are of particular interest
because research has shown they can have greater effects on health risk perceptions than
statistical information (Zillmann, 2006). Similarly, narrative evidence has been shown to
have a greater effect on behavioral intentions than statistical evidence (Zebregs, van den
Putte, Neijens, & de Graaf, 2015). Thus, exemplars in comments could potentially have
more powerful effects on intentions and risk perceptions than the information in the
articles with which they appear.
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Though more extensive research is needed to fully understand the complex media
environment surrounding mammography and user-generated commentary on
mammography, this limited content analysis was specifically designed as a preliminary
step toward Study 2, which will investigate the effects of exemplars in user-generated
commentary on mammography news articles on the readers of these comments. First,
this content analysis quantifies the prevalence, types, and representativeness of exemplars
appearing in a segment of reader comments on mammography articles, which was
necessary to help justify the legitimacy of the research questions addressed by Study 2.
Secondly, and more practically, it provides a pool of user-generated comments (both with
and without exemplars) from an online news source that can be used as experimental
stimuli, which will enhance the ecological validity of Study 2. However, this content
analysis does not attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis across media platforms
(e.g., television, social media, etc.), nor does it seek to sample from or be representative
of multiple news sources.
Background
Analyses of News Coverage of Mammography
To understand the nature of user-generated commentary, one must first
understand the nature of news coverage of mammography in recent years. Several
newsworthy events have shaped the nature of news coverage about mammography over
the last five years: changing USPSTF recommendations regarding breast cancer
screening, studies about the efficacy of mammography, the emergence of breast
tomosynthesis (also called 3D mammography) as a new screening tool, legislation about
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breast density notification, Susan G. Komen withdrawing funding from Planned
Parenthood, and celebrity breast cancer cases. The change in USPSTF recommendations
alone was heavily covered in the media, and much of the immediate coverage was critical
of the new guidelines (Squiers et al., 2011). However, there is little research about
coverage of other mammography topics that have received coverage in recent years.
While there have been content analyses of news coverage of cancer in general (e.g.,
Slater, Long, Bettinghaus, & Reineke, 2008), breast cancer (e.g., Atkin, Smith, McFeters,
& Ferguson, 2008), mammography (e.g., Schwartz & Woloshin, 2002), and the USPSTF
controversy (e.g., Squiers, Holden, Dolina, Kim, Bann, & Renaud, 2011) few examine
coverage over time, and none incorporate an analysis of comments.
At least three recent content analyses examining cancer news coverage have
discovered that, compared to actual cancer incidence rates, breast cancer is
disproportionately represented in media coverage. Using a representative sample of
national and local news from television, newspaper, and magazine sources, Slater, Long,
Bettinghaus, and Reineke (2008) analyzed cancer news coverage from 2002 and 2003.
Slater et al. found that breast cancer was over-represented in media coverage compared to
both its actual incidence and mortality rate in the population at the time; breast cancer
was mentioned in 29.6% of newspaper stories about cancer (with the next most
frequently mentioned cancer being colon cancer, mentioned in only 11.3% of newspaper
stories about cancer). Another recently completed content analysis attempts to show
change in cancer news coverage trends across three different time points, including 1977,
1980, and 2003. Jensen, Moriarty, Hurley, and Stryker (2010) examined cancer stories
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appearing in the top 50 U.S. newspapers during a time frame in 2003, which closely
replicated methods used by Greenberg, Freimuth, and Bratic (1979) and Freimuth,
Greenberg, DeWitt, and Romano (1984) to complete prior content analyses of cancer
coverage. Jensen et al. found that breast cancer was consistently overreported, compared
to its actual incidence relative to other cancers, across the three time periods reported.
Finally, Hurley, Riles, and Sangalang (2014) analyzed cancer news from the top four
online news sources (Google News, Yahoo! News, MSNBC.com, and CNN.com) over a
composite month in 2008. Consistent with previous content analyses of print media
coverage, they found that breast cancer was the most prevalent cancer mentioned. Of
breast cancer articles analyzed, 29% were about detection (presumably many of those
were about mammography), 23% were about prevention, and 22% were about treatment.
With the exception of Hurley, Riles, and Sangalang (2014), prior analyses of
broad cancer news coverage do not comment on the prevalence of mammography
coverage or the use of narratives or exemplars in the articles. Others, however, have
examined the nature of mammography coverage in the media. Wells, Marshall, Crawley,
and Dickersin (2001) analyzed newspaper reports on mammography appearing in high
circulation US newspapers from 1990 to 1997. Wells et al. found that the most common
theme of these articles was the issue of screening mammography for women ages 40 to
49. Overall, articles were mostly supportive for screening in these women; of the 160
articles with quotes, 26% included quotes supporting mammography for women in their
40s without presenting quotes from the opposite viewpoint, 15% had quotes from both
perspectives, and 7.5% had quotes regarding reservations about screening women in this
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age group. Of 619 quotes total in 160 articles, 38 quotes came from members of the
public. Wells et al. report that these quotes often involved a member of the public
describing her own experience with breast cancer or mammography. Atkin, Smith,
McFeters, and Ferguson (2008) focused specifically on the content of breast cancer news
coverage in leading newspapers, newsmagazines, and television during 2003 and 2004.
They found that 23% of breast cancer news stories analyzed referred to breast cancer
detection and 17% overall referred specifically to mammography, with most of the
articles dealing with topics of effectiveness and the age at which women should begin
having mammograms. They also examined the prevalence of personal narratives in
breast cancer news coverage, finding that 48% of stories primarily about detection cited a
“personal case” as a source.
In addition to analyses of general mammography coverage, some authors have
focused on coverage of various mammography controversies over time, including the
1997 National Institutes of Health (NIH) consensus panel recommendation against
routine screening of women in their 40s and subsequent reversal, a 2000 meta-analysis on
the efficacy of mammography published in The Lancet, and the 2009 USPSTF breast
cancer screening recommendations. Schwartz and Woloshin (2002) analyzed media
coverage for the two weeks following the 1997 National Institutes of Health (NIH)
consensus panel recommendation against routine screening of women in their 40s and for
the two weeks following the National Cancer Institute’s (NCI) subsequent reversal of that
decision by collecting stories from the top 10 US newspapers and 3 major television
networks. Despite acknowledging the uncertainty regarding whether women in their 40s
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should have mammograms following the initial NIH recommendation, 59% of the news
items still suggested that these women should be screened. Following the NCI reversal,
the expression of uncertainty dropped significantly and 96% of news items suggested that
women in their 40s should be screened. Though Schwartz and Woloshin reported on the
sources of quotations found in these stories, it is difficult to tell how many included
mammography exemplars, as quotes from breast cancer advocacy groups and survivors
are reported together (17 quotes across 51 stories). They did note that the American
Cancer Society was frequently quoted (36 times across 51 stories), while the USPSTF,
which recommended against routine screening for women aged 40 to 49 at the time, was
only quoted once across all of the news stories. Holmes-Rovner and Charles (2003) also
tracked news coverage following a mammography controversy, examining news
clippings in the United Kingdom for two weeks following the release of a meta-analysis
in The Lancet that suggested mammography did not decrease breast cancer mortality and
was unjustified. They found that approximately 20% of the articles included a patient
testimonial, and that testimonials use increased over time; articles published closer to the
release of the study were more focused on the technical aspects of the study than those
published during week two of coverage. Holmes-Rovner and Charles note that many
articles, particularly those with patient testimonials, encouraged women to disregard the
findings of this meta-analysis and continue screening. Findings from Schwartz and
Woloshin and from Holmes-Rovner and Charles suggest that news coverage of
mammography controversies is often skewed toward encouraging screening rather than
emphasizing uncertainty and the need for informed decision-making.
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The 2009 release of updated USPSTF breast cancer screening recommendations is
one of the most recent mammography controversies to be studied. Squiers et al. (2011)
analyzed newspaper and social media coverage of the new recommendations in the weeks
following their release. They found that 63% of the news articles mentioned the
guidelines for women in their 40s (the recommendations that changed most drastically),
while only 34% discussed the guidelines for women in their 50s, suggesting an emphasis
on the more controversial aspects of the recommendations. The valence of the newspaper
articles was also skewed; 55% were unsupportive of the new recommendations, 31.3%
were supportive, and 13.8% were neutral.
Research by Jensen et al. (2014), which found that self-reported news
consumption was positively related to overestimation of the prevalence of breast cancer,
suggests that the overrepresentation of breast cancer in the news affects breast cancer risk
perceptions. Exposure to news stories and comments that overrepresent the benefits of
mammography while downplaying risks may have similar effects on mammography risk
perceptions and intentions. Unfortunately, prior content analyses of breast cancer and
mammography coverage do not provide insights into the user-generated comments that
accompanied news coverage of mammography, meaning that some of the mammography
information to which readers have been exposed has remained unanalyzed. These gaps in
research have prompted the following research questions:
RQ1: How was mammography covered in online news from 2009 to 2014 (with a
particular emphasis on valence toward mammography and presence and type of
exemplars)?
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RQ2: What was the nature of online reader commentary for these mammography
news stories (with a particular emphasis on valence toward mammography and
presence and type of exemplars)?
Prior Research on User-Generated Commentary
In addition to the lack of content analyses of media coverage that incorporate an
analysis of comments, research in general on user-generated comments about
mammography that appear in the public domain is limited. Existing literature on usergenerated content about breast cancer and mammography is primarily from social media
(Abramson, Keefe, & Chou, 2015; Lyles, Lόpez, Pasick, & Sarkar, 2013; Thackeray,
Burton, Giraud-Carrier, Rollins, & Draper, 2013). While these studies provide insight
into the content of comments, they do not provide information on the interplay between
articles and comments, nor do they provide insight into the presence or role of exemplars
in comments. The limited research that does exist on the prevalence of exemplars in
comments on health news (Holton, Lee, & Coleman, 2014; Suran, Holton, & Coleman,
2014) is not specific to mammography or breast cancer.
Two of the analyses of online comments related to breast cancer and
mammography come from Twitter. Thackeray et al. (2013) conducted an analysis of all
tweets related to breast cancer during October 2012 to capture Twitter coverage of breast
cancer awareness month. Using automated text analysis, they determined that 3.1% of all
1.3 million original tweets were about breast cancer detection, including, but not limited
to, mammography. The majority of tweets were about wearing pink and participating in
fundraisers and awareness activities. Unfortunately, no further information was given
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about the detection tweets, and it is unknown whether they included exemplars (which
would have been necessarily brief given the 140-character limit of tweets). Lyles et al.
(2013) also coded a small segment of mammography tweets appearing on Twitter during
a five-week period in early 2012. Of 271 messages about mammograms, 25% included
mammography exemplars. These included women sharing experiences with
appointments, negative sentiment toward mammogram experiences, mammogram results,
and references to the mammograms of friends or family members. The analysis by Lyles
et al. was described as exploratory, and only used tweets classified as “top tweets” (those
with higher levels of engagement from other Twitter users) were included, thus these
results may not be representative of all tweets about mammography. Additionally, due to
the length limitations placed on tweets by the Twitter platform, any exemplars or
narratives included in the tweets analyzed would be incredibly brief and would not allow
for detailed descriptions of mammography outcomes. Additionally, any exemplars that
do exist would be unlikely to produce substantial cognitive involvement or narrative
transportation. Thus, Twitter is not an ideal source for finding and quantifying the
presence of mammography exemplars in user-generated commentary.
Analyses of comments on Facebook also provide limited insights into the nature
of user-generated comments about mammography. Abramson, Keefe, and Chou (2015)
analyzed wall posts from October 2010 from the Facebook page of a nonprofit
organization committed to funding free mammograms and spreading breast cancer
awareness. Abramson et al. found that users often used the Facebook wall of this
particular organization as a place to share personal breast cancer stories and anecdotes,
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though the prevalence and type of stories was not quantified. Importantly, they also note
that users were allowed to post health information, opinions, and stories without
intervention or apparent oversight from the sponsoring organization, which allows for the
spread of misinformation. The same may be true for user-generated comments on some
online news sites.
Finally, though there is not available literature on user-generated comments on
breast cancer and mammography news articles, there are limited analyses of how certain
health article characteristics may affect the types of comments generated by readers.
Though the research in this area focuses on frames and not the presence of exemplars, the
presence of episodic frames may serve as a proxy for exemplars. Holton, Lee, and
Coleman (2014) explored the effects of framing of online health news on the volume,
content, and framing of reader comments. Overall, 0.34 sentences per comment were
episodically framed, which gives some indication of the prevalence of exemplars, though
the authors do not report the average number of sentences per comment. They found that
when articles had gain frames, readers were more likely to share personal stories in the
comments. Interestingly, episodically framed articles were not more likely to have
episodically framed comments. While Holton et al. examined all health topics, Suran,
Holton, and Coleman (2014) looked specifically at whether the frames of comments were
associated with certain health topics, including cancer. Though some topics were
associated with a higher likelihood of episodically-, thematically-, gain-, or loss-framed
comments, Suran et al. did not find an association between an article being about cancer
and the frame of the comments.
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Because of a general dearth of research on user-generated comments in the online
news arena and, specifically, a lack of attention to the prevalence of exemplars in these
comments, I propose the following research question:
RQ3: What is the nature of mammography exemplars in user-generated comments
on online news articles about mammography, specifically in regards to
prevalence, type, and representativeness of actual mammography outcomes?
RQ4: How are exemplars in mammography articles related to exemplars found in
user-generated news comments?
Methods
Because this content analysis was designed to provide background information
and stimuli for Study 2, it includes a limited analysis of news articles and associated
reader comments related to mammography over a five year period, beginning with the
release of the USPSTF revised breast screening recommendations in November 2009.
The New York Times was chosen as the source for this content analysis for its broad
readership, its role in agenda-setting (Yanovitzky & Blitz, 2000), and its online
commenting system, the archives of which are well-maintained and easily accessible
through the application program interfaces (APIs) provided by The New York Times.
However, The New York Times is not representative of all news sources, nor is its
readership representative of news readers in general. Nevertheless, this source is useful
for discovering the kinds of comments generated, gauging the relative frequency of
different types of comments, and collecting stimulus materials for experimental study.
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Article Collection Procedure
To collect mammography stories appearing in The New York Times in the five
years following the release of the 2009 USPSTF mammography guidelines, the author
first conducted a search using LexisNexis for articles or blog posts appearing between
November 1, 2009 and December 31, 2014 that mentioned mammography or breast
cancer screening by using the search string mammogra! OR ("breast cancer" w/2
screen!). The author then searched the NYTimes.com website for the same date range
using the following search string: mammogram OR mammography OR "breast cancer
screening" OR "screening for breast cancer" OR "screen for breast cancer."1
Article Inclusion Criteria, Measures, and Coding Procedure
For each article retrieved in the searches described above, the author recorded
basic information, including the title; any alternate titles, if applicable (since an article’s
print and web titles sometimes differed); the date of publication; whether or not the
article was included in the LexisNexis search results, whether or not the article was
included in the NYTimes.com search results; the article type (news article,
opinion/editorial, magazine article, blog post, letter/reader reaction, other);2 and whether
the article was a duplicate of another article appearing in the search. The full codebook is

1

The NYTimes.com website uses a different search syntax than LexisNexis, so it was not
possible to exactly replicate the search string used in LexisNexis.
2
For results from the NYTimes.com search, it was sometimes difficult to ascertain the
article type because the URLs provided in the search results often pointed only to a blog
post, even if the news article appeared in both print and as a blog post. For this reason,
article type for these results may be less accurate than for articles found through
LexisNexis.
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available in Appendix A. Articles were excluded from the analysis if the article type was
“letters/reader reactions” or “other” (which included death notices, engagement and
wedding announcements, corrections, book reviews, and lists of headlines) or if they
were duplicates of an article already in the dataset. If an article appeared in the search
results as both a blog post and an article, the blog post was coded and the print version
was excluded as a duplicate, as online articles were typically more complete and correct
than versions appearing in print. Beyond these inclusion criteria, articles were included if
either of the following was true: 1) the article title included a reference to mammograms,
mammography, breast screening, or breast cancer screening, or 2) at least 50% of the
paragraphs in the story included a reference to mammograms, mammography, breast
screening, or breast cancer screening.
The unit of analysis was the full article. Articles that were included in the dataset
were coded for content variables, including whether or not the online version had
comments, mentioned the 2009 mammography guidelines issued by the USPSTF, or
mentioned any of the following organizations: Susan G. Komen for the Cure, the
American Cancer Society, the National Cancer Institute, the USPSTF, or the American
College of Radiology. Articles were also coded for overall valence with regard to
mammography and could be coded as “more enthusiastic than cautious toward
mammography,” “balanced/neutral,” or “more cautious than enthusiastic toward
mammography.” Finally, articles were coded for the presence of exemplars, including
breast cancer exemplars (a mention of an individual or individuals who was/were
diagnosed with breast cancer), mammography exemplars (a mention of an individual or
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individuals who had a mammogram or mammograms), or exemplars who chose to delay
or not to undergo mammography. If a mammography exemplar was present, the coder
went on to record the type of mammography exemplar present in the article. The types of
exemplars included false positives (women who received a call-back or follow-up for
additional screening, biopsy, etc.), cancer outcomes (women who had a screening
mammogram that found a cancer), no false positives (women who have a history of
mammograms but no false positives and no cancer diagnoses), lumps or breast cancer
found without mammography (this includes women who had a lump detected in some
way and went on to have a diagnostic mammogram as well as women who had a false
negative mammogram and later found a lump or cancer), and false negatives (women
who report that they had cancer that was missed by a mammogram). These categories
were not exclusive, and an article could be coded as including multiple or overlapping
exemplar types.
Using the measures outlined above, the author coded all of the articles retrieved in
the search for basic information, inclusion criteria, and content. A second coder was
trained and recoded a 10% sample of articles to determine inter-coder reliability for
inclusion and content. Inter-coder reliability was calculated using Krippendorff’s alpha
and was judged to be acceptable for all variables, including the following: meeting
inclusion criteria (α = 1), having comments (α = 1), mentioning 2009 USPSTF guidelines
(α = .87), mentioning Susan G. Komen for the Cure (α = 1), mentioning the American
Cancer Society (α = 1), mentioning the National Cancer Institute (α = 1), mentioning the
USPSTF (α = .74), mentioning the American College of Radiology (α = 1), valence (α =
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.71), inclusion of breast cancer exemplars (α = 1), inclusion of exemplars who delay or
do not get a mammogram (α = 1), inclusion of mammography exemplars (α = 1),
inclusion of false positive exemplars (α = 1), inclusion of exemplars with cancer outcome
(α = 1), inclusion of exemplars with no false positive (α = .86), inclusion of exemplars
with a lump or breast cancer detected without a mammogram (α = .86), and false negative
exemplars (α = 1).
Comment Collection Procedure
For articles that were included in the analysis and for which the online versions
had comments, all comments were collected using the New York Times Community API
(http://developer.nytimes.com/docs/community_api/The_Community_API_v3/).
Comments could be retrieved through the API for all but four of the articles. For each of
these remaining articles, the author manually collected all comments from the New York
Times website. For each comment, the author recorded the author name, author location,
comment date, whether or not the comment was classified as an “NYT Pick,” the number
of times the comment was recommended by other readers, the full text of the comment,
and the number of words in each comment. Due to changes in the New York Times
comment structure over time, author location, “NYT Pick” status, and number of times
recommended were not available for all comments.
Comment Inclusion Criteria, Measures, and Coding Procedure
From the total pool of 5,858 comments, a stratified random sample was
constructed by drawing 20% of each article’s comments (n = 1,185). When an article had
fewer than five comments, one comment was randomly selected and included so that all
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articles were represented. Comments from this sample were included for further analysis
if they mentioned mammography or were judged as being about mammography. The
codebook for comment inclusion and content is available as part of Appendix A, and the
full comment was the unit of analysis. Those comments that were included in the
analysis were then coded for valence with regard to mammography: “more enthusiastic
toward mammography than cautious,” “balanced/neutral—neither more enthusiastic nor
more cautious,” or “more cautious toward mammography than enthusiastic.” Comments
included in the analysis were also coded for the presence of different types of exemplars,
including breast cancer exemplars, exemplars who chose to delay or not to undergo
mammography, and mammography exemplars. If a mammography exemplar was present,
the coder went on to record the type of mammography exemplar present in the comment.
As described in the above section on article coding, the types of exemplars included false
positives, cancer outcomes, no false positives, lumps or breast cancer found without
mammography, and false negatives. As with the articles, these categories were not
exclusive, and a comment could be coded as including multiple or overlapping exemplar
types.
The author coded the entire sample of comments. A second coder was trained
and recoded a randomly drawn 10% sample of comments (n = 100) to determine intercoder reliability. Inter-coder reliability was calculated using Krippendorff’s alpha and
was judged to be acceptable for most variables, including meeting inclusion criteria (α =
.81), valence (α = .92), including a breast cancer exemplar (α = .95), including an
exemplar who chooses not to screen (α = .88), including a mammography exemplar (α =
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.85), presence of a false-positive exemplar (α = .78), presence of a cancer outcome
exemplar (α = .74), and presence of an exemplar with a lump or breast cancer detected
without mammography (α = .83). Krippendorff’s alpha for the presence of exemplars
who had a history of normal mammography results was .53 (88% agreement), which falls
below an acceptable level of agreement. This may be partly due to the rare nature of this
type of exemplar (appearing only 13 times in 576 comments).
Analysis
Statistical analyses were performed using Stata/IC 13.1 for Windows. Analyses
included basic descriptive statistics and chi-square analyses to examine the relationship
between comment exemplar type and comment valence. Logistic regression with
standard errors clustered by article were used to examine the effect of exemplars in the
article on exemplars in the comments on that article.
Results
Article Collection and Inclusion
The LexisNexis search yielded 485 articles; the search of NYTimes.com yielded
319. After accounting for overlap between the LexisNexis and NYTimes.com search,
there were 559 entries in the database. Of these, 43 were excluded because they were
duplicates,3 349 were excluded because they were not primarily about mammograms, and

3

An entry was considered a duplicate only if it appeared twice within one of the two
searches (e.g., if the same article appeared twice in the LexisNexis search, one of the
entries was coded as a duplicate and excluded from the database). An article appearing
only once in both the LexisNexis search and the NYTimes.com search would be coded as
an overlapping article, not a duplicate.
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96 were excluded because they were not news articles, opinion/editorial articles, magazine articles, or blog posts. The remaining 71 unique articles were included in the
analysis. Article source and type by inclusion status are presented in Table 2.1. The full
list of articles included is available in Appendix B.

Table 2.1
Article Source and Type by Inclusion Status
Included,

Excluded,

n = 71

n = 488

Found through LexisNexis search only, n

2

238

Found in both LexisNexis and NYTimes.com search, n

49

196

Found in NYTimes.com search only, n

20

54

News article, n (%)

37 (52)

221 (45)

Opinion/editorial, n (%)

7 (10)

44 (9)

Magazine article, n (%)

2 (3)

6 (1)

25 (35)

113 (23)

Letter/reaction, n (%)

0 (0)

48 (10)

Other, n (%)

0 (0)

56 (11)

Article type:

Blog post, n (%)

Note. Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
Article Characteristics and Content
Article characteristics and content are reported in Table 2.2. Over a third of the
articles on mammography over the five year period were published in November and
December of 2009, following the announcement of the updated USPSTF
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recommendations. A majority of the articles included in the analysis (54%) mentioned
the 2009 USPSTF guidelines. Relevant stakeholders mentioned in the articles varied,
with the most commonly mentioned being the USPSTF (mentioned in 56% of articles),
followed by the American Cancer Society (mentioned in 41% of articles). Roughly onequarter of articles (27%) included at least one breast cancer exemplar, and the same
number included a mammography exemplar (15 articles, or 21%, included both breast
cancer and mammography exemplars). Of those that included a mammography
exemplar, mammogram-detected cancer exemplars were most prevalent (42%), followed
by an equal prevalence of exemplars with cancer detected without a mammogram and
normal mammograms (32% each). A majority (54%) of the articles were judged as being
neutral or balanced toward mammography. Of the 71 articles, 32 allowed reader
comments, and the mean number of comments was 183 (SD = 206).

Table 2.2
Characteristics and Content of Articles Included in Analysis
Article characteristic

n (%)

Date of publication:
November – December 2009

25 (35.2)

January – December 2010

9 (12.7)

January – December 2011

6 (8.5)

January – December 2012

8 (11.3)

January – December 2013

6 (8.5)
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January – December 2014

17 (23.9)

Article content:
Mention 2009 USPSTF guidelines

38 (54)

Mention Susan G. Komen for the Cure

8 (11)

Mention American Cancer Society

29 (41)

Mention National Cancer Institute

11 (15)

Mention USPSTF

40 (56)

Mention American College of Radiology

10 (14)

Includes breast cancer exemplar
Includes exemplar who chose to delay or not have

19 (26.8)
4 (5.6)

mammogram
Includes mammography exemplar

19 (26.8)

Mammography exemplar type:a
Mammogram-detected cancer exemplar

8 (42.1)

False-positive mammogram result exemplar

4 (21.1)

Exemplar with lump or breast cancer detected

6 (31.6)

through means other than
mammography
Exemplar with normal mammogram

6 (31.6)

Article valence with regard to mammography:
Enthusiastic toward mammography

13 (18)

Balanced/neutral

38 (54)
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Cautious toward mammography

20 (28)

Note. N = 71. USPSTF is the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force.
a

Some articles with mammography exemplars did not specify the outcome of the

mammogram and articles could include more than one type of exemplar, thus specific
exemplar types do not add to 19, but percentages are calculated out of 19.

Comment Collection and Inclusion
When an article was included in the analysis and the online version had
comments, all of that article’s comments were collected. The total number of comments
for all articles was 5,858. Of the 5,858 comments in the full database, 145 were
classified as “NYT picks.” Of those for which the number of “recommends” was
available (n = 5,281), the mean number of recommends was 12.1 (SD = 28.5). The mean
length of comments was 99.7 words (SD = 84.9). A random sample of 20% of comments
(n = 1,185), stratified by article, was drawn for detailed analysis. When an article had
fewer than five comments, one comment was randomly selected. Of the 1,185 comments
drawn, 678 were judged as being related to mammography and included for detailed
analysis.
Comment Characteristics and Content
Characteristics and content of comments included in the detailed analysis are
presented in Table 2.3. The overall valence of comments was almost evenly split across
the three categories of “enthusiastic toward mammography,” “balanced/neutral,” and
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“cautious toward mammography.” Roughly one-third of comments (208 or 30.8%)
included a mammography exemplar, and the frequency of types of exemplars is presented
in Table 2.3. Mammogram-detected cancer exemplars were the most common, followed
by exemplars with lumps or breast cancer detected through means other than a
mammogram, followed by false-positive exemplars. Exemplars reporting a history of
normal mammogram results were least common. Slightly more than half of the
comments coded did not include any exemplars (382 or 56.3%).

Table 2.3
Characteristics and Content of Comments Included in Analysis
Comment characteristic

Comments included in analysis (% of all comments)

n (%)

678a (57.2)

Comment valence with regard to mammography:
Enthusiastic toward mammography (% of included comments)

222 (32.8)

Balanced/neutral (% of included comments)

209 (30.9)

Cautious toward mammography (% of included comments)

246 (36.3)

Comment content:
Comments including breast cancer exemplar (% of included

192 (28.4)

comments)
Comments including exemplar who chose to delay or not have

63 (9.3)

mammogram (% of included comments)
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Comments including mammography exemplar (% of included

208 (30.8)

comments)
Mammography exemplar type:b
Comments with mammogram-detected cancer

86 (41.3)

exemplar (% of mammography exemplar
comments)
Comments with false-positive mammogram

39 (18.8)

result exemplar (% of mammography
exemplar comments)
Comments with exemplar with lump or breast

50 (24.0)

cancer detected through means other than
mammography (% of mammography
exemplar comments)
Comments with exemplars with normal

15 (7.2)

mammograms (% of mammography
exemplar comments)
Comments without exemplars (% of included comments)
Nonexemplar comments about false-positive

382 (56.3)
67 (17.5)

mammograms (% of comments without
exemplars)
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Nonexemplar comments about mammogram-detected

92 (24.1)

breast cancer (% of comments without
exemplars)
Note. a Out of a total sample of 1,185 comments. b Some comments with mammography
exemplars did not specify the outcome of the mammogram and comments could include
more than one type of exemplar, thus specific exemplar types do not add to 208.

Results from further analysis of the relationship between the presence of different
types of exemplars and comment valence are presented in Table 2.4. Comments that
include breast cancer exemplars are more enthusiastic toward mammography and less
neutral or cautious than comments that do not include breast cancer exemplars. The
relationship between valence and mammography exemplar appears to vary by the type of
exemplar present; comments with mammogram-detected cancer exemplars were more
enthusiastic toward mammography, while those with false-positive exemplars were more
cautious toward mammography.

Table 2.4
Exemplar Type by Comment Valence

Comment valence

Enthusiastic,

Neutral,

Cautious,

χ2
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Exemplar type

n (%)

n (%)

n (%)

Present

120 (62.5)

42 (21.9)

30 (15.6)

Not present

102 (21.1)

166 (34.4)

215 (44.5)

Present

100 (48.1)

39 (18.8)

69 (33.2)

Not present

121 (26.0)

169 (36.3)

176 (37.8)

Present

73 (84.9)

8 (9.3)

5 (5.8)

Not present

27 (21.6)

33 (26.4)

65 (52.0)

Present

7 (18.0)

5 (12.8)

27 (69.2)

Not present

93 (54.1)

36 (20.9)

43 (25.0)

Present

17 (34.0)

19 (38.0)

14 (28.0)

Not present

83 (51.6)

22 (13.7)

56 (34.8)

6 (40.0)

1 (6.7)

8 (53.3)

Any breast cancer exemplar:
110.1***

Any mammography exemplar:
36.6***

Mammogram-detected cancer:
83.5***

False-positive mammogram:
28.6***

Lump or breast cancer
detected without
mammography:
14.6**

Normal mammogram:
Present

3.5
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Not present

94 (48.0)

40 (20.4)

62 (31.6)

Note. **p < .01, ***p < .001.

Relationship between Article Exemplars and Comment Exemplars
Results from an analysis of the relationship between the presence of exemplars in
articles and exemplars in comments is presented in Table 2.5. Overall, the presence of
any exemplar in the article was associated with a significantly higher prevalence of
exemplars in the comments. This overall relationship varied, however, among different
types of exemplars. For example, there was no relationship between the presence of
breast cancer exemplars in the article and breast cancer exemplars in comments, but there
was a significant positive relationship between the presence of any mammogram
exemplar in the article and the presence of mammogram exemplars in comments. There
was also a marginally significant relationship between the presence of false positive
exemplars in the article and false positive exemplars in the article. For all significant or
marginally significant relationships, the pattern was the same: when articles included
exemplars, the comments on those articles were also more likely to include exemplars.

Table 2.5
Effect of Presence of Article Exemplars on Presence of Comment Exemplars
Article exemplar type
Comment exemplar type

Not Present, n (%)

Present, n (%)

OR (SE,
adjusted for
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clustering
by article)
Any exemplar
Any exemplar:
Not Present
Present

214 (63.1)
125 (36.9)

171 (50.4)
168 (49.6)

1.68 (0.38)*

Breast cancer exemplar
Breast cancer exemplar:
Not Present
Present

360 (71.1)
146 (28.9)

126 (73.3)
46 (26.7)

0.90 (0.20)

Exemplar who chooses not to have a
mammogram
Exemplar who chooses
not to have a
mammogram:
Not Present
Present

588 (92.6)
47 (7.4)

27 (62.8)
16 (37.2)

7.41
(1.40)*** a

Mammography exemplar
Mammography
exemplar:
Not Present
Present

258 (74.6)
88 (25.4)

212 (63.9)
120 (36.1)

1.66 (0.38)*

Mammogram-detected cancer
Mammogram-detected
cancer:
Not Present
Present

510 (87.3)
74 (12.7)

82 (87.2)
12 (12.8)

1.01 (0.29)

False-positive mammogram
False-positive
mammogram:
Not Present
Present

538 (95.2)
27 (4.8)

101 (89.4)
12 (10.6)

2.37 (1.05) †

Lump or breast cancer detected without
mammography
Lump or breast cancer
detected without
mammography:

529 (93.6)

99 (87.6)

2.1 (0.95)
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Not Present
Present

36 (6.4)

14 (12.4)

Normal mammogram
Normal mammogram:
Not Present
Present

574 (97.6)
14 (2.4)

89 (98.9)
1 (1.1)

0.46 (0.49)

Note. aStata warns that this standard error may be unreliable because of small numbers.
This estimate is based on only one article that included an exemplar who chose not to
have a mammogram.
†

p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Discussion
This chapter addresses Objective 1 of the dissertation, which is to describe the

prevalence, content, and representativeness of mammography exemplars in comments on
online news about mammography. This analysis provides insight into mammography
newspaper coverage from 2009 to 2014, mammography-related comments generated by
readers of online news, and the presence and characteristics of exemplars in reader
comments.
RQ1 pertained to the media environment surrounding mammography coverage
from 2009 to 2014. This analysis shows that the majority of the discussion of the 2009
USPSTF recommendations in The New York Times took place immediately following
their announcement, meaning that prior analyses (Squiers et al., 2011) using media
coverage from November 2009 through January 2010 are likely to have accurately
captured coverage of that particular event. Overall, mammography coverage waned in the
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years following 2009 but increased again in 2014 with the release of a new
mammography study, introduction of a new screening method (tomosynthesis or “3-D”
mammography), and increased attention to issues associated with breast density. Articles
typically mentioned important sources or stakeholders relevant to mammography, and
since a large portion of articles related to mammography in the study period were related
to the USPSTF recommendations, they were often a cited source of information. The
American Cancer Society and, less often, the American College of Radiology were
typically included as sources who opposed the change in guidelines. The National
Cancer Institute and Susan G. Komen for the Cure were only occasionally mentioned in
mammography articles.
The valence with regard to mammography across articles was mostly balanced
(54%), though there were slightly more articles that were more cautious toward
mammography than enthusiastic (28% vs. 18%). This differs from other analyses of
news controversy, such as coverage of the NIH mammography recommendations studied
by Schwartz and Woloshin (2002) and coverage of the 2009 USPSTF recommendations
studied by Squiers et al. (2011), which showed that media coverage tended to be more
favorable toward mammography or unsupportive of recommendations against
mammography. This difference is likely due to the vastly different nature of the present
content analysis as compared to prior analyses of short-term coverage of mammography
controversies, including differences in time frames and differences in sources. Because
of the limited nature of the content analysis of coverage presented here, the main
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emphasis should be on comments in response to the news coverage as opposed to the
coverage itself.
RQ2 and RQ3 dealt with the general nature of online reader commentary on
mammography news stories and the presence of exemplars. Of the comments included in
the analysis, almost a third included a breast cancer exemplar and a 31% included at least
one mammography exemplar.4 This is similar to the prevalence of mammography
exemplars found in Twitter comments analyzed by Lyles, Lόpez, Pasick, and Sarkar
(2013). Overall, the valence was almost evenly split among those who were more
enthusiastic, neutral, or cautious toward mammography. On closer examination, however,
it appears that valence varied widely across comments and was related to the presence
and type of exemplars included. Comments with breast cancer exemplars and
mammography exemplars were generally more enthusiastic about mammography than
those without, which may mean that those in favor of mammography used personal
stories of experiences with breast cancer to support their point while those who were
cautious about mammography were less likely to include personal examples. However,
further analysis of the relationship between valence and the presence of different types of
mammography exemplars provides a more nuanced understanding. When comment
authors included an exemplar in which a mammogram detected breast cancer, this was
more likely to occur in the context of a comment that was enthusiastic toward

4

There were 120 comments that included both a breast cancer exemplar and a
mammography exemplar, so while there is overlap, these categories do not represent the
exact same set of comments.
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mammography, but when the comment included an experience with a false-positive
mammogram result, the valence was much more likely to be cautious (negative).
Comments that included an exemplar whose breast lump or breast cancer was detected
without a mammogram were much more likely to be neutral toward mammography than
comments that included other types of exemplars.
RQ3 also asked how representative mammography exemplars in comments are of
actual mammography outcomes. Even using estimates of mammography outcomes for
women between the ages of 60 and 69, for whom mammograms are most effective and
result in the least amount of harm in the form of false positives and overdiagnosis, the
balance of mammography results represented in the comments is highly skewed.
Research estimates predict that, for 10,000 women 60 years of age who are screened
every year for 10 years, 438 (4.4%) will be diagnosed with invasive breast cancer or
ductal carcinoma in situ (including those diagnosed with and without mammography),
4970 (49.7%) will experience at least one false-positive result but no cancer, and the rest
will have mammograms with normal results (Pace & Keating, 2014). When these figures
are contrasted with the distribution of mammography exemplars presented in Table 2.3,
one can see that exemplars reporting mammogram-detected cancer and even exemplars
reporting breast cancer detected without a mammogram are vastly overrepresented
(45.6% and 24.0%, respectively), while exemplars that describe false-positive
mammogram results or a history of normal mammograms are drastically
underrepresented (17.5% and 7.6%, respectively). This finding raises concerns that an
overrepresentation of mammogram-detected cancers and an under-representation of false39

positive mammogram results in comments could lead to skewed risk perceptions and
mammography intentions in those exposed to these comments. Future research should
examine the effects of exemplar type and balance on comment readers.
Finally, this analysis also provides insight into the relationship between the
presence of exemplars in articles about mammography and exemplars in comments
appearing with those articles (RQ4). The data show that articles with mammography
exemplars are more likely to have comments that also have mammography exemplars.
Further, articles with false positive exemplars are more likely to have comments with
false positive exemplars, and articles with exemplars who chose not to have a
mammogram are more likely to have comments with exemplars who report choosing not
to have a mammogram. By looking specifically at the presence of exemplars and not the
overall frame of the article, this adds to research by Holton, Lee, and Coleman (2014),
who found that episodically framed health articles were not more likely to have
episodically framed comments, and by Suran, Holton, and Coleman (2014), who did not
find an association between an article being about cancer and the frame of the comments
(i.e., articles about cancer were not more or less likely to have episodic comments). One
possible explanation for the relationship between exemplars in the article and exemplars
in the comments is the need for readers to connect with others who have had a similar
experience as a way of affirming their own experience, particularly when they
experienced an underrepresented outcome (e.g., a false positive) or they have made a
decision that goes against norms (e.g., choosing not to have a mammogram).

Future

research should examine possible explanations for the association between
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mammography exemplars in articles and mammography exemplars in comments (and the
absence of this association for breast cancer exemplars), as one cannot rule out the
possibility of a third variable that explains the association.
Due to the limited purpose for which it was designed, this content analysis has
several characteristics that may restrict generalizability of the results to other sources,
populations, or health topics. First, the choice of The New York Times as the source for
articles and associated comments may limit the generalizability of findings to other
sources of online news and commentary. Despite its wide readership, the Times is not a
national newspaper and readers of The New York Times are more educated and more
liberal than readers of other news sources such as USA Today, local daily newspapers, or
television news (The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, 2012). This may
also mean that the comments generated vary in significant ways from comments that
would be produced by readers of other online news sources. The analysis is further
limited because it includes only newspapers and newspaper-associated blogs, which may
not be representative of the full range of information about mammography to which
people are exposed (such as through social media), and thus may not capture the full
media environment surrounding mammography over the past five years. Finally, because
this analysis focused specifically on mammography, the findings are not generalizable to
news coverage of other screening procedures or health topics. Because breast cancer
advocates are vocal supporters of mammograms (Murphy, 2010), the prevalence and type
of exemplars in comments on mammography news coverage may be different than they
would be for news coverage of other screening tests or health issues.
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Despite the limitations, this analysis provides important insights and materials
needed to develop further research in this area. Specifically, understanding the
prevalence, type, and lack of representativeness of mammography exemplars present in
comments is necessary for researchers interested in investigating the effects of these
comments on readers. Knowing that exemplars present in comments are not
representative of actual mammography outcomes may also have implications for news
organizations or others who allow comments on online content and have the power to
highlight certain comments (as The New York Times can by designating comments as
“NYT Picks.”) They may choose to consider the representativeness of a particular
exemplar before promoting it so as to improve the representativeness of exemplars,
which have been shown to have effects on risk perceptions.
Conclusions
In summary, this content analysis of news coverage of mammography in The New
York Times and its news blogs from 2009 to 2014 provides an overview of article and
comment valence and content, with a particularly detailed look at the presence, type, and
representativeness of exemplars in articles and comments. Across the five-year period
studied, the plurality of news articles published appeared in the months following the
release of the controversial 2009 USPSTF breast cancer screening recommendations.
The majority of news article were balanced or neutral toward mammography; of articles
that were not neutral, slightly more stories were critical of mammography than wholly
supportive. The valence of all comments toward mammography was also balanced
overall, with almost equal numbers being enthusiastic, neutral, and cautious toward
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mammography. However, results showed that valence varied significantly by exemplar
type: comments with mammogram-detected cancer exemplars were more favorable
toward mammography than comments with false-positive exemplars. Analyses also
showed that the composition of mammography exemplar types was not representative of
actual mammography outcomes, vastly overrepresenting mammogram-detected cancers
and underrepresenting false positives and normal mammograms. The data also showed a
positive relationship between the presence of exemplars in articles and the existence of
exemplars in comments on news articles.
This enhanced understanding of the type and distribution of comments appearing
in online news commentary has informed the design of my future research on the effects
of comments on readers. Specifically, comments collected from this analysis will serve
as stimuli for Study 2, which will examine the effect of comments with different types of
exemplars on readers’ mammography intentions and risk perceptions.
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CHAPTER 3
THE EFFECTS OF ONLINE NEWS COMMENTARY ON READERS
The change in mammography recommendations in 2009 by the U.S. Preventive
Services Task Force (USPSTF) triggered a wave of media coverage on mammography
screening (Squiers et al., 2011). Celebrity diagnoses, new studies on the risks and
benefits of mammography, a controversial decision by Susan G. Komen for the Cure to
cease funding Planned Parenthood, and revised breast cancer screening recommendations
from the American Cancer Society have kept mammography in the news over the last
five years (see Study 1). Though there is a wide body of research examining the effects
of online news on media consumers, the user-generated comments that often appear
alongside online news articles are a relatively recent addition to news media and, as a
result, are less well studied. The inclusion of user comments following news stories has
become standard practice for many online news sources (Weber, 2014), and an estimated
25% of Internet users have commented on an online news story (Purcell, Rainie,
Mitchell, Rosenstiel, & Olmstead, 2010). Of particular interest are the different types of
user-generated comments that may appear, particularly comments that include
exemplars—commenters describing their individual experiences. As shown in Study 1,
readers frequently share personal experiences related to the news topic in the comment
section of articles on mammography, and many of these exemplars had narrative
qualities. This phenomenon is not limited to news stories about mammography,
however. For example, Len-Rios, Bhandari, and Medvedeva (2014) found that 42% of
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comments on articles about breastfeeding included personal experiences, as well,
suggesting that this phenomenon may be widespread.
In the research proposed here, exemplars are broadly defined as “illustrative
individual cases,” following an early definition by Brosius and Bathelt (1994, p. 48), and
are thought to increase vividness and interest and be easily understood by message
recipients (Brosius & Bathelt). Some scholars make distinctions between exemplars and
anecdotes, narratives, and testimonials (e.g., Slater & Rouner, 1996), but other authors
have equated the four concepts (e.g., Braverman, 2008).5 Though equating exemplars,
anecdotal evidence, narratives, and testimonials is an oversimplification, thinking of them
as related message types allows communication scholars to draw on a wide body of
literature to make predictions about their effects. Despite the presence of a welldeveloped line of research on the effects of exemplars in news coverage (see Zillmann,
1999; Zillmann, 2002; Zillmann & Brosius, 2000), the effect of exemplars in user-

Exemplars have been defined as “illustrative individual cases” (Brosius & Bathelt,
1994, p. 48), “case descriptions,” “case presentations” (Zillmann, 1999, p. 70), or
example cases that share the characteristics of a wider group of events (Zillmann, 2002).
Anecdotes have been referred to as “examples,” as a type of evidence to be contrasted
with statistical evidence (Hoeken & Hustinx, 2009, p. 492), or as “brief narrative[s]”
(Slater & Rouner, 1996, p. 213). Narratives are perhaps the most well-studied of the four
concepts, but researchers realize there is not a universally accepted definition of a
narrative. Hinyard and Kreuter (2007) propose the following definition for use in the
study of narratives in the health communication context: “A narrative is any cohesive and
coherent story with an identifiable beginning, middle, and end that provides information
about scene, characters, and conflict; raises unanswered questions or unresolved conflict;
and provides resolution” (p. 778). Finally, testimonials are the most loosely defined of
the four concepts and are hard to distinguish from exemplars or narratives. According to
Braverman (2008), they “may include a personal story, a description of an individual
experience or a personal opinion” (p. 666).
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generated comments on readers is not well understood. Most research to date on the
effects of comments focuses on the effects of comment valence (e.g., Lee, 2012; Lee &
Jang, 2010), incivility (e.g., Anderson, Brossard, Scheufele, Xenos, & Ladwig, 2014), or
argument strength (e.g., Lee, 2014), while research on the effect of exemplars, narratives,
testimonials, or anecdotes is lacking. To my knowledge, only one unpublished study has
examined the effects of “story-oriented” news comments, finding that story-oriented
comments had a stronger effect on opinions about the health topic of the article than factoriented comments (Witteman, Fagerlin, Exe, & Zikmund-Fisher, 2013). Further
research is needed to understand what effects, if any, exemplars appearing in comments
on stories about mammography may have on their readers’ breast cancer risk perceptions
and mammography intentions. This research examines the effects of mammography
exemplars appearing in user-generated online news comments on young female readers’
breast cancer risk perceptions, positive mammogram and false positive risk perceptions,
and intentions to be screened for breast cancer. Findings will further understanding of
mechanisms underlying the persuasive effects of exemplars and narratives on cancerrelated risk perceptions and behavior, and they may have implications for news and
public health organizations that allow online comments.
Introduction and Literature Review
Effects of Media Coverage of Breast Cancer and Mammography
Prior research demonstrates that media coverage of breast cancer and
mammography can have powerful effects on audiences. These effects range from
cognitive effects such as increased knowledge and confusion (Squiers et al., 2011) to
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changes in behavior, including increased information seeking (Niederdeppe, Frosch, &
Hornik, 2008) and even increased screening (Yanovitzky & Blitz, 2000). Prior studies
include research on effects of general media coverage related to cancer as well as effects
of coverage of specific news events related to breast cancer and mammography,
including celebrity breast cancer cases and coverage of the 2009 USPSTF breast cancer
screening recommendations.
The effects of media coverage of breast cancer and mammography on cognitive
outcomes suggest that news coverage of a cancer-related topic influences public
knowledge of that issue. For example, using a content analysis of media coverage and
survey data, Stryker, Moriarty, and Jensen (2008) found that when cancer prevention
behaviors were covered heavily in the news, self-reported attention to news stories
predicted knowledge of these modifiable cancer risk factors. In addition to general
effects of cancer-related news coverage on cognitive outcomes, there is also limited
research on outcomes of media coverage of mammography. Squiers et al. (2011)
conducted a content analysis of news stories and social media posts and a web-based
survey following the release of the 2009 USPSTF breast cancer screening guidelines.
They found that women who reported paying more attention to the new recommendations
and those with higher levels of education were more likely to correctly identify the new
mammography guidelines. Despite some improvements in knowledge associated with
exposure to the guidelines, 40% of women ages 40-49 (the group most affected by the
change in recommendations) reported being confused by the guidelines. Stryker et al.
acknowledge that cancer-related information can sometimes be complex, and gaining
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understanding may require a basic level of scientific literacy on the part of the audience.
This may explain why, in some cases (e.g., Squiers et al., 2011), increased media
attention can increase confusion, even when it leads to increased knowledge for some
groups.
In addition to effects on cognitive outcomes such as knowledge and confusion,
media coverage of cancer, in general, and of the 2009 change in mammography
guidelines have been shown to have effects on information seeking. Through a content
analysis of cancer media coverage and use of data from the Health Information National
Trends Survey (HINTS), Niederdeppe, Frosch, and Hornik (2008) demonstrated that
increases in cancer news coverage are positively associated with cancer information
seeking. However, effects were moderated by attention to health news and family history
of cancer, suggesting that effects of cancer-related media coverage on behavior depend,
in part, on individual differences. Weeks, Friedenberg, Southwell, and Slater (2012)
provide evidence that the effects of media coverage may also depend on the nature of the
coverage. In an analysis of mammography coverage in 2008 and following the 2009
USPSTF recommendations, Weeks et al. demonstrated that television coverage of
mammograms predicted online searches for mammography information, and that this
relationship was particularly strong during coverage of the guidelines controversy in
2009.
Though information seeking is a demonstrated behavioral outcome of media
coverage of cancer and mammograms, it is perhaps more interesting to examine the
effects of media coverage on actual screening behavior. Jones, Denham, and Springston
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(2006) provide some evidence that there is an association between media consumed and
mammography behavior at the individual level. In a survey of middle-aged women, they
found a positive association between reported exposure to news magazine articles about
breast cancer and mammography behavior. Jones et al. did not, however, attempt to
control for other variables that could explain both the higher media exposure and the
mammography behavior other than the presence of a family member with breast cancer.
In contrast, Yanovitzky and Blitz (2000) used time series analysis of national survey data
in conjunction with a content analysis of mammography-related media coverage to
examine the relationship between media coverage and mammography behavior at the
population level. They found a significant relationship between prior month level of
national mammography media coverage and current month level of mammography
screening for women over the age of 40 during the study period, which provides evidence
for a causal order between media coverage and screening.
Finally, several cases have also demonstrated the powerful effects that media
coverage of celebrity breast cancer cases can have on breast cancer screening behaviors.
Early examples include the effects of media coverage following breast cancer diagnosis
announcements by former first ladies Betty Ford (Fink et al., 1978) and Nancy Reagan
(Lane, Polednak, & Burg, 1989) on breast cancer screening; both appeared to contribute
to increases in screening. In more recent years, an Australian study documented that
media coverage of singer Kylie Minogue’s breast cancer diagnosis was linked to
increases in mammography appointments made in the weeks following the news
coverage (Chapman, McLeod, Wakefield, & Holding, 2005). These effects were
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especially pronounced for young women (Minogue was only 36 years old when
diagnosed) and those who had never had a mammogram. Similarly, news coverage of
actress Angelina Jolie’s decision to have genetic testing for a BRCA1 mutation and
subsequent prophylactic double mastectomy was linked to a dramatic increase in requests
for breast cancer-related genetic testing (Evans et al., 2014). In addition to providing
evidence of the effects of news coverage of breast cancer-related topics on screening
behavior, these studies hint at the powerful effects of personal stories in the news on
news consumers.
General Effects of News Commentary
Though the research described above provides insight into the ways in which
news coverage of breast cancer and mammography related issues affect news consumers,
it does not provide a comprehensive understanding of the effects of news. Online news
stories are often presented together with user-generated comments (Lee, 2012; Weber,
2014), which have been shown to modify the effects of news article on readers. The
body of research outlined below attempts to explain the effects of varying comment
characteristics, such as valence and civility, on individuals’ attitudes, perceptions of
public opinion and social norms, and perceptions of risk.
First, comments on online news articles have been shown to have effects on
readers’ attitudes and positive and negative thoughts about the topic in the news article.
In an online experiment, Lee (2014) tested the effects of argument strength (strong vs.
weak) on attitude toward the subject of the news article (graduation qualification exams)
and positive and negative thoughts about the topic provided in a thought-listing exercise.
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Lee found that comments with strong arguments were likely to produce more positive
thoughts and marginally more favorable attitudes than comments with weak arguments,
and weak arguments in the comments led to more negative thoughts reported. Hsueh,
Yogeeswaran, and Malinen (2015) also examined the effect of comments on attitudes
using an online experiment that manipulated whether comments on an article about
scholarships for Asian students were prejudiced or unprejudiced toward Asian students.
They found that participants in the prejudiced comment condition had less positive
attitudes toward Asians than participants in the unprejudiced comments condition across
multiple measures of attitude. These changes in attitude also appeared to translate into
subtle changes in behavior—participants had a chance to leave their own comments, and
those who had been exposed to prejudiced comments left comments that were judged to
be more prejudiced than were comments left by participants in the unprejudiced
condition.
Though Hsueh et al. (2015) did not measure perceived norms, they argue that
comments can be used to convey a social norm, which then influences attitudes and
behavior. Indeed, further research on the effects of user-generated comments responding
to online news articles has demonstrated that comments affect perceived norms and
perceptions of the opinion climate surrounding a particular topic. In an online
experiment, Lee and Jang (2010) found that the presence of user-generated comments
following an online news story had a significant effect on participants’ perceptions of
public opinion about the two issues addressed in the news articles (animal testing and
regulation of television content). Perhaps unsurprisingly, participants who read
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comments discrepant with the slant of the news article perceived public opinion to be
more discrepant with the tone of the article than did participants who saw no usergenerated comments following the story. This effect was especially pronounced for
participants high in need for cognition (NFC), who may have attended to the comments
more carefully than those with lower NFC, suggesting NFC as a potential moderator of
the effect of comments on readers. Similarly, Lee (2012) conducted an online
experiment in which participants read a news article with comments that were either
congruent or incongruent with their opinion, which was measured before the experiment.
Again, readers used comments to gauge public opinion on the issue; participants who
read comments that were consistent with their opinion saw the public as being on their
side, while those who saw comments that were inconsistent with their opinion perceived
the public to be on the opposite side of the debate. Perhaps more interestingly, comments
enhanced perceptions of media bias for some participants. For participants with a high
level of ego involvement, comments congenial with their opinion made the actual news
story appear more congenial, while comments hostile to their position led to perceptions
that the news story was biased against their position.
In addition to effects of comments on attitudes and perception of public opinion,
at least one study has shown that user-generated comments on news articles can affect
risk perceptions. Anderson et al. (2014) conducted an online experiment in which they
manipulated the civility of comments on an online news blog post about nanotechnology.
Because incivility in comments has been linked to negative affect and negative attitudes,
Anderson et al. expected that incivility would also be associated with increased risk
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perceptions. While this main effect was not present, findings revealed an interaction
between civility of comments and pre-existing levels of support for nanotechnology. For
those who had low levels of support for nanotechnology prior to the experiment, uncivil
comments led to higher risk perceptions of nanotechnology than for those who had high
pre-existing levels of support and also saw uncivil comments. Though this study
examines comments on science news, findings may translate to the health news domain.
Each of the studies mentioned above provides evidence that comments affect
readers, but prior research is limited in the outcomes and comment characteristics
examined. Particularly, research on behavioral outcomes and risk perceptions is rare,
with Hsueh et al. (2015) being one of the only to examine behavioral outcomes and
Anderson et al. (2014) being one of the few to examine risk perceptions. Further, the
comment characteristics examined are mostly limited to valence and civility. Despite the
fact that much is known about the persuasive effects of narratives and exemplars in the
domain of health communication (see Green, 2006, and Zillmann, 2006, respectively),
prior studies on the effects of narratives or exemplars in online news article comments are
almost nonexistent. As mentioned previously, only one study has examined the effects of
story-oriented online news comments on readers (Witteman, Fagerlin, Exe, & ZikmundFisher, 2013), and this study remains unpublished. Witteman et al. performed an online
experiment that presented a news article on the topic of home birth, followed by either no
comments or comments that varied according to a 2 (comment valence: positive vs.
negative) x 2 (comment type: fact-oriented vs. story-oriented) between-subjects factorial
design. They measured opinion toward home birth and likelihood of planning a home
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birth and recommending it to others. Valence of comments affected opinion in the
expected direction; more favorable comments led to more positive opinions. Witteman et
al. demonstrated that this effect was moderated by the presence of narrativity, such that
narrative comments enhanced the effects of valence. Though these studies provide some
insights, further research is needed to determine the effect of user-generated comments
that include exemplars on readers’ risk perceptions and behaviors, especially when
comments deal with controversial health topics and could have an influence on
consequential health behaviors such as breast cancer screening.
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
Effect of Exemplars on Behavioral Intentions
The literature in this area provides reason to believe that individual experiences
shared in comments on news articles can have an effect on behavioral intentions. First, I
proposed that different types of exemplars would affect behavioral intentions
differentially, essentially pushing intentions in different directions, due to different
valence. The predicted effects of valence are straightforward: the majority of comments
that include an exemplar in which the mammogram detects cancer (hereafter referred to
as “mammogram-detected cancer exemplars”) are pro-mammogram and are expected to
have a positive effect on mammography intentions, while the majority of comments that
include false-positive exemplars are more cautious toward mammograms and are
expected to have negative effects on mammography intentions. This is summarized in the
following hypotheses:
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H1a: Comments with mammogram-detected cancer exemplars, when
compared to comments with false-positive exemplars, will lead to increased
intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years
H1b: Comments with mammogram-detected cancer exemplars, when
compared to comments with false-positive exemplars, will lead to decreased
intentions to wait until age 50 to begin screening.
However, I also predicted that comments with exemplars would lead to greater
changes in intentions than comments without exemplars. In the case of Witteman et al.
(2013), part of the effect of comments on outcomes was driven by valence, but the effects
of valence were made stronger by the presence of narrativity. In addition to the work by
Witteman et al., a large body of research suggests that narrative information can have a
greater effect on behavioral intentions than can non-narrative information. For example,
a meta-analysis by Zebregs, van den Putte, Neijens, and de Graaf (2015) suggests that
narrative evidence has a stronger influence on behavioral intentions than statistical
evidence. Based on this research, I proposed that comments that included mammography
exemplars would lead to greater changes in mammography intention than comments
without exemplars—regardless of the direction of the change—such that the following
would be true:
H2a: Comments with mammogram-detected cancer exemplars will lead to
higher intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years and lower
intentions to wait until age 50 when compared to mammogram-detected
cancer comments without exemplars.
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H2b: Comments with false-positive exemplars will lead to lower intentions to
have a mammogram in the next two years and higher intentions to wait until
age 50 when compared to false-positive comments without exemplars.
A synthesis of how exemplars can be used to promote health outlines some of the
mechanisms of action through which exemplars may have effects on health behaviors
(Zillmann, 2006). Mechanisms through which exemplars and narratives may affect
health behaviors and predictors of health behaviors include the following: creating
transportation into a text, which has been shown to increase behavioral intentions and
may also lead to attitude change through decreased counter-arguing; shifting perceived
norms; and providing models for behavior change, which has been shown to increase
self-efficacy for behavior change. The Integrative Model (Fishbein, 2000; Fishbein &
Ajzen, 2010) proposes that attitudes, perceived norms, and self-efficacy are direct
predictors of behavioral intention, providing multiple pathways through which comments
with mammography exemplars may have an effect on mammography intentions.
Green (2006) offers multiple theoretical mechanisms through which transporting
narratives may be particularly persuasive in a cancer-related communication context,
including through effects on attitudes, norms, and self-efficacy. Given the many possible
pathways of effect, one would expect that greater transportation would lead to greater
changes in behavior intentions. In fact, Kim, Bigman, Leader, Lerman, and Cappella
(2012) found this to be the case. In an online experiment, the presence of exemplars in
news stories increased reader engagement (a combination of narrative transportation,
perceived similarity, and empathy). They found that engagement mediated the
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relationship between the presence of exemplars and intentions to quit smoking, such that
increased engagement led to greater increases in behavioral intentions. I expect the same
to be true of exemplars present in user-generated comments:
H3: Effects of comments with mammography exemplars (compared to
comments that are of the same valence and topic but lack exemplars) on
mammography intentions will be mediated by narrative transportation.
Additionally, Green (2006) describes two primary ways in which narratives may
affect attitudes: through changes in affectively-based attitudes and in cognitively-based
attitudes. In the particular case of “mammogram-detected cancer exemplars.” these
mammography narratives may result in affective shifts that create positive attitudes
toward mammography (e.g., relief that an exemplar’s cancer was caught early may
translate to increases in the perceived utility of mammograms and a desire to obtain one
for peace of mind). Additionally, because narratives have been shown to decrease
counter-arguing, mammogram-detected cancer exemplars may also change cognitivelybased attitudes about mammography by decreasing counter-arguing about the possibility
of experiencing risks associated with mammography. Similarly, I expected that falsepositive exemplars would increase negative affect toward mammograms by highlighting
the anxiety and suffering of exemplars who experienced unnecessary additional testing
and lead to more negative affectively-based attitudes toward mammograms. Falsepositive exemplars may also decrease counter-arguing about the benefits of
mammography, resulting in more negative cognitively-based attitudes toward
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mammography. Based on expected effects on intentions through attitudes, I proposed the
following:
H4: The effects of comments with exemplars (compared to comments that
are of the same valence and topic but lack exemplars) on mammography
intentions will be mediated by attitudes toward mammography.
Another possible mechanism through which exemplars in comments may affect
behavioral intentions is through comments’ effects on perceived social norms.
Individuals are motivated to observe norms (in this case, through reading about others’
experiences) so that they can hold accurate beliefs and gain social acceptance (Cialdini &
Goldstein, 2004). Hinyard and Kreuter (2007) propose that shared personal experience
narratives can shape perceived social norms related to a health behavior and that this is
particularly true when message recipients identify with the person sharing the personal
story. Further, in the domain of user-generated comments research, comments have been
hypothesized to establish social norms that influence the attitudes and behaviors of
comment readers (Hsueh, Yogeeswaran, & Malinen, 2015). Taken together, this suggests
that comments in which authors share personal mammography experiences will influence
readers’ perceived social norms related to mammography screening behavior as follows:
H5: Effects of comments with mammography exemplars (compared to
comments that are of the same valence and topic but lack exemplars) on
mammography intentions will be mediated by perceived mammography
norms.
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Finally, comments with exemplars may change behavioral intentions by providing
models for behavior change. Green (2006) explains that characters in narratives can
model the “costs and benefits of different courses of action” (p. S166), providing the
reader with vicarious experience. According to Social Cognitive Theory (Bandura, 1977;
Bandura, 1986), vicarious experience obtained by observing others can increase selfefficacy for a particular behavior. This suggests that comments containing
mammography exemplars, and thus models of women who have obtained mammograms,
can increase self-efficacy to obtain a mammogram and mammography intentions:
H6: Effects of comments with mammogram-detected cancer exemplars
(compared to comments that are of the same valence and topic but lack
exemplars) on mammography intentions will be mediated by self-efficacy to
obtain a mammogram.
Effect of Exemplars on Risk Perceptions
Exemplars in comments on mammography news articles may also have effects on
risk perceptions. Zillmann (2006) discusses two heuristics that explain why exemplars
may shape beliefs about perceived health risks: the quantification heuristic and the
availability heuristic. The quantification heuristic predicts that readers who encounter
exemplars will use the distribution of exemplar outcomes to estimate the actual
distribution of that outcome in the population. This heuristic suggests that readers who
see multiple mammogram-detected cancer exemplars will believe that this outcome is
more likely than a false-positive outcome, and that the reverse would also be true.
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1982) availability heuristic predicts that people will make
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judgments based on the exemplars that are most salient at the time of the judgment.
Therefore, frequent and recent exposure to exemplars with a mammogram-detected
cancer or false positive may heighten a reader’s perceived risk for that outcome by
influencing the ease with which readers can retrieve examples of women who have
experienced these mammography outcomes. Given the mechanisms outlined by
Zillmann, I predicted that the presence of exemplars in comments would increase
perceived risk for breast cancer, positive mammograms, and false-positive mammogram
results in the following ways:
H7a: The presence of comments with mammogram-detected cancer
exemplars will be associated with increased perceived breast cancer risk
when compared to the presence of mammogram-detected cancer comments
without exemplars (i.e., nonexemplar comments of the same valence and
topic).
H7b: The presence of comments with mammogram-detected cancer
exemplars will be associated with increased perceived risk of a positive
mammogram when compared to the presence of mammogram-detected
cancer comments without exemplars (i.e., nonexemplar comments of the
same valence and topic).
H7c: The presence of comments with false-positive exemplars will increase
perceived risk of experiencing a false-positive when compared to the
presence of false-positive comments without exemplars (i.e. nonexemplar
comments of the same valence and topic).
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In addition to working via the heuristics mentioned above, comments with
exemplars may also shape risk perceptions through their effects on affect—negative
affect, in particular. As discussed earlier in this chapter, most exemplar comments can be
considered narratives or testimonials, and one of the recognized advantages of using
narratives for cancer communication is the ability of narratives to evoke emotion (Green,
2006). Indeed, breast cancer narratives have been shown to bring about more emotion,
both negative and positive, than non-narrative information (McQueen & Kreuter, 2010).
Research has also shown a relationship between negative affect and risk. For example,
Johnson and Tversky (1983) proposed that bad moods induced by having participants
read brief newspaper stories increased general risk perceptions. In the cancer domain,
worry has been linked to breast cancer risk perceptions (Lipkus et al., 2000).
Dunlop, Wakefield, and Kashima (2008) outline a theory of the effect of
narratives on risk through the mechanism of negative emotion. In particular, Dunlop et
al. argue that testimonial messages arouse negative self-referent emotions, which are
particularly effective in changing perceptions of personal susceptibility to a disease. A
study in the breast cancer realm provides further support for negative affect as a
mediator; McQueen, Kreuter, Kalesan, and Alcaraz (2011) demonstrate that the effect of
breast cancer survivor stories on increased risk perceptions was mediated by negative
affect. Based on the expected role of negative affect as a mediator of the relationship
between exemplars and risk perception, I propose the following hypotheses:
H8a: The effects of mammogram-detected breast cancer exemplars
(compared to comments that are of the same valence and topic but lack
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exemplars) on perceived risk of breast cancer will be mediated by changes in
negative affect.
H8b: The effects of mammogram-detected breast cancer exemplars
(compared to comments that are of the same valence and topic but lack
exemplars) on perceived risk of having a positive mammogram will be
mediated by changes in negative affect.
H8c: The effects of false-positive mammogram exemplars (compared to
comments that are of the same valence and topic but lack exemplars) on
perceived risk of having a false-positive mammogram will be mediated by
changes in negative affect.
Exemplars, Risk Perceptions, and Intentions
In addition to viewing risk perception as an outcome affected by exemplars, I
wanted to examine it as a potential mediator of the effect of exemplars on mammography
intentions. As outlined above, compared to comments without exemplars, comments
with exemplars are expected to increase perceived risk of breast cancer, positive
mammograms, and false-positive mammograms, depending on the type of exemplar
presented. These changes in perceived risk are then expected to alter mammography
intentions.
Some theories of behavior change or behavioral prediction acknowledge the role
of perceived risk in predicting health behaviors. The Health Belief Model (Becker, 1974;
Rosenstock, 1974) includes perceived susceptibility and perceived severity as essential
components preceding desirable health behaviors. The Reasoned Action Model (Fishbein
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& Ajzen, 2010) proposes that risk perception is a more distal predictor of behavior,
having its effect on intention through effects on attitudes, norms, and perceived
behavioral control. Additional research demonstrates the link between risk perception
and health behavior in a number of contexts, including vaccination (Brewer et al., 2007)
and mammography (Katapodi, Lee, Facione, & Dodd, 2004).
To the author’s knowledge, there are no studies demonstrating that an effect of
narratives or exemplars on mammography is mediated by risk perceptions, but there are
several instances in the literature in which risk perceptions have been found to mediate
the relationship between the presence of exemplars and other behavioral intentions. Prior
research shows that narratives about adverse vaccine events led to increased perceived
risk of experiencing an adverse event (Betsch, Ulshofer, Renkewitz, & Betsch, 2011),
which then led to decreased vaccination intentions. Similarly, when compared to
statistical evidence, the use of personal testimonials increased perceived risk of
contracting the hepatitis B virus and intentions to get vaccinated, and the effect of
testimonials on intention was mediated by risk perceptions (de Wit, Das, & Vet, 2008).
Thus, in addition to the mediators of the exemplar–intention relationship I proposed in
Hypotheses 3 through 6, I also predicted the following:
H9: The effects of exemplars (compared to comments that are of the same
valence and topic but lack exemplars) on mammography intentions will be
mediated by risk perceptions.
These hypotheses outline the ways in which mammography exemplars found in
user-generated comments on online news articles were expected to have effects on both
63

mammography intentions and risk perceptions related to breast cancer and
mammography. This research tested these effects and proposed mechanisms by using an
experimental design that manipulated the presence and type of exemplars in usergenerated comments and measured changes in the outcome variables and proposed
mediators.
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CHAPTER 4
THE EFFECTS OF MAMMOGRAPHY EXEMPLARS IN ONLINE NEWS
COMMENTARY ON BREAST CANCER RISK PERCEPTIONS AND SCREENING
INTENTIONS: METHODOLOGY
Study 2 consisted of an experiment examining the effects of different types of
comments on intentions, risk perceptions, and potential mediators. The following section
outlines the experimental methodology.
Experimental Methodology
The main experiment assessed the effect of comments with exemplars,
specifically false-positive mammogram exemplars and mammogram-detected cancer
exemplars, on mammography intentions, breast cancer risk perceptions, positive
mammogram risk perceptions, and false-positive mammogram risk perceptions. Because
Study 1 demonstrated that a large majority of comments with false-positive exemplars
were cautious toward mammography, only false-positive exemplars with this valence
were tested. Similarly, because comments with mammogram-detected cancer exemplars
were almost exclusively enthusiastic toward mammography, only mammogram-detected
cancer exemplars of this valence were included in Study 2.
Participants
This research received approval from the Institutional Review Board at the
University of Pennsylvania. I purchased from Survey Sampling International (SSI)
access to a sample of women in the United States between the ages of 38 and 48 (N =
1,108). Potential participants received an email invitation from SSI with a link to the
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online study and received compensation from SSI for their time. SSI compensates
participants with points that can be redeemed for cash or other rewards.
Participant characteristics by condition are presented in Table 4.1. The average
age of participants was 42.8 years. Participants were more well-educated than the
general population when compared to U.S. Census estimates of people 35 to 54 years old
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2014a): 38.6% of participants had at least some college or technical
school education (compared to 27.2% of the general population), and 39.8% had a
college degree or higher educational attainment (compared to 33.9% of the general
population). The sample was ethnically and racially diverse and similar to the ethnic and
racial composition of U.S. women ages 38 to 48, with 7.4% of women identifying
themselves as being of Hispanic, Latina, or Spanish origin (vs. 12.3% in the U.S.
population); 85.6% identifying at White (vs. 81.1%); 10.0% identifying as Black or
African American (vs. 12.5%); 2.9% identifying as American Indian or Alaska Native
(vs. 1.6%); 3.1% identifying as Asian (vs. 5.9%); and 1.0% identifying as Native
Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander (vs. 0.3%; population figures derived from U.S.
Census Bureau, 2014b). Roughly 15% of participants reported a family history of breast
cancer, and 64% reported having had a prior mammogram. Chi-square analyses did not
show significant differences across condition for any of these characteristics.
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Table 4.1
Participant Characteristics

NoInfo
n
Participant age,
M (SD)
Education, %:
Less than
high school
High school
graduate or
GED
Some
college or
technical
school
College
graduate or
beyond
Ethnicity:
Hispanic,
Latino/a,
Spanish
origin, %
Race, %: a

156
43.0 (3.3)

No
FPNoEx
Comm
140
160
42.9 (3.1) 42.6
(3.4)

Condition
BCNoEx FPEx

BCEx

116
42.6
(3.1)

133
42.8
(2.9)

143
43.0 (3.2)

FPEx
Rem
128
42.8
(3.0)

BCExRem

Total

132
42.6 (3.1)

1,108
42.8
(3.1)

3.2

2.9

1.3

2.6

0.8

2.8

2.3

2.3

2.3

21.8

20.0

16.9

24.1

21.8

14.0

16.4

20.5

19.3

35.9

37.9

37.5

30.2

39.1

47.6

42.2

37.9

38.6

39.1

39.3

44.4

43.1

38.4

35.7

39.1

39.4

39.8

5.8

3.6

10.0

8.6

7.5

7.0

9.4

7.6

7.4
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White
Black or
African
American
American
Indian or
Alaska
Native
Asian
Native
Hawaiian or
Other
Pacific
Islander
Family history
of breast cancer,
%
Have had at
least one
mammogram,
%
Comment
reading time ≥
half the median
Used mobile
device to
respond to
survey

82.7
14.7

87.9
10.0

86.3
11.3

81.0
12.9

89.5
6.0

87.4
9.1

87.5
6.3

81.8
9.1

85.6
10.0

4.5

3.6

1.9

2.6

1.5

3.5

2.3

3.0

2.9

0.0
1.3

2.1
1.4

2.5
0.0

4.3
0.0

3.0
0.8

3.5
0.0

4.7
3.1

5.3
1.5

3.1
1.0

13.5

10.8

17.5

16,4

15.8

12.6

15.6

16.7

14.8

64.7

59.0

68.1

67.2

65.4

66.4

64.8

59.1

64.4

N/A

N/A

63.1

59.5

62.4

67.1

62.5

63.4

63.2

52.6

58.6

52.5

43.1

57.9

52.5

56.3

53.0

53.4
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Note. N = 1,108. Conditions are as follows: NoInfo = no information control, NoComm = no comments control, FPNoEx =
false-positive comments without exemplars, BCNoEx = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with no exemplars,
FPEx = false-positive comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with exemplars,
FPExRem = false positive comments with exemplars removed, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected breast cancer
comments with exemplars removed. Drop-out rates did not vary by condition, and chi-square tests showed no significant
difference across conditions for any of these participant characteristics.
a

Participants were allowed to choose multiple races, so percentages may not add to 100.
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Sample power
Because communication interventions typically lead to small effects (Snyder &
Hamilton, 2002), this study was powered to detect small- to medium-sized differences
between conditions. According to Cohen (1992), a standardized mean difference of .20 is
considered a small effect size, and .50 is considered a medium effect size. Power
calculations showed that a sample size of 130 participants per condition would provide
80% power to detect a standardized mean difference of .35.
Measures
The full questionnaire is available in Appendix C. Participants were first asked
their sex, age, personal breast cancer history, and whether they had tested positive for a
BRCA1 or BRCA2 genetic mutation to determine eligibility. Only women between the
ages of 38 and 48 who had no history of breast cancer and no known genetic mutation
(and thus an average risk of breast cancer) were allowed to continue. Eligible
participants then answered items regarding family breast cancer history and
mammography history before being assigned to experimental condition. The post-test
consisted of measures of the primary dependent variables (mammography intentions and
risk perceptions), proposed mediators of the relationship between exposure to
mammography exemplars and the dependent variables, demographic variables, and
variables needed to calculate objective breast cancer risk using the Gail model (Gail &
Costantino, 2001).
Mammography intentions. Mammography intentions were measured using two
items: “I intend to have a mammogram in the next two years,” and “I intend to wait until
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age 50 to have a mammogram.” Participants rated their level of agreement on a sevenpoint scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The distribution of
intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years was left-skewed (skewness = 1.13) and slightly peaked (kurtosis = 3.05). The distribution of intentions to wait until
age 50 to have a mammogram was right-skewed (skewness = 1.18) and slightly peaked
(kurtosis = 3.34). These two intention measures were negatively correlated (r = -.47, p <
.001).
Perceived risk of breast cancer. The survey measured perceived breast cancer
risk in four different ways using modified versions of measures reported by Schapira,
Davids, McAuliffe, and Nattinger (2004): five-year risk as a frequency, lifetime risk as a
frequency, five-year risk as a percentage, and lifetime risk as a percentage. Schapira et
al. demonstrated that risk perceptions varied when measured in different ways, so using
these four measures allowed me to examine how the effect of exemplars may
differentially affect types of risk perceptions. Five-year risk as a frequency was
measured using the following item: “Picture yourself in a room with 99 other women
exactly like you. How many of you will get breast cancer in the next five years? Please
pick any number between 0 and 100.” The measure of lifetime risk as a frequency posed
the same question, but asked participants “How many of you will get breast cancer in
your lifetime?” Five-year breast cancer risk as a percentage was measured using the
following item: “What do you think your personal risk or chance is of getting breast
cancer in the next five years? Please answer on a scale of 0% to 100%. For example, 0%
means ‘no risk or chance of getting breast cancer’ and 100% means ‘completely certain
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to get breast cancer.’” Lifetimes risk as a percentage was measured in a similar way,
substituting the phrase “in your lifetime” for “in the next five years.” All four measures
of breast cancer risk were right-skewed (skewness ranged from 0.59 to 1.15) and slightly
kurtotic (kurtosis ranged from 2.78 to 3.70). Correlations among measures of perceived
risk of having breast cancer are reported in Table 4.2. Perceptions vary widely based on
how risk is measured (Schapira, Davids, McAuliffe, and Nattinger, 2004; Gurmankin
Levy, Shea, Williams, Quistberg, & Armstrong, 2006), so these four measures were not
combined into a scale but rather used individually as dependent variables. Using these
measures individually is consistent with how similar measures are used in the breast
cancer literature (e.g., Gibbons & Groarke, 2015).6

Table 4.2
Correlations among Measures of Breast Cancer Risk

Five-year risk,
frequency
Lifetime risk,
frequency
Five-year risk,
percentage
Lifetime risk,
percentage
***p<.001

6

Five-year risk,
frequency
1.00

Lifetime risk,
frequency

Five-year risk,
percentage

0.74***

1.00

0.57***

0.56***

1.00

0.50***

0.57***

0.86***

Lifetime risk,
percentage

1.00

Results presented in Chapter 6 demonstrate that the conclusions drawn from this data do
not change, even if measures are combined into a scale (see footnote 13).
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Perceived risk of positive mammogram. I also adapted the items from Schapira
et al. (2004) to measure perceived risk of having a mammogram-detected breast cancer
and risk of having a false-positive mammogram result as a frequency and as a percentage.
To measure the risk of having a positive mammogram, participants were asked to
“Picture yourself in a room with 99 other women exactly like you. If you all had a
mammogram today, how many of you would have a mammogram that finds cancer?”
Answers were recorded on a sliding scale that ranged from 0 to 100. They were then
asked, “If you had a mammogram today, what do you think your personal risk or chance
is of having a mammogram that finds cancer?” The sliding scale ranged from 0% to
100%, where 0% meant no risk or chance of having a mammogram that finds cancer and
100% meant completely certain to have a mammogram that finds cancer. These two
measures were significantly correlated (r = .70, p < .001).
Perceived risk of having a false-positive mammogram result. Before
answering items regarding the risk of having a false-positive mammogram result,
participants first read the definition of a false-positive: “A ‘false positive’ happens when
a woman has a mammogram that leads to more screening, tests, or biopsies but then finds
out she does not have breast cancer.” Following the structure of risk items developed by
Schapira et al. (2004), participants were asked to “Picture yourself in a room with 99
women exactly like you. If all of you have a mammogram in the next two years, how
many of you will have a false positive (the need for extra testing that later shows you
don’t have cancer)?” Answers were recorded on a sliding scale from 0 to 100. The
percentage item read “If you have a mammogram in the next two years, what do you
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think your personal risk or chance is of having a false positive (the need for extra testing
that later shows you don’t have cancer)?” Participants were instructed to answer on a
scale from 0% to 100% where 0% means no risk or chance of having a false positive and
100% means completely certain to have a false positive. These two measures were
significantly correlated (r = .78, p < .001).
Narrative transportation. Proposed mediators of the effect of exemplars on
intention included transportation, perceived mammography norms, self-efficacy to obtain
a mammogram, and attitudes toward mammography. Narrative transportation was
measured using a subset of the original transportation scale developed by Green and
Brock (2000), adapted for this experimental context and, in one case, to remove the need
for reverse-coding. These items included “I was mentally involved in the comments
while reading them,” “The comments affected me emotionally,” “The comments are
relevant to my everyday life,” and “After finishing the comments, I found it hard to put
them out of my mind.” These four items capture major dimensions of cognitive attention
and emotional involvement and were scored on a seven point scale from 1 (not at all) to 7
(very much). The original 15-item scale had a Cronbach’s alpha of .76. Subsets of items
have been used successfully by Kim, Bigman, Leader, Lerman, and Cappella (2012), and
by Appel, Gnambs, Richter, and Green (2015) and have been shown to have adequate
reliability. However, using factor-analysis, Kim et al. found that reverse-scored items in
the transportation scale loaded on a separate factor from the other items in the scale,
which may have been an artifact of their negative wording. Thus, I chose to adapt a
reverse-scored item from the original Green and Brock scale to eliminate the need for
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reverse-scoring (i.e., “I found it hard to put them out of my mind” instead of “I found it
easy to put them out of my mind.”). Cronbach’s alpha for the scale in the present
research was .83, and participant scores on the scale were approximately normally
distributed (skewness = -0.17, kurtosis = 2.5).

Additional proposed mediators of the effect of exemplars on mammography
intentions included behavioral predictors outlined by the Integrative Model (Fishbein,
2000): attitudes, perceived norms, and self-efficacy.
Attitude toward mammography. The survey measured participant attitudes
toward “having a mammogram in the next two years” and “waiting until age 50 to have a
mammogram.” These two attitudes were each measured using a set of three semantic
differential items on a 7-point scale (extremely/ quite/ slightly/ neutral/ slightly/ quite/
extremely) with the following endpoints: useless/useful, harmful/harmless, bad/good. In
prior research on mammography attitudes (Seitz et al., 2015), a scale composed of these
three items had a Cronbach’s alpha of .87. The three items measuring attitude toward
having a mammogram in the next two years had a Cronbach’s alpha of .89 in the present
data. These three items were averaged to form a scale, which was left-skewed (skewness
= -0.80) with a large peak at 7. The three items measuring attitude toward waiting until
age 50 to have a mammogram had a Cronbach’s alpha of .90. The three items averaged
to form a scale that was right-skewed (skewness = 0.36). Distribution was bimodal, with
a large peak at 1 (extremely useless, harmful, or bad) and a second peak at 4 (neutral).
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Perceived mammography norms. Perceived norms related to mammography
were measured using items adapted from Fishbein and Ajzen (2009) to assess perceived
descriptive and injunctive norms for both having a mammogram in the next two years
and postponing a mammogram until age 50. Participants were asked to rate their level of
agreement, on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), with the following
statements: “Most people who are important to me think I should have a mammogram in
the next two years” (injunctive for having mammogram), “Most people who are
important to me think I should wait until age 50 to have a mammogram” (injunctive for
postponing mammogram), “Most women like me will have a mammogram in the next
two years” (descriptive for having mammogram), and “Most women like me will wait
until age 50 to have a mammogram” (descriptive for postponing mammogram).
Measures of norms related to having a mammogram in the next two years were leftskewed (injunctive: skewness = -0.43; descriptive: skewness = -0.49). The pattern was
reversed for norms related to waiting until age 50 to have a mammogram, with both
measures being right-skewed (injunctive: skewness = 0.47; descriptive: skewness = 0.21).
Kurtosis measures ranged from 2.71 to 2.39. Correlations among the four measures are
reported in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3
Correlation among Measures of Mammography Norms
Injunctive for
having
mammogram

Injunctive for
postponing
mammogram

Descriptive for
having
mammogram

Descriptive for
postponing
mammogram
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Injunctive for
having
mammogram
Injunctive for
postponing
mammogram
Descriptive for
having
mammogram
Descriptive for
postponing
mammogram
***p < .001

1.00

-0.35***

1.00

0.50***

-0.18***

1.00

-0.26***

0.52***

-0.30***

1.00

Self-efficacy to obtain a mammogram. Self-efficacy was measured using items
and scales adapted from Bandura (2006). These two items asked participants to rate
“how certain you are that you could have a mammogram in the next two years if you
wanted to” and “how certain you are that you could wait until age 50 to have a
mammogram if you wanted to” using a scale from 1 (could not do at all) to 11 (highly
certain I could). Self-efficacy to have a mammogram in the next two years was leftskewed (skewness = -0.80) and kurtotic (kurtosis = 2.42). Overall distribution for selfefficacy to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram had peaks at 1, 6, and 11 (skewness =
0.28, kurtosis = 1.77).
Affect. Affect was measured using the 20-item Positive Affect Negative Affect
Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) and five additional items taken
from the expanded version of the PANAS, the PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1994).
Together, these 25 items included a 10-item negative affect scale and a 10-item positive
affect scale. The scales and additional items also allow for measurement of individual
affective states, including fear, anger, guilt, sadness, joviality (happiness), self-assurance,
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attentiveness, serenity, and surprise. Three additional affective items were added to the
scale to allow for measurement of hope, pride, and worry. Negative affect was proposed
to be the main mediator of effects of exemplars on risk perceptions. The negative affect
scale averaged responses to the following emotions: afraid, scared, nervous, jittery,
irritable, hostile, guilty, ashamed, upset, and distressed. The scale had a Cronbach’s
alpha of 0.93 and was right-skewed (skewness = 1.26) and kurtotic (kurtosis = 4.06).
Demographic and breast cancer risk factors. Demographic variables,
including ethnicity (of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin/not of Hispanic, Latino, or
Spanish origin), race (White/Black or African American/American Indian or Alaska
native/Asian/Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander), and education (less than high
school/high school graduate or GED/some college or technical school/college graduate or
beyond) were also recorded. In the analyses that appear in following chapters, education
has been recoded so that it can be treated as a continuous variable (less than high school
= 10 years, high school graduate or GED = 12 years, some college or technical school =
14 years, college graduate or beyond = 16 years). Participants also answered questions
about breast cancer risk factors (identified by Gail & Costantino, 2001), including age at
first live birth of a child, age of menarche, and history of breast biopsy.
Potential moderators. Although no moderators of effects of comments on
mammography intentions or risk perceptions were hypothesized, the variables measured
allow for the examination of potential moderating effects. Moderating variables of
interest include those that might increase participants’ ability or motivation to attend to
the experimental manipulation, as ability and motivation have been shown to influence
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processes of persuasive information (Elaboration Likelihood Model; Petty & Cacioppo,
1981, 1986a, 1986b). The primary variable in this research that captures participants’
ability to process the messages is education level (described above). In this case,
education also serves as a proxy for numeracy and health literacy, which are distinct from
but highly correlated with education (see Baker, 2016 for more information about
numeracy and health literacy). In my prior research, numeracy has served as an
important moderator of effects of numeric risk-based interventions on accuracy of risk
perceptions (Seitz et al., 2015). There are also variables that could affect participants’
motivation to attend to messages. Because motivation increases with increasing message
relevance (Briñol & Petty, 2006), variables affecting relevance may serve as moderators.
Variables related to relevance include family history of breast cancer (recoded as a
dichotomous variable: no family history/one or more first-degree relatives have had
breast cancer) and having had at least one prior mammogram (dichotomous: yes/no).
Among study participants, 14.8% had a family history of breast cancer, and 64.4% had
had at least one prior mammogram. Summary statistics for each of these variables by
condition are presented in Table 4.1.
I was also interested in variables that might affect the success of the intervention,
such as time spent on the comment page (which was the main experimental
manipulation) of the survey and whether or not participants accessed the survey using a
mobile phone (because the small screen might make reading text more difficult).
Because average reading time varied across comment conditions due to differing lengths
of comments used, I created a dichotomous reading time variable to separate participants
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who spent less than half of the median reading time for their condition on the comment
page from those who spent at least half of the median reading time or higher on the
comment page. I was also able to use survey metadata on the screen size of the device on
which the participant viewed the survey to construct a dichotomous variable capturing
whether or not the survey was taken on a mobile phone. In the study sample, 63.3% had
a reading time that was at least half of the median reading time for their condition, and
53.4% completed the survey on a mobile phone. Summary statistics for each of these
variables by condition are presented in Table 4.1.
Research Design
This research utilized Qualtrics, a web-based survey platform, to execute a
between-subjects experimental design embedded within a survey. After giving informed
consent, participants completed the screening items and measures of breast cancer and
mammography history. Participants were then randomly assigned to one of the following
conditions, shown in Table 4.4: 1) no information control (NoInfo), 2) no comments
control (NoComm), 3) false-positive comments without exemplars (FPNoEx), 4)
mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with no exemplars (BCNoEx, 5) falsepositive comments with exemplars (FPEx), 6) mammogram-detected breast cancer
comments with exemplars (BCEx), 7) false positive comments with exemplars removed
(FPExRem), or 8) mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with exemplars
removed (BCExRem). In the NoInfo condition, participants moved directly to the posttest. In the NoComm condition, participants viewed a balanced composite news story
about mammography before completing the post-test. In the remaining conditions,
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participants viewed the same balanced news story followed by a series of four reader
comments (varying by condition) before completing the post-test. The post-test included
measures of mammography intentions, perceived breast cancer risk, perceived risk of
having a false-positive mammogram result, and perceived risk of having a positive
mammogram, followed by measures of the proposed mediators, demographic variables
and breast cancer risk factors, and an opportunity for open-ended feedback. Participants
were fully debriefed after completing the survey.
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Table 4.4
Experimental Conditions
Controls

NoInfo:
No info
control (no
article, no
comments)

NoComm:
No
comments
control
(article, no
comments)

User-generated
nonexemplar comments
FPNoEx:
Article + 3
usergenerated
false-positive
comments
without
exemplars +
1 neutral
comment

BCNoEx:
Article + 3
usergenerated
mammodetected
cancer
comments
without
exemplars +
1 neutral
comment

User-generated
exemplar comments
FPEx: Article
+ 3 usergenerated
false-positive
comments
with
exemplars +
1 neutral
comment

BCEx::
Article + 3
usergenerated
mammodetected
cancer
comments
with
exemplars +
1 neutral
comment

Artificially created/edited
nonexemplar comments
FPExRem:
Article + 3
false-positive
comments
(from FPEx)
rewritten to
remove
exemplars but
preserve
content +1
neutral
comment

BCExRem:
Article + 3
mammodetected
cancer
comments
(from BCEx)
rewritten to
remove
exemplars but
preserve
content + 1
neutral
comment
Note. In conditions with comments, the neutral comments were pulled from a single pool of neutral user-generated comments
about mammography that did not contain exemplars and were only minimally edited.
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Experimental manipulation. The article and comments used for the study were
taken from materials gathered in Study 1, which included mammography articles and
associated reader comments published on NYTimes.com from November 2009 through
December 2014. The article used was an edited version of an article on the revised
USPSTF guidelines that was published in the New York Times in November 2009. The
original article was altered to neutralize the title, reduce the overall length, balance the
length of arguments for and against beginning mammograms at 50, remove quotations
and exemplars, and update the guidelines to reflect recommendations at the time of the
experiment (see stimulus article in Appendix D). The arguments for beginning
mammograms at age 50 included minimizing the risks of false positives and
overdiagnosis (137 words), and the arguments against waiting until age 50 included
benefits of early detection and reduction in cancer deaths (136 words).
The comments used as experimental stimuli were also drawn from the content
analysis and were minimally edited only when editing was needed to remove formatting,
a reference to another commenter, a reference to something in the original article that was
not present in the stimulus article, or, for the FPExRem and BCExRem conditions, to
remove exemplars. Prior to the experiment, I constructed 20 sets of randomly selected
and randomly ordered comments for each condition with comments (a sample set of
comments for each condition is presented in Appendix D and the full comment pools are
available in Appendix E). To construct sets of comments with the content and valence
needed for each condition, as outlined in Table 4.1, comments were randomly drawn
from seven pools of comments with 15 comments in each pool: neutral comments with
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no exemplars, user-generated false positive comments without exemplars, user-generated
mammogram-detected cancer comments without exemplars, user-generated false positive
comments with exemplars, user-generated mammogram-detected cancer comments with
exemplars, false positive comments that were rewritten to remove exemplars but preserve
content, length, and reading level, and mammogram-detected cancer comments that were
rewritten to remove exemplars but preserve content, length, and reading level. The
inclusion of neutral comments in conditions with comments was designed to help mask
the purpose of the study, while the use of random sampling from large pools of comments
was designed to minimize case-category confounding and provide built-in experimental
replication (as recommended by O’Keefe, 2015).
The experimental design employs two different ways of operationalizing
nonexemplar comments. Including user-generated comments that did not originally
include individual case examples in the FPNoEx and BCNoEx conditions helps increase
the ecological validity of the experiment by providing a means of generalizing findings to
currently existing nonexemplar comments. However, these comments differ from
exemplar comments in the information they contain (despite attempts to select comments
that are generally about false positives and mammogram-detected breast cancer). They
may also differ from exemplar comments in other ways that are not experimentally
controlled. To provide nonexemplar comparison conditions that convey the same
information as the exemplar conditions, the FPExRem and BCExRem conditions use
comments from the FPEx and BCEx conditions, respectively, that have been edited to
remove references to exemplars. References to individual exemplars were replaced with
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phrases such as “some women.” Across all of these conditions, efforts were made to
construct sets of comments that were similar in length, reading level, and content.
Analysis
Descriptive statistics were used to examine demographic characteristics, breast
cancer history, and mammography history across conditions. The effects of condition on
risk perception and mammography intentions were examined using Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) regression. Moderating effects were examined using factorial analysis of
variance (ANOVA) and OLS regression. When needed to compare sets of conditions or
individual conditions, Wald tests were used following the regression analyses. The
mediation hypotheses were tested using OLS regression with bootstrapping to create a
bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for indirect effects.
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CHAPTER 5
THE EFFECTS OF ONLINE NEWS COMMENTARY ON MAMMOGRAPHY
INTENTIONS
Introduction
This chapter presents the results from an online experiment to examine the effects
of online news commentary on mammography intentions, including the effects of
comments on intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years and intentions to
wait until age 50 to have a mammogram. It also presents results of analyses investigating
mechanisms of action underlying effects of comments on mammography intentions.
Further detail about the hypotheses outlined below can be found in Chapter 3.
Hypotheses
Prior research on the effects of online commentary (Lee, 2012; Lee & Jang, 2010;
Witteman, Fagerlin, Exe, & Zikmund-Fisher, 2013) suggests that the valence of
comments will have an influence on outcomes; comments that are favorable toward the
target behavior will produce more favorable outcomes, whether they are opinions,
perceptions of public opinion, perceived message effectiveness, or intentions. Because
the mammogram-detected cancer exemplar comments used in the study were all
favorable toward mammography and comments with false-positive exemplars were all
unfavorable toward mammography, I made the following predictions:
H1a: Comments with mammogram-detected cancer exemplars, when
compared to comments with false-positive exemplars, will lead to increased
intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years.
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H1b: Comments with mammogram-detected cancer exemplars, when
compared to comments with false-positive exemplars, will lead to decreased
intentions to wait until age 50 to begin screening.
I also made predictions about the effects of the presence of exemplars in
comments. Based primarily on research by Witteman et al. (2013) and Zebregs, van den
Putte, Neijens, and de Graaf (2015) suggesting that narrative information has a stronger
influence that non-narrative information, I predicted that comments with exemplars
would lead to greater changes in intentions than comments without exemplars:
H2a: Comments with mammogram-detected cancer exemplars will lead to
higher intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years and lower
intentions to wait until age 50 when compared to mammogram-detected
cancer comments without exemplars.
H2b: Comments with false-positive exemplars will lead to lower intentions to
have a mammogram in the next two years and higher intentions to wait until
age 50 when compared to false-positive comments without exemplars.
I proposed that exemplars would affect health behaviors and predictors of health
behaviors by creating transportation into a text, which has been shown to increase
behavioral intentions; changing attitudes; shifting perceived norms; and providing
models, which has been shown to increase self-efficacy for behavior change. The latter
three constructs—attitudes, norms, and self-efficacy—have been consistently shown to
predict behavioral intentions as part of the Integrative Model (Fishbein, 2000; Fishbein &
Ajzen, 2010).
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First, exemplars were expected to create more narrative engagement and
transportation than nonexemplar messages (Kim, Bigman, Leader, Lerman & Cappella,
2012). Green (2006) suggests that messages that produce greater transportation will have
a stronger effect on behavioral intentions. This led to the following hypothesis:
H3: Effects of comments with mammography exemplars (compared to
comments that are of the same valence and topic but lack exemplars) on
mammography intentions will be mediated by narrative transportation.
The effects of exemplars on intentions were also expected to be mediated by a
change in attitudes. Green (2006) proposed that narratives may create larger changes in
affectively-based and cognitively-based attitudes than non-narrative information.
Therefore, I expected that exemplars would create changes in attitudes toward
mammography that would then shape mammography intentions, based on predictions
from the Integrative Model (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010) and Reasoned Action Model
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010):
H4: The effects of comments with exemplars (compared to comments that
are of the same valence and topic but lack exemplars) on mammography
intentions will be mediated by attitudes toward mammography.
I also proposed that exemplars may have effects on intentions through their
effects on perceived norms. Hinyard and Kreuter (2007) highlight the potential of
narrative to influence health behavior changes through its effects on shaping social
norms, and Hsueh, Yogeeswaran, and Malinen (2015) demonstrated that user-generated
comments can influence perceived social norms. Norms are then expected to predict
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behavioral intentions based on the Integrative Model (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010) and
Reasoned Action Model (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010):
H5: Effects of comments with mammography exemplars (compared to
comments that are of the same valence and topic but lack exemplars) on
mammography intentions will be mediated by perceived mammography
norms.
Exemplars were also expected to affect mammography intentions through their
effects on self-efficacy. Narratives provide models of behavior change and vicarious
experience for the reader (Green, 2006). Social Cognitive Theory (Bandura, 1977;
Bandura, 1986) recognizes the role of behavioral modeling and vicarious experience in
increasing self-efficacy, and self-efficacy is one of the key predictors of behavior change
included in the Integrative Model (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). Because comments with
mammogram-detected cancer exemplars provided models of women who had obtained
mammograms, I expected the following:
H6: Effects of comments with mammogram-detected cancer exemplars
(compared to comments that are of the same valence and topic but lack
exemplars) on mammography intentions will be mediated by self-efficacy to
obtain a mammogram.
Methods
This study used an experiment embedded in an online survey to examine the
effects of mammography news commentary on readers. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of eight conditions (see Table 4.1), with conditions varying on the
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presence or type of comments displayed. These conditions are further described in
Chapter 4.
Participants
Survey Sampling International recruited women in the United States between the
ages of 38 and 48 years to participate in the study (N = 1,108) who had no history of
breast cancer or genetic mutations related to breast cancer. Full participant
characteristics are available in Chapter 4.
Measures
The focal dependent variables of interest in this chapter are intention to have a
mammogram in the next two years and intention to wait until age 50 to have a
mammogram. Measures are described in detail in Chapter 4 and the full questionnaire is
available in Appendix C.
Research Design, Stimuli, and Procedure
See Chapter 4 for full details of the experimental design, procedure, and stimuli.
Analytic Approach
Main effects. To examine the effects of condition on each of the intention
measures, I used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with the NoComm condition
as the comparison condition. I then followed each regression with Wald tests to test
individual hypotheses and to examine the main effects of presence of exemplars and
valence/topic. To address Hypothesis 1a, I used intentions to have a mammogram in the
next two years as the dependent variable and used Wald tests to compare FPEx and
BCEx. Hypothesis 1b was tested similarly, using intentions to wait until age 50 to have a
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mammogram as the dependent variable. Hypothesis 2a and 2b were tested in the same
way: for H2a, Wald tests compared BCNoEx with BCEx and BCEx with BCExRem for
both intention measures, and for H2b, Wald tests compared FPNoEx with FPEx and
FPEx with FPExRem for both intention measures.
Moderation. I explored the moderating effects of participant education, family
history of breast cancer, history of prior mammogram, survey reading time (dichotomous:
less than one half of the mean reading time for respective condition vs. greater than or
equal to one half of the mean time), and use of a mobile phone to answer the survey on
the relationship between condition and mammography intentions using factorial ANOVA
and OLS regression.
Mediation models. The mediation hypotheses tested in this chapter, Hypotheses
3, 4, 5, and 6, involved comparing an exemplar condition to a nonexemplar condition of
the same topic and valence (i.e., FPEx vs. FPNoEx, FPEx vs. FPExRem, BCEx vs.
BCNoEx, and BCEx vs. BCExRem. In each of these comparisons, a dummy variable
was created for condition such that the condition with exemplars was coded as “1” and
the nonexemplar condition was coded as “0.” Mediator and outcome variables were
interval or ratio. Hypotheses 3, 4, and 6 involved testing a simple mediation model as
illustrated in Figure 5.1. The mediator (M) and the dependent variable (Y) varied based
on the hypothesis being tested. Because injunctive and descriptive norms were measured
separately but both expected to mediate the effects of exemplars on intentions,
Hypothesis 5 was tested using the parallel multiple mediation model shown in Figure 5.2.
All models were tested using PROCESS for SPSS (Hayes, 2016) with SPSS version 22.
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I used bootstrapping to create bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals for indirect effects

M

a

b

X
(exemplar
condition)

Y
c´

as recommended by Hayes (2009, 2013).

Figure 5.1. Simple mediation model. The effect of exemplars on the dependent variables
of interest (either mammography intentions or risk perceptions, depending on the

a

M
(injunctive
norms)

b

X

Y

(exemplar
condition)

c

M
d

(descriptive
norms)

f

hypothesis being tested) are proposed to be at least partially mediated (proposed
mediators vary by hypothesis).
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Figure 5.2. Parallel multiple mediator model. The effect of exemplars on the dependent
variables of interest (either intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years or
intentions to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram) are proposed to be at least partially
mediated by injunctive norms and descriptive norms for each behavior.
Results
Study Flow
Of 3,800 potential participants invited, 1,527 began the survey. Two hundred and
twelve were excluded because they did not meet eligibility criteria: 17 were male, 63
were outside of the study age range, 113 reported a history of breast cancer, and 19
reported having tested positive for a BRCA1 or BRCA2 genetic mutation. An additional
48 dropped out of the survey before being assigned to an experimental condition. The
remaining 1,267 participants were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions: 169 to
NoInfo (156 completed the survey), 157 to NoComm (140 completed), 180 to FPNoEx
(160 completed), 140 to BCNoEx (116 completed), 154 to FPEx (133 completed), 160 to
BCEx (143 completed), 153 to FPExRem (128 completed), and 154 to BCExRem (132
completed). The final number of participants was 1,108. There were no significant
differences in drop-out rates across condition, X2 (7, N = 1,267) = 10.2, p = .176.
Mobile Phone Use
After data collection, I discovered that, despite being asked not to, approximately
half of the participants completed the survey using mobile phones. As shown in Table
4.1, use of mobile phones to complete the survey did not vary across condition, Χ2 (7, n =
1,108) = 8.14, p = .320. Table 5.1 shows participant characteristics by mobile phone use.
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Mobile use was significantly higher for participants with low levels of education, Χ2 (3, n
= 1,108) = 8.99, p = .029, and significantly lower for participants who were Asian, Χ2 (1,
n = 1,108) = 4.64, p = .031. Use of mobile phones was associated with a greater
likelihood of having a reading time for the experimental manipulation that was less than
half the median time for one’s condition, Χ2 (7, n = 1,108) = 8.99, p = .003. Of 12 tests
of the use of mobile phones to take the survey as a moderator of the effects of condition
on intentions, none were significant.

Table 5.1
Participant Characteristics by Mobile Phone Use

Total %
Age, M (SD)
Education, %:a
Less than high
school
High school
graduate or
GED
Some college or
technical school
College
graduate or
beyond
Ethnicity:
Hispanic,
Latino/a,
Spanish origin,
%
Race, %: a
White

Did not use mobile
phone
46.6
42.9 (3.1)

Used mobile phone

Total

53.4
42.7 (3.2)

100
42.8 (3.1)

1.4

3.0

2.3

17.4

21.0

19.3

37.6

39.5

38.6

43.6

36.5

39.8

6.4

8.3

7.4

86.6

84.6

85.6
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Black or
African
American
American
Indian or Alaska
Native
Asianb
Native
Hawaiian or
Other Pacific
Islander
Family history of
breast cancer, %
Have had at least
one mammogram,
%

9.1

10.8

10.0

2.5

3.2

2.9

4.3
0.4

2.0
1.5

3.1
1.0

14.3

15.2

14.8

64.7

64.1

64.4

Note. N = 1,108. Participants could choose multiple races, so percentages may not add to
100.
a
Significant difference between groups, X2 (3, n = 1,108) = 8.99, p = .029
b
Significant difference between groups, Χ2 (1, n = 1,108) = 4.64, p = .031
Effects of Comments on Mammography Intentions
Means for all intention measures are presented in Table 5.2. Table 5.3
summarizes results of analyses testing individual hypotheses included in this chapter.
All conditions compared to no comment control. Mean intentions to have a
mammogram in the next two years by condition are reported in Figure 5.3. The overall F
test for the OLS regression comparing each condition to the NoInfo condition was
significant, F (7, 1100) = 3.17, p = .0025. Compared to the NoComm condition,
participants in NoInfo, BCNoEx and BCEx reported significantly higher intentions to
have a mammogram in the next two years (p < .001, p = .030, and p = .004, respectively).
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Table 5.2
Mean Intentions, by Condition
Condition

Variable
n
Intention to have
mammogram in
the next 2 years,
M
Intention to wait
until age 50 to
have
mammogram, M

NoInfo
156

NoCom
m
140

FPNoEx
160

BCNoEx
116

FPEx
133

BCEx
143

FPExRe
m
128

BCExRe
m
132

5.85***

5.04

5.47

5.60*

5.20

5.70**

5.15

5.43

2.03*

2.46

2.38

2.14

2.54

2.08

2.48

2.21

Overall F
test for
regression,
F (df)
F (7, 1100)
= 3.17**

F (7, 1100)
= 2.08*

Note. N = 1,108. Conditions are as follows: NoInfo = no information control, NoComm = no comments control, FPNoEx = falsepositive comments without exemplars, BCNoEx = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx = falsepositive comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with exemplars, FPExRem = false
positive comments with exemplars removed, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with exemplars
removed. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression was used to compare all conditions to the NoComm condition, the condition in
which participants received the stimulus news story but no comments. Means that are significantly different from the mean of the
NoComm condition are marked with an asterisk.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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Table 5.3
Summary of Analyses Testing Main Effect Hypotheses
Hypothesis
Tested
H1a

Outcome Variable

Conditions
Compared
FPEx vs.
BCEx

Wald test
result
F (1, 1100)
= 5.27, p =
.02

Conclusion

H1b

Intention to wait until
age 50 to have a
mammogram

FPEx vs.
BCEx

F (1, 1100)
= 5.43, p =
.02

FPEx > BCEx,
H1b supported

H2a

Intention to have
mammogram in the
next two years

BCNoEx vs.
BCEx

F (1, 1100)
= 0.16, p =
.69

BCNoEx ≈
BCEx, No
support for H2a

BCEx vs.
BCExRem

F (1, 1100)
= 1.43, p =
.23

BCEx ≈
BCExRem, No
support for H2a

BCNoEx vs.
BCEx

F (1, 1100)
= 0.08, p =
.78

BCNoEx ≈
BCEx, No
support for H2a

BCEx vs.
BCExRem

F (1, 1100)
= 1.43, p =
.23

BCEx ≈
BCExRem, No
support for H2a

FPNoEx vs.
FPEx

F (1, 1100)
= 1.50, p =
.22

FPNoEx ≈
FPEx, No
support for H2b

FPEx vs.
FPExRem

F (1, 1100)
= 0.05, p =
.82

FPEx ≈
FPExRem, No
support for H2b

FPNoEx vs.
FPEx

F (1, 1100)
= 0.69, p =
.41

FPNoEx ≈
FPEx, No
support for H2b

FPEx vs.
FPExRem

F (1, 1100)
= 0.07, p =
.79

FPEx ≈
FPExRem, No
support for H2b

Intention to have
mammogram in the
next two years

Intention to wait until
age 50 to have a
mammogram

H2b

Intention to have
mammogram in the
next two years

Intention to wait until
age 50 to have a
mammogram

FPEx < BCEx,
H1a supported
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Note. Conditions are as follows: FPNoEx = false-positive comments without exemplars,
BCNoEx = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx =
false-positive comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected breast cancer
comments with exemplars, FPExRem = false positive comments with exemplars removed,
and BCExRem = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with exemplars removed.

Mean Intention to Have Mammogram in the Next Two
Years, by Condition (N = 1,108)
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Figure 5.3. Mean participant intention to have a mammogram in the next two years, by
condition. Error bars indicate ±SE.

Figure 5.4 shows mean intentions to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram.
The overall F test for the OLS regression comparing all conditions to the NoComm
condition was again significant, F (7, 1100) = 2.08, p = .04, but only the NoInfo condition
was significantly different from NoComm (p = .03). BCEx was marginally significantly
lower than NoComm (p = .054).
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Mean Intention to Wait Until Age 50 to Have a
Mammogram, by Condition (N = 1,108)
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BCEx
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Figure 5.4. Mean participant intention to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram, by
condition. Error bars indicate ±SE.

Effect of comment valence/topic on mammography intentions. Hypothesis 1a
predicted that comments with mammogram-detected cancer exemplars (BCEx), when
compared to comments with false-positive exemplars (FPEx), would lead to increased
intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years. Following the regression
comparing each condition to the NoComm condition, a planned contrast (Wald test)
showed that intention to have a mammogram in the next two years was significantly
higher in BCEx than in FPEx, F (1, 1100) = 5.27, p = .02, providing support for H1a (see
Table 5.4). A factorial ANOVA was conducted to examine whether there was an
interaction between condition (BCEx vs. FPEx) and mammography history (no prior
mammogram vs. at least one mammogram). This interaction was significant, (F (1, 227)
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= 6.49, p = .01, such that the hypothesized effect of condition on mammography intention
appeared only for women who had had a mammogram (see Figure 5.5).

Intention to have mammogram in the next two
years

7
6
5
4

BCEx
FPEx

3

average for NoComm

2
1
0
Prior mammogram

No prior mammogram

Figure 5.5. Representation of the effect of FPEx condition (vs. BCEx condition) on
intention to have a mammogram in the next two years as moderated by history of prior
mammogram.
An exploratory Wald test comparing combined conditions FPNoEx, FPEx, and
FPExRem to combined conditions BCNoEx, BCEx, and BCExRem on intention to have a
mammogram in the next two years showed that the mammogram-detected breast cancer
comments (BCNoEx, BCEx, and BCExRem) had significantly higher intentions, F (1,
1100) = 5.08, p = .02. Mean intention to have a mammogram in the next two years in
each control condition and each group of conditions (grouped by topic/valence) is shown
in Figure 5.6. Mean intention to have a mammogram in the next two years in the
NoInfocontrol condition is significantly higher than in the NoComm control condition
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(F(1,1100) = 12.69, p < .001) and in the combined false-positive mammogram conditions
(F(1,1100) = 11.60, p < .001). Mean intention to have a mammogram in the next two
years is also higher in the combined grouping of all mammogram-detected breast cancer
conditions than in the NoComm control (F(1,1100) = 7.05, p = .008) and the combined

Intention to have mammogram in next
two years

false-positive mammogram conditions (F(1,1100) = 5.08, p = .024).
7.00
6.00

5.85a
5.29b

5.04b

5.58a

5.00
4.00
3.00
2.00
1.00
NoInfo Control

NoComm Control All FP Conditions

All BC Conditions

Group

Figure 5.6. Mean intention to have a mammogram in the next two years across control
conditions and conditions combined by topic/valence. Error bars indicate ± SE. Means
sharing the same superscript are not significantly different from each other (F test, p<.05).

Hypothesis 1b predicted that comments with mammogram-detected cancer
exemplars (BCEx), when compared to comments with false-positive exemplars (FPEx),
would lead to decreased intentions to wait until age 50 to begin screening. A follow-up
Wald test showed that intention to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram was
significantly lower in BCEx than FPEx, F (1, 1100) = 5.43, p = .02, providing support for
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H1b (see Table 5.4). However, an ANOVA showed that there was a significant
interaction between condition (BCEx vs. FPEx) and education (recoded to be a continuous
variable), F (1, 272) = 5.15, p = .02; mammogram-detected breast cancer exemplars did
lead to lower intentions to wait until age 50 for the most highly educated women in the
sample, but the effect appears to be reversed for women with the lowest level of education
(see Figure 5.7).7

Intention to wait until age 50

3.5
3
2.5
2
BCEx
1.5

FPEx
average for NoComm

1
0.5
0
10

12

14

16

Approximate Years of Education

Figure 5.7. Representation of the effect of FPEx condition (vs. BCEx condition) on
intention to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram as moderated by education.

An exploratory contrast (using a Wald test) showed that when FPNoEx, FPEx, and
FPExRem were combined and compared to combined conditions BCNoEx, BCEx, and

7

Note that 39.8% of the sample had at least a college degree, while only 2.3% had less
than a high school degree, so estimates may be unstable for low levels of education.
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BCExRem on intention to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram, mammogram-detected
cancer comments (BCNoEx, BCEx, and BCExRem) had significantly lower intentions, F
(1, 1100) = 7.74, p = .006. Again, there was a significant moderating effect of education.
A factorial ANOVA conducted to examine the interaction between comment topic (all FP
conditions vs. all BC conditions) and education (recoded to be a continuous measure) was
significant, F (1, 808) = 4.38, p = .04, such that higher education led to a positive effect of
false-positive comments on intentions to wait until age 50, which diminished for women
at lower levels of education (see Figure 5.8). Mean intention to wait until age 50 to have a
mammogram for control conditions compared to comment conditions combined by
topic/valence are presented in Figure 5.9. In addition to the significant difference between
all false positive conditions and all mammogram-detected breast cancer conditions noted
above, mean intention to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram in the NoInfo control
condition is significantly lower than in the NoComm control condition (F(1,1100) = 4.98,
p = .026) and in the combined false-positive mammogram conditions (F(1,1100) = 8.66, p
= .003).
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Figure 5.8. Representation of the effect of all false-positive conditions (vs. all
mammogram-detected breast cancer conditions) on intention to wait until age 50 to have a
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mammogram as moderated by education.
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Figure 5.9. Mean intention to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram across control
conditions and conditions combined by topic/valence. Error bars indicate ± SE. Means
sharing the same superscript are not significantly different from each other (F test, p<.05).

Effect of presence of exemplars on mammography intentions. Following the
OLS regressions for each of the intention measures, I used Wald tests to examine the
effects of exemplars on intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years and
intention to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram. Hypothesis 2a predicted that
comments with mammogram-detected cancer exemplars would lead to higher intentions to
have a mammogram in the next two years and lower intentions to wait until age 50 when
compared to mammogram-detected cancer comments without exemplars. To test this
hypothesis, I compared BCNoEx to BCEx and BCEx to BCExRem for both of the
intention measures. None of the four tests were significant (see Table 5.4), so there was
no support for H2a. However, there was a moderation effect such that the predicted effect
of BCEx vs. BCNoEx emerged for women with a history of a prior mammogram (see
Figure 5.10); a factorial ANOVA conducted to test the interaction of condition (BCEx vs.
BCNoEx) and history of a prior mammogram (no prior mammogram vs. at least one
mammogram) showed that the interaction was significant, F (1, 255) = 5.54, p = .02.
Hypothesis 2b predicted that comments with false-positive exemplars would lead to lower
intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years and higher intentions to wait until
age 50 when compared to false-positive comments without exemplars. To test this

105

hypothesis, I compared FPNoEx to FPEx and FPEx to FPExRem for both intention items.
None of the four tests were significant (see Table 5.4), so H2b was also not supported.

Intention to have mammogram in the next
two years
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BCEx
BCNoEx
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average of NoComm
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0
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No prior mammogram

Figure 5.10. Representation of the effect of BCEx condition (vs. BCNoEx condition) on
intention to have a mammogram in the next two years as moderated by history of prior
mammogram.

I further explored the data by combining nonexemplar conditions of the same
valence and comparing them to the appropriate exemplar condition. When BCNoEx and
BCExRem were combined and compared to BCEx using Wald tests, cancer exemplars had
no significant effect on intention to have a mammogram in the next two years or intention
to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram. When FPNoEx and FPExRem were combined
and compared to FPEx, false-positive exemplars had no effect on intention to have a
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mammogram in the next two years or intention to wait until age 50 to have a
mammogram.
Mediators of Effects of Comments on Mammography Intentions
Hypotheses 3 through 6 predicted that effects of exemplars on mammography
intentions would be mediated by narrative transportation, mammography attitudes,
mammography norms, and self-efficacy. Despite the lack of direct effects of exemplars
on intentions, analyses of possible indirect effects were still necessary and valuable
because, as Hayes (2013) points out, indirect effects can be present in the absence of direct
effects. Thus, the results of formal tests of indirect effects for each proposed mediator of
the effects of condition on mammography intentions are presented in the sections that
follow. The mean values of each proposed mediator by condition are presented in Table
5.4. Detailed tables summarizing the results of analyses of each mediator are presented in
Appendix F.
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Table 5.4
Mediator Means and Standard Deviations, by Condition
Mediator
n
Narrative transportation,
M (SD)
Attitude toward having
mammogram in next two
years, M (SD)
Attitude toward waiting
until age 50 to have a
mammogram, M (SD)
Injunctive norm for
having mammogram in
two years, M (SD)
Injunctive norm for
waiting until age 50 to
have a mammogram, M
(SD)
Descriptive norm for
having mammogram in
two years, M (SD)
Descriptive norm for
waiting until age 50 to
have a mammogram, M
(SD)
Self-efficacy to have a
mammogram in the next
two years, M (SD)

Condition
FPNoEx

NoInfo

NoComm

FPNoEx

BCNoEx

BCEx

FPExRem

BCExRem

156

140

160

116

133

143

128

132

N/A

N/A

4.31 (1.33)

4.39 (1.36)

4.31 (1.49)

4.54 (1.42)

4.29 (1.58)

4.29 (1.40)

5.67 (1.81)

5.30 (1.80)

5.41 (1.64)

5.46 (1.71)

5.33 (1.57)

5.54 (1.60)

4.88 (1.83)

5.28 (1.57)

3.19 (1.83)

3.52 (1.65)

3.46 (1.69)

3.25 (1.88)

3.46 (1.73)

3.02 (1.70)

3.35 (1.59)

3.33 (1.77)

5.06 (1.71)

4.58 (1.72)

4.84 (1.81)

4.97 (1.78)

4.87 (1.64)

4.89 (1.73)

4.52 (1.73)

4.76 (1.64)

2.69 (1.60)

2.77 (1.53)

2.71 (1.53)

2.76 (1.72)

2.71 (1.48)

2.54 (1.41)

2.93 (1.55)

2.69 (1.48)

5.00 (1.45)

4.84 (1.49)

4.89 (1.64)

4.91 (1.50)

4.66 (1.60)

4.87 (1.45)

4.95 (1.46)

4.89 (1.51)

3.63 (1.57)

3.45 (1.55)

3.30 (1.62)

3.05 (1.52)

3.30 (1.60)

3.46 (1.58)

3.23 (1.41)

3.27 (1.56)

8.89 (2.88)

8.11 (3.19)

8.50 (2.86)

8.57 (3.08)

8.95 (2.50)

8.80 (2.92)

7.83 (3.23)

8.30 (2.80)
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Self-efficacy to wait
until age 50 to have a
mammogram, M (SD)

5.52 (3.70)

5.39 (3.48)

6.14 (3.50)

4.78 (3.61)

5.74 (3.62)

5.20 (3.75)

5.03 (3.49)

5.62 (3.48)

Note. Conditions are as follows: NoInfo = no information control, NoComm = no comments control, FPNoEx = false-positive
comments without exemplars, BCNoEx = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx = false-positive
comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with exemplars, FPExRem = false positive
comments with exemplars removed, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with exemplars removed. The
narrative transportation scale was an average of four items from Green and Brock (2000) measured on a 7-point scale from 1 (not at
all) to 7 (very much). Each attitude scale was created by averaging three semantic differential items on a 7-point scale from 1 to 7,
where 1 was the negative end of the scale. Norms were measured by having participants rate their agreement with each norm on a
scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Each self-efficacy item (adapted from Bandura, 2006) was measured using a scale
from 1 (could not do at all) to 11 (highly certain I could).
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Narrative transportation. In the mammography-detected breast cancer
conditions, increased narrative transportation was associated with increased intentions to
have a mammogram in the next two years (b = 0.187 for BCEx and BCNoEx, and b =
0.217 for BCEx and BCExRem) and decreased intention to wait until age 50 to have a
mammogram (b = -0.211 for BCEx and BCNoEx, and b = -0.205 for BCEx and
BCExRem; see Tables F1 and F2). However, because exemplars had no effect on
transportation, bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals constructed using 10,000
bootstrap samples included zero for all of the indirect effects through transportation that
were tested. Thus, there is no evidence that effects of exemplars on mammography
intentions are mediated by transportation in this experiment and no support for H3.
Attitude. When compared to FPExRem, FPEx led to a more positive attitude
toward having a mammogram in the next two years (a = 0.453)8, and more positive
attitude led to higher intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years (b = 0.561).
A bias-corrected bootstrap 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of FPEx vs.
FPExRem on intention through attitude (ab = 0.254) based on 10,000 bootstrap samples
was above zero (0.026, 0.521), providing evidence of mediation and partial support for
H4. The path between condition and attitude was not significant in the other models
tested (see Table F3). However, paths between attitudes and intentions were significant
in all of the models, with more positive attitudes toward having a mammogram in the
next two years consistently related to greater intentions to have a mammogram in the next

8

a and b refer to path coefficients in Figure 5.1.
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two years. Similarly, a more positive attitude toward delaying mammography was
significantly related to increased intentions to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram
(see Table F4), but there was no evidence that effects of exemplars on intentions to wait
until age 50 to have a mammogram are mediated by attitude.
Mammography norms. Exemplar conditions did not significantly change
injunctive or descriptive norms toward having a mammogram in the next two years;
however, stronger perceived injunctive norms related to having a mammogram in the
next two years were associated with significantly higher intentions to have a
mammogram in the next two years. Additionally, in the two instances in which
exemplars were compared to conditions in which exemplars were removed (FPEx vs.
FPExRem and BCEx vs. BCExRem), descriptive norms were also significantly positively
related to mammography intentions (f = 0.178 and f = 0.278, respectively, see Table F5)9.
Bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals constructed using 10,000 bootstrap samples
included zero for all of the indirect effects tested, thus there was no evidence that effects
of exemplars on intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years were mediated
by norms related to having a mammogram in the next two years.
There was one instance in which exemplars had an effect on norms related to
waiting until age 50 to have a mammogram; when BCEx was compared with BCNoEx,
the presence of exemplars led to a significant increase in descriptive norms (d = 0.409,
see Table F6). However, in all cases, both injunctive norms and descriptive norms were

9

Path coefficients for models including norms refer to paths identified in Figure 5.2.
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significantly and positively related to intentions to wait until age 50 to have a
mammogram. Bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals constructed using 10,000
bootstrap samples included zero for all but one of the indirect effects tested. When BCEx
was compared with BCNoEx, the indirect effect of exemplars on intentions to wait until
age 50 to have a mammogram through descriptive norms (ab = 0.079) was above zero
(95% CI [0.008, 0.190]). Thus, H5 was only partially supported.
Self-efficacy. There were no significant effects of exemplars on self-efficacy.
However, higher self-efficacy was significantly associated with higher mammography
intentions both when BCEx was compared to BCNoEx (b = 0.099) and when BCEx was
compared with BCExRem (b = 0.229; see Table F7). Bias-corrected bootstrap 95%
confidence intervals for the indirect effects of exemplars on intentions through selfefficacy included zero, thus there is no evidence that effects of exemplars on intentions to
have a mammogram in the next two years are mediated by self-efficacy and no support
for H6.
Exploratory analyses of mediators of effects of topic/valence on intentions. In
addition to the mediation analyses necessitated by Hypotheses 3 through 6, I also
undertook exploratory analyses to investigate the mechanisms behind the effects of
comment topic and valence on mammography intentions. I tested transportation,
attitudes, norms, self-efficacy, and negative affect as possible mediators of these effects.
Only attitude toward waiting until age 50 to have a mammogram was a mediator of these
effects. As shown in Table 5.5, BCEx (as compared to FPEx) made attitudes toward
waiting more negative, which led to an increase in intentions to have a mammogram in
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the next two years (because attitudes toward waiting are negatively related to intentions
to screen). Because attitudes toward waiting are positively associated with intentions to
wait until age 50 to have a mammogram, there was also a significant indirect effect of
BCEx on intention to wait to have a mammogram through attitudes toward waiting.
Finally, when all mammogram-detected breast cancer conditions (BCEx, BCNoEx, and
BCExRem) are combined and compared to all false positive conditions (FPEx, FPNoEx,
and FPExRem), the effect of breast cancer conditions on intention to have a mammogram
in the next two years is mediated by attitudes toward waiting; breast cancer conditions
lead to more negative attitudes toward waiting, which are negatively related to intentions
to screen in the next two years.
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Table 5.5
Mediating Effects of Attitude toward Waiting until Age 50 to Have a Mammogram

Model paths

Constant,
Coeff.
(SE)

Effect of X
(condition) on
M (attitude),
Coeff. (SE)

BCEx vs. FPEx 
attitude toward
waiting

3.460
-0.438 (0.207)*
(0.149)***

Attitude toward
waiting  intention
to have mammogram;
BCEx vs. FPEx 
intention to have
mammogram

6.277
(0.259)***

BCEx vs. FPEx 
attitude toward
waiting

3.460
-0.438 (0.207)*
(0.149)***

__

Effect of M
(attitude) on Y
(intention),
Coeff. (SE)

Effect of X
(condition) on
Y (intention),
Coeff. (SE)

R2

F (df), p

__

__

0.016

4.46 (1, 271),
p = .036

-0.308
(0.061)***

0.334 (0.210)

0.102

15.25 (2,
270), p < .001

__

__

0.016

4.46 (1, 271),
p = .036

Indirect effect
of X on Y
through M,
Coeff.
(bootstrapped
bias-corrected
95% CI)

0.135 (0.019,
0.299)
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Attitude toward
waiting  intention
to wait; BCEx vs.
FPEx  intention to
wait

1.253
(0.225)***

__

0.369
(0.053)***

-0.269 (0.183)

0.167

26.99 (2,
270), p < .001

All BC vs. all FP 
attitude toward
waiting

3.427
(0.084)***

-0.232 (0.121)

__

__

0.005

3.62 (1, 802),
p = .057

Attitude toward
waiting  intention
to have mammogram;
All BC vs. all FP 
intention to have
mammogram

6.183
(0.158)***

__

-0.260
(0.038)***

0.238 (0.131)

0.062

26.34 (2,
801), p < .001

-0.162 (-0.351,
-0.018)

0.060 (0.002,
0.137)

Note. Conditions are as follows: FPNoEx = false-positive comments without exemplars, BCNoEx = mammogram-detected breast
cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx = false-positive comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected breast cancer
comments with exemplars, FPExRem = false positive comments with exemplars removed, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected
breast cancer comments with exemplars removed.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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Discussion
This study assesses the effects of valence and the presence of exemplars in online
mammography news commentary on young women. In particular, it examines the effects
of comments on mammography intentions, including intentions to have a mammogram in
the next two years and intentions to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram. It also
investigates possible mechanisms of these effects, including moderating effects of
participant education and history of prior mammogram and mediating effects of
transportation, attitude, norms, and self-efficacy. The results of tests of hypotheses
related to the main effects of comments, results of tests of mediation effects, and
incidental findings are discussed below.
Effects of Comment Topic
Results showed that participants in conditions with comments about
mammogram-detected breast cancer (when BCNoEx, BCEx, and BCExRem were treated
collectively) reported higher intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years than
participants in conditions with comments about false-positive mammograms (FPNoEx,
FPEx, and FPExRem, collectively). Participants in BCNoEx, BCEx, and BCExRem also
reported significantly lower intentions to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram.
Additionally, participants in BCEx had significantly higher intentions to have a
mammogram in the next two years and significantly lower intentions to wait until age 50
than participants in FPEx, providing support for H1a and H1b, respectively.
Because all mammogram-detected cancer comments used in the experiment were
pro-mammogram and all false-positive mammogram comments were cautious toward
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mammography, the effects of valence and topic are intertwined, meaning that these
effects were due to differences in comment valence, differences in content, or a
combination of the two. One explanation for the differing effects of mammogramdetected cancer comments and false positive comments on mammography intentions is
their differing valence toward mammography: women who read pro-mammogram
comments were more likely to intend to have mammograms than women who read
comments that were cautious toward mammograms. This effect is supported by prior
literature, which has found effects of comment valence on various outcomes, including
perceived effectiveness of the message accompanied by the comments (Walther,
DeAndrea, Kim, & Anthony, 2010), opinions (Lee & Jang, 2010; Witteman, Fagerlin,
Exe, & Zikmund-Fisher, 2013) and behavioral intentions (Witteman, Fagerlin, Exe, &
Zikmund-Fisher, 2013).
Effect of Exemplars in Comments
Though there were significant effects of comment valence and topic, there were
no main effects of the presence of exemplars on mammography intentions. This was true
regardless of whether exemplar and nonexemplar conditions were compared collectively
or individually. Thus, H2a and H2b were not supported. One possibility for why I saw
an effect of comment topic but not an effect of exemplars could be that, while the effect
of topic or valence is immediate, the effect of exemplars emerges only over time.
Specifically, Zillmann (2002) proposes that, because “concrete events” (p. 29) are
retained more easily than abstract information, and exemplars are presumably more
concrete than similar information without exemplars, exemplars will continue to “exert
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unopposed influence on judgment” (p. 29). Though the effects of the experimental
manipulation in all conditions is expected to decay over time, one might expect the effect
of the exemplar conditions to fade more slowly such that a “sleeper effect” emerges
(Zillmann, 2002, p. 29). This could be explored in future research.
The failure to find effects of exemplars could also be due, in part, to failure of
participants to read the comments thoroughly leading to a lack of sufficient exposure to
the manipulation. For example, in conditions with comments, median time spent on the
comment page ranged from a low of 29 seconds for Condition 8 (cancer exemplars
removed) to a high of 57 seconds for Condition 5 (false-positive exemplars). The
average set of comments in Condition 8 was 398 words, and the average set of comments
in Condition 5 was 584 words. Typical reading speeds in experimental studies involving
reading on computer screens (Knoblauch, Arditi, & Szlyk, 1991) and smartphones (Na,
Choi, & Suk, 2016) are roughly 300 words per minute. At these speeds, it should take
readers an average of 80 seconds to read the comments in Condition 8 and an average of
117 seconds to read the comments in Condition 5. Since the average observed times were
lower than predicted, it is plausible that some participants skimmed comments rather than
reading them thoroughly. To investigate this possibility, I included a dichotomous
reading time variable as a possible moderator of effects of condition on intention. In
eight tests including an interaction term between condition and the reading time variable
(comparing each exemplar condition to each of its corresponding nonexemplar condition
for both measures of intention), no significant interaction effects emerged. When FPEx
was compared to FPNoEx, the standardized coefficient of the interaction effect was
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largest, at -0.21, and approached significance (p = .063). While this could mean that
reading time was not a factor in the absence of effects of exemplars, it is also possible
that the study did not have enough power to detect moderation effects.
Effect of Presence of Comments
Similar to findings from Shi, Messaris, and Cappella (2014) that the presence of
any comments (positive or negative) detracted from the perceived effectiveness of the
message, in the present research, the presence of any comments may have had harmful
effects on readers by altering the effects of the news article. An incidental finding of my
research is that, compared to the NoInfo condition, the NoComm condition led to
decreased intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years. Conditions in which
participants viewed the news story and a set of comments generally increased intentions
to have a mammogram in the next two years. For women in this experiment, choosing to
delay mammography until age 50 is consistent with current USPSTF recommendations
outlined in the stimulus news article, thus lowering intentions to have a mammogram in
the next two years could be considered a desirable outcome.
Moderation of Effects
Three of the effects of condition on intention were moderated by education level:
FPEx vs. FPNoEx on intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years, FPEx vs.
BCEx on intention to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram, and all false positive
conditions vs. all mammogram-detected breast cancer conditions on intention to wait
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until age 50.10 In each of these cases, the expected effects appeared for the most highly
educated participants but weakened with lower levels of education. This is suggestive of
an effect of participant ability to attend to and process the text presented in the
experimental manipulation. The Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981,
1986a, 1986b) proposes that those who are motivated and able to process a persuasive
message are more likely to do so through the central route, which produces more
enduring persuasive effects than processing through the peripheral route. Participants
with higher levels of education may have been both more motivated to attend to messages
(due to higher need for cognition) and more capable of processing messages, leading to
stronger effects of exemplars.
Similarly, the effect of exemplars (BCEx vs. FPEx and BCEx vs. BCNoEx) on
intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years was strengthened among women
with a history of prior mammography.11 This is indicative of an effect of higher
motivation to process the experimental manipulation. Women who had previously made
the decision to have a mammogram may also have a higher risk for breast cancer, higher
levels of breast cancer worry, or greater interest in health issues in general that would
also motivate them to pay attention to messages about mammography. This is also

10

Three out of 12 (or 25% of) tests examining the interaction between conditions (or sets
of conditions) and education were significant, which is greater than the percentage
expected by chance with an alpha level of .05.
11
Two out of 12 (or 16.7% of) tests examining the interaction between conditions and
mammography history were significant, which is greater than the percentage expected by
chance with an alpha level of .05.
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consistent with effects proposed in the Elaboration Likelihood Model, and higher levels
of motivation likely led to stronger effects of exemplars.
Mediation of Effects
The results presented in this chapter also show that there is little to no support for
the proposed mediators of the effects of exemplars on mammography intentions (H3, H4,
H5, and H6). Attitude toward having a mammogram in the next two years successfully
mediated one relationship between exemplars and intentions, and mammography norms
mediated another. There was no evidence of indirect effects of exemplars on
mammography intentions through narrative transportation (proposed in H3) or selfefficacy (proposed in H6). Though exemplars often failed to have the predicted effects
on proposed mediators, those mediator variables were often significantly associated with
the outcome of interest. There was evidence that, for mammogram-detected cancer
exemplar conditions, increased narrative transportation was associated with an increase in
intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years and a decrease in intentions to
wait until age 50 to have a mammogram. There was also evidence that attitudes,
perceived norms, and self-efficacy were significantly related to behavioral intention, as
predicted by the Integrative Model (Fishbein, 2000).
The lack of hypothesized mediation effects is contrary to prior literature on
exemplars, which suggests that they have their effects through changes in narrative
transportation (Kim, Bigman, Leader, Lerman & Cappella, 2012), attitudes (Green,
2006), norms (Hinyard & Kreuter, 2007), and self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977; Bandura,
1986). The lack of mediation effects might be expected, however, since there was little
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evidence that exemplar conditions changed mammography intentions (when compared to
nonexemplar conditions). In addition to a lack of effects of exemplar conditions on
intentions, exemplars also failed to have an effect on the proposed mediators: narrative
transportation, attitudes, norms, and self-efficacy. Because narrative transportation is
typically associated with becoming immersed in a longer narratives—narratives in some
previous research have spanned several pages (e.g. Green & Brock, 2000)—it is possible
that the comments were not long enough to create a sense of transportation. Other
research that found the effect of exemplars on intention was mediated by engagement
(Kim, Bigman, Leader, Lerman & Cappella, 2012) embedded exemplars in the text of a
longer news article. Further, Green (2006) describes ways in which transportation can
lead to changes in attitude, norms, and efficacy, so the failure to find effects on these
variables may be partially due to the lack of effects on transportation.
Though the predicted mediation paths were not present, I also conducted
mediation analyses in an attempt to understand the main effects of comments on
mammography intentions that did exist. The effect of BCEx vs. FPEx was mediated by
attitude toward waiting until age 50 to have a mammogram, and the effect of all
mammogram-detected breast cancer conditions (BCEx, BCNoEx, and BCExRem
combined) vs. all false positive conditions (FPEx, FPNoEx, and FPExRem combined)
was mediated by attitude toward waiting until age 50. It is possible that this attitude was
malleable because participants did not have a pre-existing attitude toward waiting until
age 50, whereas attitudes toward having a mammogram in the next two years were likely
well-formed and influenced by numerous social and cognitive factors. Future research
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should examine the interplay between effects of attitudes toward having a mammogram
and attitudes toward waiting on intentions, especially in the context of attitudinal
ambivalence--“a psychological state in which a person holds mixed feelings (positive and
negative) towards some psychological object” (Gardner, 1987,p. 241). This mediation
pathway also suggests a possible avenue for messaging related to mammography
decision-making, in that those hoping to change intentions should target not only
attitudes toward having a mammogram but also attitudes toward waiting to have a
mammogram.
Limitations
Although this research has many strengths and exciting implications, it also has a
number of conceptual and methodological limitations.
First, though the choices made in designing conditions and selecting the
experimental stimuli offer advantages over prior work in this area, they also present
limitations. Most importantly, the decision to use comments in the mammogramdetected breast cancer conditions that were all pro-mammogram and comments in the
false-positive mammogram conditions that were cautious toward mammography means
that valence and content are conflated and their effects cannot be teased apart in this
experiment. Originally, this decision was made to produce a cleaner and simpler
experimental design. In retrospect, it could have been advantageous to select comments
for each set of conditions that proportionally represented the valences of comments on
their respective topic. Another option would have been to introduce a valence factor and
include additional conditions such that the experimental factors of valence, topic, and
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presence of exemplars were fully crossed. An additional conceptual limitation that may
have limited my ability to find effects is my operationalization of an exemplar as a
mention of an individual in a comment. Definitions of exemplar vary widely, and one
conceptualization refers to exemplars as “short quotations…from concerned or interested
people that illustrate a particular problem or a particular view” (Brosius, 1999, p. 213).
Using this definition, all comments could be considered exemplars, which could mean
that they are all expected to have stronger effects than nonexemplar text (i.e., parts of the
article without exemplars).
This research also has limitations that are related to the methodology. One of
these limitations is that, while participants were asked not to use mobile phones to
complete the survey, based on survey metadata, it appears that approximately 50%
accessed the survey from a small mobile device. Allowing participants to be exposed to
the content on a mobile phone may simulate real conditions in which people are exposed
to media content and user-generated comments, thus increasing external validity.
However, it raises concerns about participants’ exposure to the manipulation and ability
to complete measures, which were not all optimized for mobile phones. Though few
moderation effects of mobile phone use were found, this may have weakened effects or
introduced additional error (i.e., “noise”) making it more difficult to find effects. Related
to this issue is the finding that many participants spent only a short amount of time on the
comment page, which was the primary experimental manipulation. Though some effects
of comments were observed (e.g., effects of topic on intention and risk perceptions) and
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no significant moderating effect of the reading time variable was found, it is possible that
the brevity of exposure may have contributed to a lack of effects of exemplars.
This research also possesses limitations related to generalizability. One of the
strengths of this study is that it takes place in an online context, as exposure to online
news commentary would. However, other aspects of the setting, including the layout of
the stimulus article and comments, were simplified for the experiment and findings may
not be representative of results of exposure to all online news and commentary.
Similarly, the findings are limited because of the experimental stimuli. I only used one
article, so the effect of comments used with this particular article may differ from effects
of comments with other articles. Additionally, though one of the strengths of the study is
that the stimulus comments were real comments found on mammography articles from
The New York Times, I could not use all of the coded comments because some would not
make sense with the article. This may limit generalizability to other types of comments
that were not used or to comments and articles found in other media outlets. Additionally,
this experiment included only false-positive comments that were cautious toward
mammography and mammogram-detected breast cancer comments that were promammography for experimental simplicity. This means one can generalize findings to
most but not all false positive comments and mammogram-detected breast cancer
comments. Finally, the population used in this experiment was selected because women
between the ages of 40 and 50 years old are the ones who have been affected by changes
in mammography guidelines and, according to guidelines from the USPSTF (2016), have
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an individual decision to make about when to begin screening. These findings cannot
necessarily be extended to other populations.
Implications
This research on the effects of user-generated commentary on online
mammography news has valuable implications. First, findings suggest that the topic of
user-generated mammography comments may have an effect on mammography
intentions, with those about mammogram-detected breast cancer exemplars leading to
higher intentions to screen in the next two years than when the story was presented along
with comments about false positives or with no comments at all. Because having a
mammogram between age 40 and 50 is not universally recommended, exposure to these
comments may nudge women to screen, putting them at risk for excess false positives
and unnecessary procedures. The findings suggest that producers of online news and
managers of news websites and any others on which user comments are allowed should
be aware that comments can have harmful effects on readers and may detract from the
effects of the main message.
Though the hypothesized mediation pathways were not significant, mediation
analyses provided insight into why exemplars did not produce the predicted effects on
mammography intentions and further understanding of perceived risk and theories of
behavioral prediction in the mammography context. Because attitudes, norms, and selfefficacy reliably predicted behavioral intentions, this research offers additional support
for the validity of applying the Integrative Model (Fishbein, 2000) and Reasoned Action
Model (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010) to mammography behavior.
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CHAPTER 6
THE EFFECTS OF ONLINE NEWS COMMENTARY ON RISK PERCEPTIONS
Introduction
This chapter presents results from an online experiment to examine the effects of
online news commentary on women’s risk perceptions. Results include the effects of
comments on perceived five-year and lifetime risks of developing breast cancer,
perceived risk of having a positive mammogram, and perceived risk of having a falsepositive mammogram result. It also presents results of analyses investigating
mechanisms of action underlying effects of comments on risk perceptions. Further detail
about the hypotheses outlined below can be found in Chapter 3.
Hypotheses
I made multiple predictions about the effects of comments with exemplars on risk
perceptions related to breast cancer and mammography. Based on the quantification
heuristic and the availability heuristic (Zillmann, 2006), I predicted that comments with
exemplars would alter risk perceptions by prompting readers to rely on those examples
when estimating their own risk for breast cancer, a positive mammogram, or a falsepositive mammogram result:
H7a: The presence of comments with mammogram-detected cancer
exemplars will be associated with increased perceived breast cancer risk
when compared to the presence of mammogram-detected cancer comments
without exemplars (i.e., nonexemplar comments of the same valence and
topic).
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H7b: The presence of comments with mammogram-detected cancer
exemplars will be associated with increased perceived risk of a positive
mammogram when compared to the presence of mammogram-detected
cancer comments without exemplars (i.e., nonexemplar comments of the
same valence and topic).
H7c: The presence of comments with false positive exemplars will increase
perceived risk of experiencing a false positive when compared to the presence
of false positive comments without exemplars (i.e. nonexemplar comments of
the same valence and topic).
Exemplars were also expected to affect perceived risk of breast cancer, perceived risk of
having a positive mammogram, or perceived risk of having a false-positive mammogram,
depending on experimental condition. These effects were expected to be at least partially
mediated by the effects of exemplars on affect. Dunlop, Wakefield, and Kashima (2008)
have outlined a theory in which testimonial messages increase negative emotions, which
then increase perceived susceptibility to a disease. In a demonstration of this effect,
McQueen, Kreuter, Kalesan, and Alcaraz (2011) found that the effect of breast cancer
survivor stories on increased breast cancer risk perceptions was mediated by negative
affect. Thus, I predicted the following:
H8a: The effects of mammogram-detected breast cancer exemplars
(compared to comments that are of the same valence and topic but lack
exemplars) on perceived risk of breast cancer will be mediated by changes in
negative affect.
128

H8b: The effects of mammogram-detected breast cancer exemplars
(compared to comments that are of the same valence and topic but lack
exemplars) on perceived risk of having a positive mammogram will be
mediated by changes in negative affect.
H8c: The effects of false-positive mammogram exemplars (compared to
comments that are of the same valence and topic but lack exemplars) on
perceived risk of having a false-positive mammogram will be mediated by
changes in negative affect.
Finally, I proposed that exemplars would alter mammography intentions through
their effects on risk perceptions. Though there is not much evidence for this mediation
pathway between exemplars and mammography behavior, it has been demonstrated for
other health behaviors. Betsch, Ulshofer, Renkewitz, and Betsch (2011) found that the
relationship between narratives about adverse vaccine events and vaccination intentions
was mediated by perceived risk of experiencing an adverse event. Similarly, de Wit, Das,
and Vet (2008) found that the effect of personal testimonials on intention to get
vaccinated for hepatitis B was mediated by perceived risk of contracting the hepatitis B
virus. I hypothesized that this effect would also exist in the present research:
H9: The effects of exemplars (compared to comments that are of the same
valence and topic but lack exemplars) on mammography intentions will be
mediated by risk perceptions.
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Methods
This study used an experiment embedded in an online survey to examine the
effects of mammography news commentary on readers. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of eight conditions (see Table 4.1), with conditions varying on the
presence or type of comments displayed. These conditions are further described in
Chapter 4.
Participants
Survey Sampling International recruited women in the United States between the
ages of 38 and 48 years to participate in the study (N = 1,108) who no history of breast
cancer or genetic mutations related to breast cancer. Full participant characteristics are
available in Chapter 4.
Measures
The focal dependent variables of interest in this chapter are perceived risk of
having breast cancer (5-year and lifetime risk, measured as both a percentage and a
frequency out of 100), perceived risk of having a positive mammogram (measured as a
percentage and a frequency out of 100), and perceived risk of having a false-positive
mammogram (measured as a percentage and a frequency out of 100). Detailed
descriptions of measures used are available in Chapter 4, and the full questionnaire is
available in Appendix C.
Research Design, Stimuli, and Procedure
See Chapter 4 for full details of the experimental design, procedure, and stimuli.
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Analytic Approach
Main effects. To examine the effects of condition on each of the dependent
measures of risk perception, I used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with the
NoComm condition as the comparison condition. I then followed each regression with
Wald tests to test individual hypotheses and to examine the main effects of presence of
exemplars and valence/topic. To test Hypothesis 7a, I used a separate OLS regression for
each of the four measures of breast cancer risk perception, each time following the
regressions with Wald tests to compare BCNoEx with BCEx and BCEx with BCExRem.
I used OLS regression to test Hypothesis 7b, using the two measures of perceived risk of
having a positive mammogram and using Wald tests to contrast BCNoEx with BCEx and
BCEx with BCExRem. Finally, I also used OLS regression to test Hypothesis 7c with
two measures of perceived risk of having a false-positive mammogram and used Wald
tests to contrast FPNoEx to FPEx and FPEx to FPExRem.
Moderation. I explored the moderating effects of participant education, family
history of breast cancer, history of prior mammogram, survey response time
(dichotomous: less than one half of the mean response time for respective condition vs.
greater than or equal to one half of the mean time), and use of a mobile phone to answer
the survey on the relationship between condition and perceived risk measures using
factorial ANOVA and OLS regression.
Mediation models. The mediation hypotheses tested in this chapter, Hypotheses
8 and 9, involved comparing an exemplar condition to a nonexemplar condition of the
same topic and valence (i.e., FPEx vs. FPNoEx, FPEx vs. FPExRem, BCEx vs. BCNoEx,
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and BCEx vs. BCExRem. In each of these comparisons, a dummy variable was created
for condition such that the condition with exemplars was coded as “1” and the
nonexemplar condition was coded as “0.” Mediator and outcome variables were interval
or ratio. Hypotheses 8 and 9 involved testing a simple mediation model as illustrated in
Figure 5.1. The mediator (M) and the dependent variable (Y) varied based on the
hypothesis being tested. All models were tested using PROCESS for SPSS (Hayes,
2016) with SPSS version 22. I used bootstrapping to create bias-corrected 95%
confidence intervals for indirect effects as recommended by Hayes (2009, 2013).
Results
Mobile Phone Use
Participant characteristics by mobile phone use are summarized in Chapter 5.
Most tests of the use of mobile phones to take the survey as a moderator of the effects of
condition on outcome variables were not significant. However, taking the survey on a
mobile phone significantly moderated the effect of BCEx vs. BCNoEx on perceived fiveyear risk of breast cancer such that the BCNoEx condition increased perceived risk for
mobile users and decreased perceived risk for non-mobile users (i.e., the interaction term
in a 2x2 ANOVA was significant, F(1, 255) = 5.79, p = .017; see Figure 6.1). It also
moderated the effect of topic/valence on perceived risk of experiencing a false positive,
such that topic/valence had little effect for those who completed the survey on a mobile
phone (the interaction was significant, F(1, 807) = 3.99, p = .046). For those who did not
use a mobile phone, comments about mammogram-detected breast cancer led to lower
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perceived risk of a false positive than did comments about false-positive mammograms
(see Figure 6.2).12

Perceived risk of false positive,
frequency

35
30
25
20
BCNoEx
15

BCEx

10
5
0
mobile

not mobile

Figure 6.1. Use of mobile phone to answer survey as a moderator of effect of BCNoEx
condition (vs. BCEx) on perceived risk of a false positive.

12

Two out of 24 (or 8.3% of) tests of the interaction between using a mobile phone and
condition were significant, which is only slightly higher than the percentage expected by
chance with an alpha level of .05.
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Perceived risk of false positive,
frequency

35
30
25
20
All BC conditions
15

All FP conditions

10
5
0
mobile

not mobile

Figure 6.2. Use of mobile phone to answer survey as a moderator of effect of conditions
with comments about mammogram-detected breast cancer (vs. comments about false
positives) on perceived risk of a false positive.

Main Effects of Comments on Perceived Risk
Means for all measures of perceived risk are presented in Table 6.1. Table 6.2
summarizes results of analyses testing Hypotheses 7a, 7b, and 7c.
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Table 6.1
Mean Risk Perceptions, by Condition
Condition

Variable
n
Perceived 5-year
breast cancer
risk as a
frequency, M
Perceived
lifetime risk of
breast cancer as
a frequency, M
Perceived 5-year
risk of breast
cancer as a
percentage, M
Perceived
lifetime risk of
breast cancer as
a percentage, M
Perceived risk of
experiencing a

Overall F
test for
regression,
F (df)

NoInfo
156

NoCom
m
140

FPNoEx
160

BCNoEx
116

FPEx
133

BCEx
143

FPExRe
m
128

BCExRe
m
132

29.9**

21.6

25.2

31.4***

24.8

25.6

24.5

27.6*

F (7, 1100)
= 2.78**

41.2***

30.8

32.0

36.9*

31.9

35.8*

30.5

36.2*

F (7, 1100)
= 4.17***

25.7*

19.6

20.8

24.3

22.7

23.6

23.8

25.6*

F (7, 1094)
= 1.39

32.7**

25.2

26.4

29.9

29.2

29.1

28.4

30.6*

F (7, 1095)
= 1.48

25.1*

19.4

20.9

23.2

23.5

20.7

23.4

24.0*

F (7, 1098)
= 1.39
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positive
mammogram as
a frequency, M
Perceived Risk
of Experiencing
a Positive
Mammogram as
a Percentage, M
Mean perceived
risk of
experiencing a
false-positive
mammogram as
a frequency, M
Mean perceived
risk of
experiencing a
false-positive
mammogram as
a percentage, M

23.9*

18.1

19.1

21.3

19.5

17.6

23.4

22.2

F (7, 1096)
= 1.68

32.3*

27.3

28.7

29.7

31.1

26.5

35.9**

31.8

F (7, 1098)
= 2.59*

31.5

25.9

27.6

27.6

29.2

25.6

35.0**

31.9*

F (7, 1098)
= 2.27*

Note. N = 1,108. Conditions are as follows: NoInfo = no information control, NoComm = no comments control, FPNoEx = falsepositive comments without exemplars, BCNoEx = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx = falsepositive comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with exemplars, FPExRem = false
positive comments with exemplars removed, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with exemplars
removed. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression was used to compare all conditions to the NoComm condition, the condition in
which participants received the stimulus news story but no comments. Means that are significantly different from the mean of the
NoComm condition are marked with an asterisk.
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*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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Table 6.2
Summary of Analyses Testing Main Effect Hypotheses
Hypothesis
Tested

Outcome Variable

Conditions
Compared

Wald test
result

Conclusion

H7a

Perceived 5-year breast
cancer risk as a
frequency out of 100

BCNoEx vs.
BCEx

F (1, 1100)
= 4.26, p =
.04

BCNoEx >
BCEx, No
support for H7a
(wrong
direction)

BCEx vs.
BCExRem

F (1, 1100)
= 0.65, p =
.42

BCEx ≈
BCExRem, No
support for H7a

BCNoEx vs.
BCEx

F (1, 1100)
= 0.14, p =
.71

BCNoEx ≈
BCEx, No
support for H7a

BCEx vs.
BCExRem

F (1, 1100)
= 0.02, p =
.89

BCEx ≈
BCExRem, No
support for H7a

BCNoEx vs.
BCEx

F (1, 1094)
= 0.06, p =
.81

BCNoEx ≈
BCEx, No
support for H7a

BCEx vs.
BCExRem

F (1, 1094)
= 0.53, p =
.47

BCEx ≈
BCExRem, No
support for H7a

BCNoEx vs.
BCEx

F (1, 1095)
= 0.07, p =
.79

BCNoEx ≈
BCEx, No
support for H7a

BCEx vs.
BCExRem

F (1, 1095)
= 0.27, p =
.61

BCEx ≈
BCExRem, No
support for H7a

BCNoEx vs.
BCEx

F (1, 1098)
= 1.03, p =
.31

BCNoEx ≈
BCEx, No
support for H7b

Perceived lifetime risk
of breast cancer as a
frequency out of 100

Perceived 5-year breast
cancer risk as a
percentage

Perceived lifetime risk
of breast cancer as a
percentage

H7b

Perceived risk of
having a positive
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H7c

mammogram as a
frequency out of 100

BCEx vs.
BCExRem

F (1, 1098)
= 2.07, p =
.15

BCEx ≈
BCExRem, No
support for H7b

Perceived risk of
having a positive
mammogram as a
percentage

BCNoEx vs.
BCEx

F (1, 1096)
= 2.16, p =
.14

BCNoEx ≈
BCEx, No
support for H7b

BCEx vs.
BCExRem

F (1, 1096)
= 3.36, p =
.07

BCEx ≈
BCExRem, No
support for H7b

FPNoEx vs.
FPEx

F (1, 1098)
= 0.83, p =
.36

FPNoEx ≈
FPEx, No
support for H7c

FPEx vs.
FPExRem

F (1, 1098)
= 3.09, p =
.08

FPEx ≈
FPExRem, No
support for H7c

FPNoEx vs.
FPEx

F (1, 1098)
= 0.31, p =
.58

FPNoEx ≈
FPEx, No
support for H7c

FPEx vs.
FPExRem

F (1, 1098)
= 3.32, p =
.07

FPEx ≈
FPExRem, No
support for H7c

Perceived risk of
having a false-positive
mammogram as a
frequency out of 100

Perceived risk of
having a false-positive
mammogram as a
percentage

Note. Conditions are as follows: FPNoEx = false-positive comments without exemplars,
BCNoEx = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx =
false-positive comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected breast cancer
comments with exemplars, FPExRem = false positive comments with exemplars
removed, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with
exemplars removed.
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I used OLS regression to examine the effects of condition on each of the four
measures of perceived risk of breast cancer.13 Hypothesis 7a predicted that the presence
of comments with mammogram-detected cancer exemplars would be associated with
increased perceived breast cancer risk when compared to the presence of mammogramdetected cancer comments without exemplars (i.e., nonexemplar comments of the same
valence and topic).
Perceived 5-year risk of breast cancer as a frequency. Mean perceived risk of
developing breast cancer in the next five years, when risk was measured as a frequency
out of 100, is shown in Figure 6.3. The overall F test for the regression was significant
(F (7, 1100) = 2.78, p = .007), with NoInfo, BCNoEx, and BCExRem being significantly
higher than NoComm (p = .001, p < .001, and p = .015, respectively). Planned Wald
tests following the regression show that perceived risk in BCNoEx was significantly
higher than in BCEx, F (1, 1100) = 4.26, p = .04, contrary to H7a. This effect was
moderated by history of a prior mammogram; such that the difference between BCEx and
BCNoEx was not significant for women who had had a prior mammogram (the
interaction between condition and mammography history in an ANOVA was significant,
F (1, 255) = 4.22, p = .04; see Figure 6.4). BCEx was not significantly different from
BCExRem (see Table 6.2). Hypothesis 7a was not supported for this measure of
perceived breast cancer risk.

I repeated the analyses described below with an aggregated measure of risk that
combined the four measures of perceived risk of breast cancer. There was no effect of
exemplars when these measures were combined.
13
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Perceived risk as a frequency out of 100

Perceived 5-Year Breast Cancer Risk as a Frequency, by
Condition (N = 1,108)
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

31.4

29.9
25.2

21.6

NoInfo

NoComm

FPNoEx

BCNoEx

24.8

25.6

24.5

FPEx

BCEx

FPExRem

27.6

BCExRem

Condition

Figure 6.3. Mean perceived risk of having breast cancer in the next five years when risk
was measured as a frequency out of 100, by condition. Error bars indicate ±SE.

Perceived 5-year risk of breast cancer,
frequency

40
35
30
25
BCEx
20

BCNoEx
average of NoComm

15
10
5
0
Prior mammogram

No prior mammogram

Figure 6.4. Representation of moderating effect of history of prior mammogram on
relationship between exemplars and perceived 5-year risk of breast cancer measured as a
frequency.
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Exploratory Wald tests show that, collectively, BCNoEx, BCEx, and BCExRem
had significantly higher perceived 5-year risk of breast cancer as a frequency than
combined conditions FPNoEx, FPEx, and FPExRem, F (1, 1100) = 4.74, p = .030.
Means for each combined group of conditions and the control conditions are shown in
Figure 6.5. In addition to the significant difference between all false-positive conditions
and all mammogram-detected breast cancer conditions, the NoInfo control condition was
significantly higher than the NoComm control condition (F(1,1100) = 11.32, p < .001)
and all false positive conditions combined (F( 1, 1100) = 5.75, p = .017), and all breast
cancer conditions combined were significantly higher than the NoComm control
(F(1,1100) = 10.89, p = .001). When each exemplar condition was compared to the
combined nonexemplar conditions of the same valence (BCEx vs. BCNoEx and
BCExRem combined; FPEx vs. FPNoEx and FPExRem combined), there were no
significant effects of exemplars on perceived 5-year breast cancer risk measured as a
frequency.
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50

Perceived risk as a frequency out of 100

45
40
35

29.9a

28.0a

30

24.8b

21.6b

25
20
15
10
5
0
NoInfo

NoComm

All FP Conditions

All BC Conditions

Condition

Figure 6.5. Mean perceived 5-year risk of breast cancer (measured as a frequency) across
control conditions and conditions combined by topic/valence. Error bars indicate ± SE.
Means sharing the same superscript are not significantly different from each other (F test,
p<.05).

Perceived lifetime risk of breast cancer as a frequency. The mean perceived
risk of developing breast cancer in one’s lifetime, measured as a frequency out of 100, is
presented in Figure 6.6. The pattern is similar to 5-year risk: the overall regression is
significant, F (7, 1100) = 4.17, p < .001, and NoInfo, BCNoEx, BCEx, and BCExRem
are significantly higher than NoComm (p < .001, p = .015, p = .043, and p = .027,
respectively). Planned Wald tests show that BCEx did not differ significantly from either
BCNoEx or BCExRem, so Hypothesis 7a was not supported for this measure of
perceived breast cancer risk (see Table 6.2).
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Perceivedrisk as a frequency out of 100

Perceived Lifetime Risk of Breast Cancer as a Frequency,
by Condition (N = 1,108)
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Figure 6.6. Mean perceived risk of having breast cancer in one’s lifetime when risk was
measured as a frequency out of 100, by condition. Error bars indicate ±SE.

Exploratory analyses again showed that, collectively, BCNoEx, BCEx, and
BCExRem had significantly higher perceived risk for this measure than FPNoEx, FPEx,
and FPExRem, F (1, 1100) = 10.24, p = .001. Means for each set of combined conditions
and each control group are shown in Figure 6.7. In addition to the significant difference
between all mammogram-detected breast cancer conditions and all false-positive
conditions, mean perceived risk in the all BC conditions was higher than the NoComm
control (F (1, 1100) = 7.95, p = .005), and the NoInfo control was higher than the
NoComm control (F (1, 1100) = 17.46, p < .001), all FP conditions combined (F (1,
1100) = 20.30, p < .001), and all BC conditions combined (F (1, 1100) = 5.07, p = .025).
When each exemplar condition was compared to the combined nonexemplar conditions
of the same valence (BCEx vs. BCNoEx and BCExRem combined; FPEx vs. FPNoEx
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and FPExRem combined), there were no significant effects of exemplars on perceived
lifetime breast cancer risk measured as a frequency.
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Figure 6.7. Mean perceived lifetime risk of breast cancer (measured as a frequency)
across control conditions and conditions combined by topic/valence. Error bars indicate
± SE. Means sharing the same superscript are not significantly different from each other
(F test, p<.05).
Perceived 5-year risk of breast cancer as a percentage. Figure 6.8 displays
mean perceived risk of developing breast cancer in the next five years across conditions,
with risk being measured as a percentage. The overall regression was not significant, F
(7, 1094) = 1.39, p = .21. Planned Wald tests show that BCEx did not differ significantly
from either BCNoEx or BCExRem, so Hypothesis 7a was not supported for this measure
of perceived breast cancer risk (see Table 6.2). However, there was a significant
moderating effect of prior history of a mammogram, such that the predicted difference
between BCEx and BCNoEx emerged for women who had had a mammogram (the
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interaction between condition and mammography history in an ANOVA was significant,
F (1, 255) = 4.91, p = .03; see Figure 6.9). There was also a moderating effect of family
history of breast cancer; for women with a family history, BCEx led to higher perceived
risk than BCExRem (in an ANOVA, the interaction between condition and family history
was significant, F (1, 270) = 10.74, p = .001; see Figure 6.10). Finally, there was a
moderating effect of education on the relationship between exemplars and risk
perceptions, such that BCExRem led to lower perceived risk that BCEx for the most
highly educated but higher perceived risk for participants with lower levels of education
(in an ANOVA, the interaction between condition and education recoded as a continuous
measure was significant, F (1, 270) = 5.59, p = .02; see Figure 6.11). Exploratory
analyses showed that there were no significant differences when all mammogramdetected breast cancer comment conditions were compared to conditions with falsepositive mammogram comments or when exemplar conditions were compared to
corresponding combined nonexemplar conditions (BCEx vs. BCNoEx and BCExRem
combined; FPEx vs. FPNoEx and FPExRem combined). Thus, there were not effects of
topic or presence of exemplars.
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Perceived risk as a percentage

Perceived 5-Year Risk of Breast Cancer as a Percentage,
by Condition (N = 1,108)
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Figure 6.8. Mean perceived risk of having breast cancer in the next five years when risk
was measured as a percentage, by condition. Error bars indicate ±SE.
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Figure 6.9. Representation of the effect of BCEx (vs. BCNoEx) on perceived 5-year risk
of developing breast cancer, as moderated by prior history of mammogram.
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Figure 6.10. Representation of the effect of BCEx (vs. BCExRem) on perceived 5-year
risk of developing breast cancer, as moderated by family history of breast cancer.
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Figure 6.11. Representation of the effect of BCEx (vs. BCExRem) on perceived 5-year
risk of developing breast cancer, as moderated by education. Note that 39.8% of the
sample had at least a college degree, while only 2.3% had less than a high school degree,
so estimates may be unstable for low levels of education.

Perceived lifetime risk of breast cancer as a percentage. Mean perceived
lifetime breast cancer risk, measured as a percentage, is presented in Figure 6.12. The
overall regression was not significant, F (7, 1095) = 1.48, p = .17. BCEx did not differ
significantly from either BCNoEx or BCExRem, so Hypothesis 7a was not supported for
this measure of perceived breast cancer risk (see Table 6.2). However, there was a
significant moderating effect of family history of breast cancer; as with perceived 5-year
risk, for women with a family history, BCEx led to higher perceived risk than BCExRem
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(in an ANOVA, the interaction between condition and family history of breast cancer was
significant, F (1, 270) = 6.49, p = .01; see Figure 6.13). Exploratory analyses showed
that there were no significant differences when all mammogram-detected breast cancer
comment conditions were compared to conditions with false-positive mammogram
comments or when exemplar conditions were compared to corresponding combined
nonexemplar conditions (BCEx vs. BCNoEx and BCExRem combined; FPEx vs.
FPNoEx and FPExRem combined). Thus, there was no evidence of an effect of topic or
presence of exemplars.

Perceived risk as a percentage

Perceived Lifetime Risk of Breast Cancer as a Percentage,
by Condition (N = 1,103)
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Figure 6.12. Mean perceived risk of having breast cancer in one’s lifetime when risk was
measured as a percentage, by condition. Error bars indicate ±SE.
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Figure 6.13. Representation of the effect of BCEx (vs. BCExRem) on perceived lifetime
risk of developing breast cancer, as moderated by family history of breast cancer.

Perceived risk of positive mammogram. Perceived risk of experiencing a
positive mammogram was measured both as a frequency out of 100 and as a percentage,
and the means are presented in Figure 6.14 and Figure 6.15, respectively.14 Hypothesis
7b predicted that the presence of comments with mammogram-detected cancer exemplars
would be associated with increased perceived risk of a positive mammogram when
compared to the presence of mammogram-detected cancer comments without exemplars.

14

I repeated the analyses with a combined measure of risk of a positive mammogram, but
the pattern of results is the same as for the individual measures.
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Perceived risk as frequency out of 100

Perceived Risk of Experiencing a Positive Mammogram as
a Frequency, by Condition (N = 1,106)
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Figure 6.14. Mean perceived risk of experiencing a positive mammogram, measured as a
frequency out of 100, by condition.

Perceived risk as a percentage

Perceived Risk of Experiencing a Positive Mammogram as
a Percentage, by Condition (N = 1,104)
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Figure 6.15. Mean perceived risk of experiencing a positive mammogram, measured as a
percentage, by condition.
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When perceived risk of experiencing a positive mammogram was measured as a
frequency, the overall regression comparing each condition to NoComm was not
significant, F (7, 1098) = 1.39, p = .21. Planned contrasts (using Wald tests) show that
BCEx did not differ significantly from BCNoEx or BCExRem (see Table 6.2). However,
there was a significant moderating effect of family history of breast cancer, such that the
expected effect did appear for women with a family history (in a factorial ANOVA, the
interaction between condition (BCEx vs. BCExRem) and family history (no family
history of breast cancer vs. at least one first degree relative with breast cancer) was
significant, F (1, 270) = 4.66, p = .03; see Figure 6.16). There was also a moderating
effect of education, and the predicted effect was only present for the most highly
educated; in an ANOVA, the interaction between condition (BCNoEx vs. BCEx) and
education, recoded as a continuous variable, was significant, F (1, 254) = 4.55, p = .03.
As levels of education decreased, BCNoEx led to higher levels of perceived risk than
BCEx (see Figure 6.17).
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Figure 6.16. Representation of the effect of BCEx (vs. BCExRem) on perceived risk of
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having a positive mammogram, as moderated by family history of breast cancer.
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Figure 6.17. Representation of the effect of BCEx (vs. BCNoEx) on perceived risk of
having a positive mammogram, as moderated by level of education.
When perceived risk of having a positive mammogram was measured as a
percentage, the overall regression was not significant, F (7, 1096) = 1.68, p = .11, and
planned contrasts show that BCEx did not differ significantly from BCNoEx or
BCExRem (see Table 6.2). Hypothesis 7b was not supported. However, there was an
unexpected moderating effect of history of prior mammogram; in a factorial ANOVA,
the interaction between condition (BCEx vs. BCNoEx) and history of mammogram was
significant, F (1, 254) = 5.86, p = .02. There was no substantial difference between the
BCEx and BCNoEx condition for women with a prior mammogram, but, for women who
had not had a prior mammogram, the BCNoEx condition led to higher perceived risk of a
positive mammogram (see Figure 6.18).
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Figure 6.18. Representation of the effect of BCEx (vs. BCNoEx) on perceived risk of
having a positive mammogram, as moderated by history of prior mammogram.
Exploratory analyses showed that there were no significant differences when all
mammogram-detected breast cancer comment conditions were compared to conditions
with false-positive mammogram comments or when the mammogram-detected cancer
exemplar condition was compared to combined cancer nonexemplar conditions (BCEx
vs. BCNoEx and BCExRem combined). Thus, there were no effects of topic or presence
of exemplars on this measure of perceived risk.
Perceived risk of a false-positive mammogram. Like the other risk constructs,
perceived risk of having a false-positive mammogram was measured as both a frequency
out of 100 and a percentage.15 Means by condition when risk was measured as a
frequency are presented in Figure 6.19. Means by condition when risk was measured as a
percentage are presented in Figure 6.20. Hypothesis 7c predicted that the presence of
comments with false-positive exemplars would increase perceived risk of experiencing a
false-positive when compared to the presence of false-positive comments without
exemplars.

15

I repeated these analyses using a combined measure of risk of a false positive, but there
was still no significant effect of exemplars on perceived risk.
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Perceived risk as frequency out of 100

Mean Perceived Risk of Experiencing a False-Positive
Mammogram as a Frequency, by Condition (N = 1,106)
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Figure 6.19. Mean perceived risk of experiencing a false-positive mammogram,
measured as a frequency out of 100, by condition.

Perceived risk as %
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Figure 6.20. Mean perceived risk of experiencing a false-positive mammogram,
measured as a percentage, by condition.
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When perceived risk of having a false positive was measured as a frequency out
of 100, the regression was significant, F (7, 1098) = 2.59, p = .01, and NoInfo and
FPExRem had significantly higher average perceived risks than NoComm (p = .048 and
p = .001, respectively). Planned Wald tests show that FPEx was not significantly
different from FPNoEx or FPExRem (see Table 6.2). However, for participants with a
higher reading time (compared to those with a reading time that was less than half the
median time for participants in their condition), the FPExRem condition led to higher
perceived risk of a false positive than the FPEx condition. In a factorial ANOVA, the
interaction between condition [FPEx vs. FPExRem] and a dichotomous measure of
reading time was significant, F (1, 257), = 6.16, p = .01; see Figure G1 in Appendix G.
When perceived risk of a false positive was measured as a percentage, the regression was
significant, F (7, 1098) = 2.59, p = .01, and FPExRem and BCExRem had significantly
higher average perceived risks than NoComm (p =.003 and p = .035). Again, FPEx was
not significantly different from FPNoEx or FPExRem (see Table 6.2), but there was
again a moderating effect of reading time. In a factorial ANOVA, the interaction between
condition [FPEx vs. FPExRem] and a dichotomous measure of reading time was
significant, F (1, 257) = 4.47, p = .04; see Figure G2 in Appendix G. Hypothesis 7c was
not supported for either measure of perceived risk of a false-positive mammogram.
Exploratory analyses showed that there were no significant differences when all
mammogram-detected breast cancer comment conditions were compared to conditions
with false-positive mammogram comments or when both false-positive nonexemplar
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conditions were compared to the false-positive exemplar condition (FPEx vs. FPNoEx
and FPExRem combined) for either measure of perceived risk of a false-positive
mammogram.
Mediators of Effects of Comments on Perceived Risk
I used mediation analysis to test Hypotheses 8a, 8b, 8c, and 9. A summary of the
results of formal tests of indirect effects for each proposed mediator are presented in the
sections that follow. Full details of these results are available in Appendix F.
Negative affect. Negative affect was the primary proposed mediator of effects of
exemplars on risk perceptions. Negative affect by condition is shown in Figure 6.21;
FPEx was the only individual condition to lead to a significant increase in negative affect.
However, when all false positive comment conditions (FPNoEx, FPEx, and FPExRem)
were combined and all breast cancer comment conditions (BCNoEx, BCEx, and
BCExRem) were combined, each set led to significantly higher negative affect than the
NoComm condition (see Figure 6.22). There was no significant effect of exemplars on
negative affect (regardless of whether each exemplar condition was compared to its
corresponding individual nonexemplar conditions or combined nonexemplar conditions)
or of comment topic/valence on negative affect. Though greater negative affect was
consistently significantly associated with an increase in perceived risk of breast cancer
(path coefficients in mediation models ranged from 4.38 [p = .006] to 12.28 [p < .001]),
regardless of how risk was measured, there was no effect of condition on perceived risk
of breast cancer and no indirect effects through negative affect (see Tables F8 through
F11). Greater negative affect was also significantly associated with an increase in
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perceived risk of a positive mammogram (path coefficients in mediation models ranged
from 5.93 to 10.26, both p < .001; see Tables F12 and F13) and perceived risk of having
a false-positive mammogram (path coefficients in mediation models ranged from 2.48
[not significant] to 7.85 [p < .001]; see Tables F14 and F15). However, as with perceived
risk of breast cancer, there were no indirect effects of exemplars on positive mammogram
or false-positive mammogram risk perceptions through negative affect. Due to the lack
of indirect effects, there was no support for H8a, H8b, or H8c.
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Figure 6.21. Mean negative affect, by condition. Negative affect was measured using
the 10-item negative affect scale from the Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule
(PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Responses for each item ranged from 1 to 5
(very slightly or not at all/a little/moderately/quite a bit/extremely) and the ten items were
averaged to form the scale.
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Figure 6.22. Mean negative affect, by control conditions and conditions combined by
topic/valence. Negative affect was measured using the 10-item negative affect scale from
the Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen,
1988). Responses for each item ranged from 1 to 5 (very slightly or not at all/a
little/moderately/quite a bit/extremely) and the ten items were averaged to form the scale.
Groups that share a superscript are not significantly different from each other (p < .05).

Perceived risk as a mediator. I also conducted a mediation analyses using OLS
path analysis to test the role of perceived risk of breast cancer as a mediator of the effect
of exemplars on intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years. Although
perceived risk of breast cancer (measured as a percentage) was consistently significantly
related to increased intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years (see Tables
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F18 and F19), there were no consistent effects of exemplars on risk (regardless of how
risk was measured). There were also no significant indirect effects of exemplars on
intentions through risk perceptions, thus H9 was not supported.
Exploratory analyses. In addition to the hypothesis-driven mediation analyses
reported above, I also performed exploratory mediation analyses to attempt to explain the
effect of comment topic/valence on risk perceptions. Of the variables tested (including
narrative transportation, attitudes, norms, self-efficacy, and affect), none significantly
mediated the effects.
Discussion
This study investigates the impact of mammography news commentary on risk
perceptions, including perceived risk of contracting breast cancer, perceived risk of
having a positive mammogram, and perceived risk of having a false-positive
mammogram. It also investigates the mechanisms underlying these effects, including
moderating effects of education, family history of breast cancer, history of prior
mammogram, and time spent with the experimental manipulation and mediating effects
of negative affect.
Effects of Comment Topic
Though there was no evidence of a positive effect of presence of exemplars on
perceived risk, I did observe an effect of comment topic on breast cancer risk perceptions
that was not hypothesized. For both five-year breast cancer risk measured as a frequency
and lifetime breast cancer risk measured as a frequency, BCNoEx, BCEx, and BCExRem
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had significantly higher perceived risk of breast cancer than FPNoEx, FPEx, and
FPExRem.
While the effects of comment topic (false-positive mammograms vs.
mammogram-detected cancer) on mammography intention reported in Chapter 5 were
predicted and may be explained by the difference in valence, the effects of topic on risk
perceptions reported in this chapter were unexpected and not as easily explained by
valence. Instead, I propose that the effects of topic on risk perceptions were due to their
differences in content and might be explained by the availability heuristic (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1982). According to Tversky and Kahneman, “a person is said to employ the
availability heuristic whenever he estimates frequency or probability by the ease with
which instances or associations could be brought to mind" (1982, p. 164). It is plausible
that those who read comments about mammogram-detected breast cancer had higher
breast cancer risk perceptions than those who read about false positives because they
could more easily recall instances of others discussing having been diagnosed with breast
cancer. Comments about mammogram-detected cancer may have also been more
accessible due to being more believable, familiar, or higher in perceived argument
strength than false-positive comments. These possible mechanisms of action should be
explored through future research.
Effect of Exemplars in Comments
Results of tests of hypotheses 7a, 7b, and 7c (main effects of exemplars on risk
perceptions) are presented in Table 6.2. In this experiment, there is no evidence that
exemplars increase breast cancer risk perceptions, thus H7a was not supported. In fact,
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there was one test that showed exemplars decreased risk perceptions, contrary to my
hypothesis; when perceived risk of developing breast cancer in the next five years was
measured as a frequency, the mammogram-detected cancer comments condition with
exemplars led to a lower perceived risk than the condition without exemplars. There is
also no evidence that the presence of exemplars affects perceived risk of have a positive
mammogram or perceived risk of having a false positive, meaning there is also no
support for H7b and H7c, respectively.
Despite my prediction that exemplar comments would increase risk perceptions
over nonexemplar comments because of the availability heuristic, availability may also
actually explain why the predicted differences between exemplar and nonexemplar
conditions did not emerge for risk perceptions. Sometimes, FPExRem and BCExRem
even appeared to have higher means when compared to FPEx and BCEx, respectively,
though the differences never reached significance. In the FPExRem and BCExRem
conditions, exemplars were removed from comments by replacing mentions of individual
women with “women” or “some women.” It is possible that, though FPExRem and
BCExRem did not technically contain exemplars according to my relatively narrow
operational definition, the comments in these conditions conveyed the idea that many
other women were experiencing false positives (FPExRem) or mammogram-detected
breast cancer (BCExRem). Future research should examine how effects differ with
definitions of exemplars that are more or less inclusive. It should also be noted that much
of the work on exemplars (e.g., Zillmann, 2006) contrasts exemplars with numeric baserates and not merely with statements lacking exemplars, as I have. While this
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experimental decision was made in an attempt to isolate effects of exemplars, the choice
of comparison condition may have contributed to the lack of effects.
As mentioned in Chapter 5, there are several additional reasons why exemplars
may have failed to produce the predicted effects. First, participants spent very little time
reading the experimentally manipulated comments.16 Due to the low average time spent
on the page of the survey that displayed the experimental manipulation, exposure to the
manipulation may have been insufficient to produce effects on the constructs of interest.
Though moderation analyses did not show a significant moderation effect of reading
time, the study may not have enough power to detect moderation effects. Finally, it is
possible that effects of exemplars will only emerge over time, producing a sleeper effect.
Effect of Presence of Comments
As mentioned in Chapter 5, these findings are consistent with prior research (Shi,
Messaris, & Cappella, 2014) that found that the presence of any comments (positive or
negative) detracts from the perceived effectiveness of the message. Indeed, the presence
of any comments may have had harmful effects on readers in the present research by
altering the effects of the news article. Compared to the NoInfo condition, the NoComm
condition to decreased breast cancer risk perceptions. Conditions in which participants

As described in Chapter 5, in conditions with comments, median time spent on the
comment page ranged from a low of 29 seconds for BCExRem to a high of 57 seconds
for FPEx. The average set of comments in BCExRem was 398 words, and the average
set of comments in FPEx was 584 words. Typical reading speeds in experimental studies
involving reading on computer screens (Knoblauch, Arditi, & Szlyk, 1991) and
smartphones (Na, Choi, & Suk, 2016) are roughly 300 words per minute. At these
speeds, it should take readers an average of 80 seconds to read the comments in
BCExRem and an average of 117 seconds to read the comments in FPEx.
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viewed the news story and a set of comments generally increased breast cancer risk
perceptions. Because participants who read the article but no comments had the lowest
perceived breast cancer risk and women tend to overestimate their breast cancer risk
(Hoffman et al., 2010), these women (in the NoComm condition) most likely also had the
most accurate risk perceptions.17 This would mean that any comments (but
mammogram-detected breast cancer comments, in particular) further inflated
overestimates of risk.
Moderation of Effects
Additionally, I found several moderation effects that were not hypothesized.
First, a participant’s family history of breast cancer moderates the effect of exemplar
conditions on risk perceptions.18 For women with a family history (approximately 15%
of the sample), the BCEx condition led to higher perceived 5-year and lifetime risk of
breast cancer compared to the BCExRem condition. The pattern was reversed for women
without a family history. Similarly, for women with a family history of breast cancer, the
BCEx condition led to increases in perceived risk of a positive mammogram over the
BCExRem condition. Again, the pattern was reversed for women without a family
history. There was also a moderating effect of history of a prior mammogram; effects of

Based on current incidence rates (National Cancer Institute, 2015), the national average
lifetime risk of breast cancer is 12.5%, but the average estimate from women in NoComm
was 25.2%. Though this is still an overestimate (especially since women at the highest
risk of developing breast cancer were excluded from the study), it is lower than average
estimates in any other condition.
18
Three out of 16 (or 18.8%) of tests examining the interaction between conditions and
family history of breast cancer were significant, which is greater than the percentage
expected by chance with an alpha level of .05.
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exemplar conditions on risk perceptions were closer to the predicted effects for women
with a history of prior mammography.19 Education also had a moderating effect on the
relationship between exemplar conditions and risk perceptions. The expected effects of
exemplars on breast cancer risk perceptions emerged for the most highly educated
participants when BCEx was compared to BCExRem for five-year risk of breast cancer
measured as a percentage. An additional two marginally significant interactions showed
the same pattern of results. A similar pattern emerged when the dependent variable was
perceived risk of a positive mammogram; only one test of the interaction was significant,
but the remaining three were in the same direction.20
As is Chapter 5, the moderation effects by family history of breast cancer, history
of prior mammography, and education are consistent with predictions of the Elaboration
Likelihood Model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981, 1986a, 1986b). The fact that
expected effects of exemplars (BCEx > BCNoEx and BCEx > BCExRem) on risk
perceptions emerged for the most highly educated participants is indicative of an effect of
greater ability to process the experimental messages. The observed moderation effects of
family history of breast cancer and history of a prior mammogram are consistent with the
expected effects of greater motivation to attend to messages. As predicted by the ELM,

19

Three out of 24 (or 12.5%) of tests examining the interaction between conditions and
history of a prior mammogram were significant, which is greater than the percentage
expected by chance with an alpha level of .05.
20
Across all 24 tests examining the interaction between conditions and education, two (or
8.3%) were significant. This is slightly greater than the percentage expected by chance
with an alpha level of .05. Given the additional marginally significant results in the same
direction, this appears to represent a consistent pattern of effects.
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higher levels of ability and motivation to process messages appear to leader to stronger
persuasive effects. The observed moderation effects of reading time on effects of
exemplars on perceived risk of a false positive are not as clearly explained by this
framework. If longer reading time is an indication of higher attention to the experimental
manipulation, then the FPExRem condition may have conveyed that multiple women had
experiences with false positives compared to single examples presented in the FPEx
condition (a possibility mentioned above).
Mediation of Effects
This chapter also presented results of mediation tests designed to examine the
mechanisms underlying effects of comments on risk perceptions. Though comment
conditions, in general, led to elevated levels of negative affect, exemplars did not produce
more negative affect than nonexemplar conditions. Thus, there was no evidence of
indirect effects of exemplars on risk perceptions through negative affect (as proposed in
H8a, H8b, and H8c) due to a lack of effects of exemplar conditions. However, negative
affect was consistently related to perceived risk of having breast cancer and risk of
having a positive mammogram. The role of negative affect in predicting perceived risk
of having a false-positive mammogram was not as consistent but was significant when
FPEx was compared to FPNoEx. Though the expected path between exemplars, negative
affect, and perceived risk was not present, the observed effects are of interest. Compared
to the NoComm condition, all comment conditions combined resulted in significantly
elevated levels of negative affect. In Chapter 5, I proposed that all comments may have
been viewed as exemplars, which would reduce my ability to detect differences between
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comment conditions. Narratives (Green, 2006), testimonials (Dunlop, Wakefield, &
Kashima, 2008) and breast cancer narratives (McQueen & Kreuter, 2010) are all expected
to increase negative affect more than nonnarrative text., so my alternate explanation is
supported by the findings regarding the effects of all comments on negative affect.
Perceived breast cancer risk was also positively associated with intention in many
cases, particularly when risk was measured as a percentage. However, there was no
evidence of indirect effects of exemplars on mammography intentions through perceived
breast cancer risk (proposed in H9) due to a lack of effects of condition on perceived risk.
Alternate explanations for the lack of effects on perceived risk are discussed above.
Limitations
As detailed in Chapter 5, the experiment that provided the data for this analysis
has several important limitations, including limitations related to experimental design,
data collection, and generalizability. First, my ability to find effects may have been
limited by my definition of exemplars and subsequent choice of comparison conditions.
Though I defined an exemplar as a mention of an individual in a comment, definitions
vary widely, and one conceptualization refers to exemplars as “short quotations…from
concerned or interested people that illustrate a particular problem or a particular view”
(Brosius, 1999, p. 213). Using this definition, all comments could be considered
exemplars, which would mean that no differences would be expected between comment
conditions of the same valence. This study also has limitations related to data collection
in an online survey setting that may have reduced the likelihood of finding significant
effects. First, because of the online setting, participant attention to the screen, and thus
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exposure to the experimental stimuli, cannot be guaranteed. Secondly, use of mobile
phones may have contributed to low exposure due to the difficulty of reading large
amounts of text on a small screen. I estimate that more than 50% of respondents
accessed the survey from a mobile device, and using a mobile phone to respond did
produce two moderation effects of condition on perceived risk. Researchers should
consider these findings when planning research and attempting to balance generalizability
of experimental settings and fidelity of experimental treatment. Finally, this study has
limitations related to generalizability of measures, stimuli, setting, and population.
Results cannot be reliably generalized to other measures of the constructs used in this
study, other exemplar stimuli, settings outside the online experimental context, or
populations other than women between the ages of 38 and 48 years old.
An additional methodological issue is related to the measurement of perceived
risk. The numeric measurement of perceived susceptibility to breast cancer has been
shown to be difficult to measure. For example, Schapira, Davids, McAuliffe, and
Nattinger (2004) found that accuracy of perceived risk varied based on the timeframe
being measured (five-year vs. lifetime) and the measurement format (percentage vs.
frequency). In their research, only 31% of scale users used the scales consistently (i.e.,
provided equivalent estimates on the percentage and frequency scales), and consistency
was positively associated with numeracy. The inability of participants to adequately use
these scales to express perceived risk may also help explain some of the failed effects,
and results may differ when using other measures of perceived risk (e.g., qualitative
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measures). Finally, though I did not measure numeracy, future research could examine
the possible role of numeracy as a moderator of effects.
Implications
This research has valuable implications related to the effect of comments on risk
perceptions. Findings suggest that the topic of comments may shape breast cancer risk
perceptions, with mammogram-detected cancer comments heightening perceived risk
more than false positive comments and articles presented without comments. Because
women already typically overestimate their breast cancer risk (Hoffman et al., 2010), and
because risk perceptions may inform screening decisions (Gross, Filardo, Singh,
Freedman, & Farrell, 2006), heightening breast cancer risk perceptions may not only
needlessly increase breast cancer worry but also push women to make ill-informed
screening decisions. Taken together with the findings presented in Chapter 5, this
research has implications for those who make decisions about online content related to
mammography. It suggests that allowing comments may have harmful effects on readers
and that comments may alter the effects of the primary content.
Though proposed mediation pathways were not significant, this study also
provides insight into why exemplars did not produce the predicted effects on risk
perceptions and provides further understanding of the relationship between affect and
perceived risk. Specifically, these findings bolster research showing an association
between negative affect and perceived risk of breast cancer (e.g., Dunlop, Wakefield, &
Kashima, 2008 and McQueen, Kreuter, Kalesan, & Alcaraz, 2011).
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CHAPTER 7
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This dissertation examines the prevalence of exemplars in mammography news
articles and user-generated comments, effects of comments on risk perceptions and
mammography intentions, and mechanisms through which comments have their effects.
This chapter includes a discussion of the main findings of each study, the strengths and
limitations of this research, directions for future research, and conclusions that can be
drawn from the dissertation as a whole.
Discussion
This dissertation set out to address three primary research objectives related to
exemplars in user-generated comments that accompany news articles about
mammography:
Objective 1: Describe the prevalence, content, and representativeness of
mammography exemplars in comments on online news about mammography.
Objective 2: Test the effects of comments with exemplars on risk perceptions and
mammography intentions.
Objective 3: Explore the mechanisms of action underlying effects of exemplar
comments on risk perceptions and mammography intentions.
Objectives 1, 2 and 3 are directly addressed by the results presented in Chapters 2, 5, and
6, and the main results from this dissertation can be summarized as follows:
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Study 1 found that approximately one-third of comments on news articles about
mammography included a mammography exemplar. Of comments including a
mammography exemplar, 41% included a mammogram-detected breast cancer
exemplar, 24% included an exemplar in which breast cancer was detected through
other means, and 19% included a false-positive mammogram exemplar. Given an
average population breast cancer rate of 12.5%, exemplars depicting cancer
diagnoses are overrepresented. Exemplar type was also related to comment
valence toward mammography; most comments with false-positive exemplars
were cautious toward mammography, and most comments with mammogramdetected breast cancer exemplars were enthusiastic toward mammography.
Additionally, articles with mammography exemplars were more likely to have
comments that also included mammography exemplars.



In Study 2, when compared to conditions without exemplars, comments with
exemplars did not produce effects on mammography intentions or risk
perceptions. However, there were differences in mammography intentions and
risk perceptions between the two types of exemplar conditions (mammogramdetected breast cancer exemplars vs. false-positive mammogram exemplars) and
between comments of different topic and valence (all mammogram-detected
breast cancer conditions vs. all false-positive mammogram conditions).
Compared to comments about false positives, comments about mammogramdetected breast cancer led to higher intentions to have a mammogram in the next
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two years, lower intentions to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram, and higher
breast cancer risk perceptions.


The examination of mechanisms of effects of comments demonstrated that most
predicted mediation pathways did not exist. This was mostly due to a failure of
exemplar conditions to produce effects on the proposed mediators. Though
exemplars often failed to have the predicted effects on proposed mediators,
proposed mediators were consistently significantly associated with the outcomes
of interest (e.g., narrative transportation, attitudes, perceived norms, and selfefficacy were associated with mammography intentions, and negative affect was
related to perceived risk of having breast cancer and perceived risk of having a
positive mammogram). Exploratory analyses revealed that attitudes toward
waiting until age 50 to have a mammogram mediated some of the effects of
comment topic/valence on intentions. Additionally, exploratory analyses found
that the predicted effects of exemplars often did emerge for participants high in
ability and motivation to read the stimulus materials (i.e., those high in education,
with a family history of breast cancer, or with a history of prior mammograms).

The findings in Study 1 regarding the content of comments on news articles about
mammography are relatively novel, as the author could find no prior published content
analyses of comments appearing with mammography news. There are, however, some
similarities to findings from related research. The prevalence of exemplars in comments
was similar to the prevalence in analyses of comments on other health issues. For
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example, Len-Rios, Bhandari, and Medvedeva (2014) found that 42% of comments on
articles about breastfeeding recommendations discussed personal experiences. Similarly,
the prevalence of mammography exemplars in comments, in particular, was comparable
to the prevalence of mammography exemplars in an analysis of Twitter comments on
breast cancer screening (Lyles, Lόpez, Pasick, and Sarkar, 2013). However, findings
related to the association between exemplars in articles and exemplars in comments are
contrary to previous related research. For example, Holton, Lee, and Coleman (2014)
found no association between episodic framing of general health articles and episodic
framing of comments, nor did Suran, Holton, and Coleman (2014) find an association
between an article being about cancer and the frame of the comments (i.e., articles about
cancer were not more or less likely to have episodic comments). Overall, Study 1
contributes to a general understanding of the content of user-generated comments that
appear with online news articles about mammography by providing further evidence that
exemplars appear in online comments, describing the prevalence of various types of
exemplars in these comments, and providing evidence of a correspondence between
exemplars in articles and exemplars in comments. Understanding the prevalence, type,
and lack of representativeness of mammography exemplars present in comments is
necessary for researchers interested in investigating the effects of these comments on
readers.
Study 2 found that the topic of comments—but not the presence of exemplars—
had an effect on intentions and risk perception. The lack of effects of exemplars on
mammography intentions and risk perceptions was unexpected. Alternate explanations
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for the lack of effects observed in the immediate post-test include lack of participant
attention to the stimuli, inadequate contrast between exemplar and nonexemplar
conditions (i.e., a weak manipulation), and the possibility that effects are not immediate
but will emerge over time (i.e., a “sleeper effect”). Differences in intention between
comments about mammogram-detected breast cancer and comments about false positives
may be due to the different valence of these comments. This effect is supported by prior
literature, which has found effects of comment valence on various outcomes, including
perceived effectiveness of the message accompanied by the comments (Walther,
DeAndrea, Kim, & Anthony, 2010), opinions (Lee & Jang, 2010; Witteman, Fagerlin,
Exe, & Zikmund-Fisher, 2013) and behavioral intentions (Witteman, Fagerlin, Exe, &
Zikmund-Fisher, 2013). The increase in breast cancer risk perceptions seen in
participants who read about mammogram-detected breast cancer may be due to the
availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982). Overall, the effects of comments
may have been harmful to participants by heightening risk perceptions in women who
already tend to overestimate breast cancer risk (Hoffman et al., 2010).
Results from Study 2 also showed that very few of the hypothesized mediation
pathways were supported by the data. Many of these paths were not significant because
exemplar conditions (when compared to nonexemplar conditions) failed to have an effect
on the predicted mediator. This may have been due to low exposure to the intervention, a
weak manipulation, a lack of power to detect very small effects, or the short length of
exemplars used (which may have been too brief to allow for narrative transportation).
Though the hypothesized mediation pathways were not significant, this study provides
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further understanding of perceived risk and theories of behavioral prediction in the
mammography context. That is, because attitudes, norms, and self-efficacy reliably
predicted behavioral intentions, this research offers additional support for the validity of
applying the Integrative Model (Fishbein, 2000) and Reasoned Action Model (Fishbein &
Ajzen, 2010) to mammography behavior. These findings also bolster research showing
an association between negative affect and perceived risk of breast cancer (see, for
example, Dunlop, Wakefield, & Kashima, 2008 and McQueen, Kreuter, Kalesan, &
Alcaraz, 2011). Additionally, findings from moderation analyses are consistent with the
Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981, 1986a, 1986b) and suggest that
the proposed effects of exemplars may only exist for those who are motivated and able to
process them.
Strengths and Limitations
Though these studies have both strengths and limitations, they offer unique
contributions to the understanding of user-generated comments that appear with online
news articles about mammography. One of the strengths of the content analysis
presented in Study 1 is that it addresses an under-researched area—little was previously
known about the content of these comments. It is even more unique it its attempts to
quantify the presence of exemplars in these comments. Additionally, it contributes to
knowledge on the relationship between article features and comment features and
generates a set of data that can be used to further explore this area. Finally, this design is
strengthened by capturing all articles about mammography published in a single source
over a five-year period (as opposed to a sample of articles published during this time
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period or all articles appearing around a particular event over a short timespan) and
taking a stratified sample of comments that allows each article to be represented in the
data. This increases confidence that findings will generalize to future media coverage of
mammography.
The experimental design offers a number of strengths that enhance the value of
this research. First, the use of an experimental design, rather than an observational
design, helps to establish causal order in the study of effects of comments on outcome
variables. Additionally, because participants were randomly assigned to condition, the
risk of confounding variables is mitigated. Further, a between-subjects experimental
design minimizes fatigue and eliminates cross-over effects associated with withinsubjects designs. An additional strength of this research is that the stimuli consisted of
real comments from readers of The New York Times. Even in the conditions that used
comments in which exemplars were removed, the majority of the content was usergenerated. This not only creates a feeling of authenticity for the participant and bolsters
the credibility of the cover story, but it also increases the external generalizability of the
findings. The online experimental context further increases generalizability by testing
effects in an online environment similar to the one in which readers of online news are
typically exposed to content. Finally, the use of multiple sets of comments that were
randomly selected from large pools of comments and randomly ordered reduces order
effects and the risk of a case-category confound. This design also functions as a way to
build in experimental replication (O’Keefe, 2015), an additional strength.
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While many of the strengths of Study 2 stem from the experimental design
described above, there are additional benefits of the analytical methods used. Traditional
mediation analysis approaches suggest that one should not pursue mediation analysis in
the absence of a direct effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable (in
this case, if the condition failed to have an effect on intentions or risk perceptions).
However, Hayes (2009) explains that this approach would fail to detect some intervening
effects, thus a direct effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable should
not be a prerequisite for testing for indirect effects. Hayes (2009, 2013) further argues
that the Baron and Kenny (1986) method for testing mediation is low in power and that
the Sobel (1982, 1986) test, another popular method for testing the significance of an
indirect effect, is flawed in its reliance on the assumption that the sampling distribution of
the indirect effect is normal. In lieu of using these methods, Hayes (2009, 2013)
recommends the use of bootstrapping to construct a confidence interval for the indirect
effect as a means of testing that it is significantly different from zero. By using Hayes’
approach of creating 10,000 bootstrapped samples and bias-corrected confidence
intervals for each indirect effect tested, this research avoids the issues with mediation
testing identified by Hayes.
Despite the general strengths of the methodological approach of these studies, this
research has limitations related to generalizability, experimental design, and data
collection. First, the findings of Study 1 are limited in their generalizability. Despite the
wide readership of The New York Times, the Times is not a national newspaper and may
not be representative of other media outlets. Additionally, readers of the Times are more
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educated and more liberal than consumers of other news sources such as USA Today,
local daily newspapers, or television news (The Pew Research Center for the People &
the Press, 2012). Thus, articles published in The New York Times may not be
representative of articles on mammography found in other media during the time period
covered by the content analysis, and comments on these articles may differ from
comments that would be produced by readers of other online news sources. Finally,
because the content analysis was limited to newspaper coverage of mammography, the
results cannot be reliably generalized to other types of media or other health topics.
Study 2 also has limitations related to generalizability of results. Experimental
findings are primarily limited because of the experimental stimuli used. I only used one
article, so the effect of comments used with this particular article may differ from effects
of comments with other articles. Additionally, though one of the strengths of the study is
that the stimulus comments were real comments (or edited versions of real comments)
found on mammography articles from The New York Times, I could not use all of the
coded comments because some would not make sense with the article. This may limit
generalizability to other types of comments that were not used or to comments and
articles found in other media outlets. Additionally, this experiment included only falsepositive comments that were cautious toward mammography and mammogram-detected
breast cancer comments that were pro-mammography for experimental simplicity. This
means findings can be generalized to most but not all false positive comments and
mammogram-detected breast cancer comments. Finally, this study has limitations related
to generalizability of measures, setting, and population. Results cannot be reliably
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generalized to other measures of the constructs used in this study, settings outside the
online experimental context, or populations other than women between the ages of 38 and
48 years old.
Study 2 is further limited by elements of the experimental design. First, the
decision to use comments in the mammogram-detected breast cancer conditions that were
all pro-mammogram and comments in the false-positive mammogram conditions that
were cautious toward mammography means that valence and content are conflated and
their effects cannot be disentangled in this experiment. This limitation could be
addressed in future research that adds a valence factor to the experimental design. The
operationalization of an exemplar and selection of the comparison conditions are also
limitations of this design and may have contributed to a lack of effects. Because
exemplars were operationalized as a mention of an individual in a comment, exemplar
comments and nonexemplar comments may have been too similar, resulting in a weak
manipulation. Additionally, because much of Zillmann’s work on exemplars compares
exemplar conditions to conditions with numeric base-rates (e.g., Zillmann, 2006), the
choice to use nonexemplar comparison conditions that lacked exemplars but did not
include base-rates may have contributed to the lack of expected effects. A further
limitation of the experimental design is that it does not allow this research to address
whether comments matter due to their form or because of the content they add to the
article. Future research should investigate whether the form of comments allows them to
have effects over and above the effects of the content they contain. For example, one
could compare a condition in which participants read an article followed by comments to
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one in which participants read an article with these same comments embedded in the
article text. A difference between these conditions would suggest that the effect of
comments is not due solely to the content comments provide but to some other feature.
Finally, Study 2 has limitations related to data collection. Though allowing
participants to participate in the experiment via mobile device may have increased
external validity by simulating real conditions in which people are exposed to media
content and user-generated comments, it raises concerns about participants’ exposure to
the manipulation and may have reduced effects. However, most moderation analyses that
included use of a mobile phone as a moderator were not significant. Related to this issue
is the finding that many participants spent only a short amount of time on the comment
page, which was the primary experimental manipulation. Though some effects of
comments were observed (e.g., effects of topic on intention and risk perceptions) and
most moderation analyses using response time were not significant, the brevity of
exposure may have contributed to a lack of effects of exemplars. Many of these
limitations can be addressed in future research.
Directions for Future Research
This research provided insight into the content of reader comments on online
mammography news articles and the effects these comments may have on readers. While
the content analysis and experiment answered key research questions, they also raised
additional questions for future research.
Compared to the study of media content produced by news organizations, the
study of comments appearing with these news articles is a relatively new area and replete
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with possibilities for additional research. One potential line of research involves
developing further understanding of the characteristics of people who write comments on
news articles and those who read these comments. Though there is a small amount of
population-level data that estimates the number of people who have read user-generated
comments, little is known about the characteristics that separate readers from nonreaders. Possible differences include differences in need for information, need for
cognition, desire to connect with others, or other individual characteristics. Even less is
known about the motivations behind posting comments and characteristics that may be
associated with this behavior. Within the study of why people post comments on news
stories, there also exists a more specific need to understand what makes individuals more
likely to include exemplars in their comments.
An additional potential line of research that emerged from Study 1 involves
understanding how article characteristics influence comment characteristics. Particularly,
future research should examine possible explanations for the association between
mammography exemplars in articles and mammography exemplars in comments (and the
absence of this association for breast cancer exemplars). Additionally, one could use
automated linguistic analysis to examine how other characteristics of the article, such as
the use of first-person pronouns or emotion words, affect comment characteristics.
Study 2 also raised additional questions for future research. Most importantly,
future work is needed to separate the effects of comment topic and comment valence
toward mammography. This could be done using a 2 (valence toward mammography:
pro vs. con) by 2 (exemplar: present vs. absent) design with or without a no comment
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control condition. This line of research could also be furthered by replicating the
experiment using different types of nonexemplar conditions as comparison conditions
(e.g., conditions that use statements with numeric base-rates or conditions in which
comparable information is presented but not in a comment form or attributed to another
reader). Finally, future research should expand efforts to understand mechanisms of
effect by searching for additional mediators of the effects of comment topic on risk
perceptions and mammography intentions, such as cognitive availability of breast cancer
cases. Additional research should also examine additional potential moderators of effects
of comments, including need for cognition, health literacy, and numeracy.
Conclusion
User-generated comments on online news articles about mammography often
include mentions of individuals’ experiences with mammography and breast cancer.
These comments can have an impact on comment readers’ breast cancer risk perceptions
and intentions to have or delay a mammogram. In particular, exposure to user-generated
comments that are favorable toward mammography and about the topic of mammogramdetected breast cancer can lead to higher risk perceptions and higher intentions to screen
than exposure to 1) comments that are cautious toward mammography and about the
topic of false-positive mammograms and 2) articles presented without comments. This
study adds to the body of evidence that suggests that comments appearing with news
articles have effects on readers. It suggests that news organizations, health organizations,
and others who share content online and allow user-generated comments should consider
the impact of these effects before allowing comments to be posted. Further research is
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needed to fully understand the role that the presence of mammography exemplars in
comments may play in these effects.
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APPENDIX A
CONTENT ANALYSIS CODEBOOK
ARTICLES
Basic Information and Inclusion Criteria
[articleID] Article ID number
[title] Article title, as appearing in search
[alttitle] Alternate title, if applicable (sometimes web and print versions have different
titles)
[date] Article date in MM/DD/YYYY format
[lexisnexis] Found in LexisNexis search
0. No
1. Yes
[nytimescom] Found in NYTimes.com search
0. No
1. Yes
[type] Article type:
1. Newspaper article
2. Blog post
3. Opinion/Editorial
4. Magazine
5. Letter/reader reaction
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6. Other: death notice, engagement announcement, wedding announcement,
correction, book review, or other
[duplicate] Is article a duplicate of an article already coded?
0. No
1. Yes
If 0 (no), continue. If 1 (yes), coding is complete.
*Note: If duplicate, and one is print and one is web/blog, code the web/blog version.
[include] Should article be included in database of articles about mammography? First,
exclude if article type is coded as 5 or 6. Include if
mammogram/mammography/breast cancer screening/breast screening is in the
title of the article OR at least 50% of paragraphs mention breast cancer
screening/mammography or are generally about breast cancer
screening/mammography. Otherwise, exclude.
Include article in database?
0. No
1. Yes
If 1 (yes), continue to next item. If 0 (no), coding is complete.
[url] Article URL
[comments] Does online version of article have comments?
0. No
1.

Yes

Article contents
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[guidelines] Does the article mention guidelines for when women should be screened for
breast cancer? This includes even very general mentions of when to begin screening.
0. No
1. Yes
[2009guidelines] Does the article specifically mention the 2009 guidelines issued by the
U.S. Preventive Services Task Force?
0. No
1. Yes
[komen] Does the article mention Susan G. Komen for the Cure?
0. No
1. Yes
[nci] Does the article mention the American Cancer Society?
0. No
1. Yes
[nci] Does the article mention the National Cancer Institute?
0. No
1. Yes
[uspstf] Does the article mention the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force?
0. No
1. Yes
[acr] Does the article mention the American College of Radiology?
0. No
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1. Yes
[articlevalence] Would you consider the overall tone of the article to be…
1. More enthusiastic toward mammography than cautious
2. More cautious toward mammography than enthusiastic
3. Balanced/neutral—neither more enthusiastic nor more cautious
[artbcexemplars] Does the article mention an individual’s experience with breast cancer
(a breast cancer exemplar)? Note: This should be a specific person, not a reference to
women or a woman in general.
0. No, or unclear
1. Yes
If 0 (no), skip to artnomammogram. If 1 (yes), continue.
[artbcexemplarsnum] How many breast cancer exemplars are mentioned in the article?
1. 1
2. 2
3. 3 or more
[artnomammogram] Does the comment include someone who makes a decision to not
have a mammogram/mammograms (or to delay one)? This includes those who have had
a mammogram in the past and but have made a decision to not have another one (or delay
having another one). Note: This should be a specific person, not a reference to women or
a woman in general.
0. No, or unclear
1. Yes
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If 0 (no), skip to artmammexemplars. If 1 (yes), continue.
[artnomammogramnum] How many individuals who made a decision to not have a
mammogram/mammograms are included in the article?
1. 1
2. 2
3. 3 or more
[artmammexemplars] Does the article mention at least one individual’s experience with
mammography (a mammography exemplar)? (Note: These may be overlap with breast
cancer exemplars. For example, an individual in the comment may refer to having had a
mammogram and having had breast cancer; in that case, both artbcexemplars and
artmammexemplars would be coded 1.) Note: This should be a specific person, not a
reference to women or a woman in general.
0. No, or unclear
1. Yes
If 0 (no), skip to the end and coding is complete. If 1 (yes), continue.
[artmammexemplarsnum] How many mammography exemplars/individuals are
mentioned in the article?
1. 1
2. 2
3. 3 or more
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[artfalsepositive] Does it include an exemplar with a false-positive mammography
outcome (includes call-backs for additional screening, referral for further testing,
biopsy)?
0. No
1. Yes
If 0 (no), skip to artcanceroutcome. If 1 (yes), continue.
[artfalsepositivenum] How many exemplars with a false-positive mammography outcome
are included?
1. 1
2. 2
3. 3 or more
[artcanceroutcome] Does it include an exemplar with a screening mammogram-detected
cancer outcome (Note: This should be a screening mammogram, not a diagnostic
mammogram following development of symptoms or discovery of a lump through other
means)?
0. No
1. Yes
If 0 (no), skip to artnofalsepositive. If 1 (yes), continue.
[artcanceroutcomenum] How many exemplars with a mammogram-detected cancer
outcome are included?
1. 1
2. 2
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3. 3 or more
[artnofalsepositive] Does it include an exemplar who had a mammogram and no false
positive results from the mammogram or cancer?
0. No
1. Yes
If 0 (no), skip to artlumporbc. If 1 (yes), continue.
[artnofalsepositivenum] How many exemplars with mammograms and no false positives
or cancer are included?
1. 1
2. 2
3. 3 or more
[artlumporbc] Does it include an exemplar who had a lump or breast cancer detected by a
means other than mammogram (Note: This includes people who discovered a lump and
went on to have a diagnostic mammogram)?
0. No
1. Yes
If 0 (no), skip to artfalsenegative. If 1 (yes), continue.
[artlumporbcnum] How many exemplars with lump or breast cancer detected without a
mammogram are included?
1. 1
2. 2
3. 3 or more
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[artfalsenegative] Does it include an exemplar who had a false negative (i.e., breast
cancer that was missed by a mammogram)? (Note: All false negatives should also be
coded as artlumporbc, but the reverse is not necessarily true.)
0. No
1. Yes
If 0 (no), skip to the end and coding is complete. If 1 (yes), continue.
[artfalsenegnum] How many false negative exemplars are included?
1. 1
2. 2
3. 3 or more
End

COMMENTS
Basic Information
[maincommentID] Overall comment ID number, each comment in the database receives
unique number
[commentarticleID] ArticleID to which comment corresponds
[commentID] comment ID, comment number within article
[authorname] Name of author
[commentdate] Date of comment in MM/DD/YYYY HH:MM format
[location] Location, if given (not available for all comments)
[nyttoppick] Marked as an NYT “pick” (not available for all comments)
193

0. No
1. Yes
[recommends] number of times comment was “recommended” (not available for all
comments)
[commenttext] Text of comment
[commentlength] Number of words in comment (automatically calculated in Excel)
Comment Contents
[includecomment] Is the comment related to mammography/mammograms?
[Notes to coders:


If it mentions mammography or breast cancer screening, it should definitely be
included. It does not, however, have to use the word
“mammogram”/”mammography.” For example, those that refer to the change in
mammography recommendations should be included (including references to
recommendations, guidelines, and the USPSTF), even if they don’t use the word
“mammograms.”



Alternate terms: Sometimes, a comment will use the word “screening” and it can
be inferred that they are talking about breast cancer screening. These should be
included. Others use the word “testing” or “exam” when referring to
mammography, and these should be included as well (but be careful to not include
those that only discuss breast self-exams, MRI, or ultrasounds).



Do not include those that only talk about breast cancer without referring to
mammography.]
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0. No
1. Yes
If 0 (no), skip to the end and coding is complete. If 1 (yes), continue.
[commentvalence] Would you consider the overall tone of the comment to be…
1. More enthusiastic toward mammography than cautious
2. More cautious toward mammography than enthusiastic
3. Balanced/neutral—neither more enthusiastic nor more cautious
[explicitrec] Does the comment make an explicit recommendation regarding
mammography (e.g., “get a mammogram,” “every woman should get a mammogram,” “I
advise against routine mammograms,” etc.)?
0.

No, or unclear

1.

Yes, explicit recommendation for mammography

2.

Yes, explicit recommendation against mammography

[implicitrec] Does the comment make an implicit recommendation regarding
mammography (e.g., “I am going to get a mammogram,” [implicit for] “I am going to
stop getting mammograms,” [implicit against] “mammograms save lives,” [implicit for]
“mammograms cause harm,” [implicit against] referring to mammograms as important
[implicit for], unnecessary [implicit against], or dangerous [implicit against], etc.)?
0.

No, or unclear

1.

Yes, implicit recommendation for mammography

2.

Yes, implicit recommendation against mammography

[exemplar] Does the comment have any exemplars (an example case)?
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0. No
1. Yes
If 0 (no), skip to fpnoexemplar. If 1 (yes), continue.
[bcexemplars] Does the comment mention an individual’s experience with breast cancer
(a breast cancer exemplar)? Note: This should be a specific woman, not a reference to
women or a woman in general.
0. No, or unclear
1. Yes
If 0 (no), skip to nomammogram. If 1 (yes), continue.
[numberbcexemplars] How many breast cancer exemplars/individuals are mentioned in
the comment?
1. 1
2. 2
3. 3 or more
[nomammogram] Does the comment include someone who makes a decision to not have
a mammogram/mammograms (or to delay one)? This includes those who have had a
mammogram in the past and but have made a decision to not have another one (or delay
having another one). Note: This should be a specific woman, not a reference to women or
a woman in general.
0. No, or unclear
1. Yes
If 0 (no), skip to mammexemplars. If 1 (yes), continue.
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[nomammogrampov] What is the point of view of the person who makes a decision to not
have a mammogram/mammograms (i.e., if the comment author decides to not have a
mammogram, code as first-person; if the comment author describes someone else who
decides not to have a mammogram, code as third-person)?
1. First-person
2. Third-person
[mammexemplars] Does the comment mention at least one individual’s experience with
mammography (a mammography exemplar)? (Note: These may be overlap with breast
cancer exemplars. For example, an individual in the comment may refer to having had a
mammogram and having had breast cancer; in that case, both bcexemplars and
mammexemplars would be coded 1.) Note: This should be a specific woman, not a
reference to women or a woman in general.
0. No
1. Yes
If 0 (no), skip to the end and coding is complete. If 1 (yes), continue.
[numbermammexemplars] How many mammography exemplars/individuals are
mentioned in the comment?
1. 1
2. 2
3. 3 or more
[Note: In the rare case that any of there are multiple narratives of any of the following
types and they are from different points-of-view, code only the first one mentioned.]
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[falsepositive]
Does it include an exemplar with a false-positive mammography outcome (includes callbacks for additional screening, referral for further testing, biopsy)?
0. No
1. Yes
If 0 (no), skip to canceroutcome. If 1 (yes), continue.
[falsepositivepov] What is the point of view of the exemplar with a false-positive
mammography outcome?
1. First-person
2. Third-person
[canceroutcome] Does it include an exemplar with a screening mammogram-detected
cancer outcome (Note: This should be a screening mammogram, not a diagnostic
mammogram following development of symptoms or discovery of a lump through other
means)?
0. No
1. Yes
If 0 (no), skip to nofalsepositive. If 1 (yes), continue.
[canceroutcomepov] What is the point of view of the exemplar with a mammogramdetected cancer outcome?
1. First-person
2. Third-person
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[nofalsepositive] Does it include an exemplar who had a mammogram and no false
positive results from the mammogram or cancer?
0. No
1. Yes
If 0 (no), skip to lumporbc. If 1 (yes), continue.
[nofalsepositivepov] What is the point of view of the exemplar who had a mammogram
and no false positives or cancer?
1. First-person
2. Third-person
[lumporbc] Does it include an exemplar who had a lump or breast cancer detected by a
means other than mammogram (Note: This includes people who discovered a lump and
went on to have a diagnostic mammogram)?
0. No
1. Yes
If 0 (no), skip to falsenegative. If 1 (yes), continue.
[lumporbcpov] What is the point of view of the exemplar who had a lump or breast
cancer detected by a means other than mammogram?
1. First-person
2. Third-person
[falsenegative] Does it include an exemplar who had a false negative (i.e., breast cancer
that was missed by a mammogram)? (Note: All false negatives should also be coded as
lumporbc, but the reverse is not necessarily true.)
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0. No
1. Yes
If 0 (no), skip to the end, and coding is complete. If 1 (yes), continue.
[falsenegativepov] What is the point of view of the exemplar who had a false negative?
1. First-person
2. Third-person
Skip to the end, and coding is complete.
[fpnonexemplar] Does this comment (without exemplars) mention or allude to the
concept of false positive mammography results?
0. No, or unclear
1. Yes
[mdbcnonexemplar] Does this comment (without exemplars) mention or allude to the
concept of mammogram-detected breast cancer?
0. No, or unclear
1. Yes
[fpnonexemplar] Does this comment (without exemplars) mention or allude to the
concept of false positive mammography results?
0. No, or unclear
1. Yes
[mdbcnonexemplar] Does this comment (without exemplars) mention or allude to the
concept of mammogram-detected breast cancer?
0. No, or unclear
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1. Yes
END
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APPENDIX B
ARTICLES INCLUDED IN ANALYSIS

The full list of articles included in the content analysis is included below. The LexisNexis and New York Times website columns
indicate whether an article was retrieved in the search using that particular method. An “N/A” in the “number of comments” column
indicates that comments were not allowed on that article.
Table B1
Article title

Breast Cancer: Who Should Be Screened?
Quandary With Mammograms: Get a Screening, or Just
Skip It?
Getting Screened for Breast Cancer
New Guidelines Suggest Cutback In Mammograms
BlogTalk: Breast Cancer Screening, Magazine Covers
Republicans Say Cancer Screening Guidelines Portend
Medical Rationing

Publication
date

LexisNexis

Article type

Number of
comments

No
Yes

New
York
Times
website
Yes
Yes

11/3/2009
11/3/2009

blog post
news article

139
N/A

11/16/2009
11/17/2009
11/17/2009
11/17/2009

No
Yes
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

blog post
news article
blog post
blog post

147
631
16
54
202

New Guidelines on Breast Cancer Draw Opposition
Many Doctors to Stay the Course on Breast Exams for
Now
New Mammogram Advice Finds a Skeptical Audience
G. O. P. Women Attack Mammogram Guidelines
Republican Lawmakers Criticize New Cancer
Guidelines
Breast Cancer Screening Policy Won't Change, U.S.
Officials Say
Among Clinics, the Mammogram Is Slipping as a
Popular Offering
Sebelius on Mammograms: Don't Change What You're
Doing
The Controversy Over Mammograms

11/17/2009
11/18/2009

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

news article
news article

N/A
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11/18/2009
11/18/2009
11/18/2009

Yes
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes

news article
blog post
blog post

N/A
N/A
N/A

11/19/2009

Yes

Yes

news article

96

11/19/2009

Yes

Yes

news article

N/A

11/19/2009

No

Yes

blog post

N/A

11/20/2009

Yes

Yes

152

The Uproar Over Mammography
Addicted to Mammograms

11/20/2009
11/20/2009

No
Yes

Yes
Yes

Mammogram Debate Took Group by Surprise
Get a Test. No Don't. Repeat
Confused? Get the Mammogram
Behind Cancer Guidelines, Quest for Data
Study Questions Safety of Mammograms for Young
Women at High Risk of Cancer
Senate Blocks Use of New Mammogram Guidelines
Mammogram Math

11/20/2009
11/22/2009
11/23/2009
11/23/2009
12/1/2009

Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

opinion/editor
ial
blog post
opinion/editor
ial
news article
news article
blog post
news article
news article

12/3/2009
12/13/2009

No
Yes

Yes
Yes

blog post
magazine
article

N/A
N/A

19
N/A
N/A
N/A
2
N/A
N/A
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Gauging the Odds (And the Costs) In Health Screening
Mammograms and Severe Dementia
Women Resolve to Keep Getting Mammograms
Doctor-Patient Divide On Mammograms
SCREENING: Gaps Found in Breast Cancer Testing
Radiation And Risks Are Focus Of Studies
New Treatments Are Challenging Mammogram's Need,
Study Says
Mammogram Benefit Seen For Women in Their 40s
Adding MRIs to Mammograms for High-Risk Women
A Doctor's Mammogram Mission Turns Personal
Audit Finds Long Waits For Mammograms in City
SCREENING: New Threat Rises Between
Mammograms
Screening: Mammograms Seen Ineffective in Europe
You Have to Gamble on Your Health

12/20/2009
2/15/2010
2/15/2010
2/16/2010
7/20/2010
8/24/2010
9/23/2010

Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

news article
blog post
blog post
news article
news article
news article
news article

N/A
83
80
N/A
N/A
N/A
75

9/30/2010
11/15/2010
12/21/2010
5/5/2011
5/10/2011

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

news article
blog post
news article
news article
news article

N/A
46
N/A
N/A
N/A

8/2/2011
10/11/2011

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

N/A
N/A

Mammogram's Role as Savior Is Tested
More Questions About Mammograms

10/24/2011
10/27/2011

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Mayor to Give $250,000 to Planned Parenthood
A Better Way to Spend Breast Cancer Funds?
Real Race In Cancer Is Finding Its Cause
Fewer Younger Women Are Getting Mammograms
POSTINGS | RECENT ENTRIES FROM OUR
BLOGS

2/2/2012
2/7/2012
2/7/2012
7/2/2012
7/3/2012

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

news article
opinion/editor
ial
blog post
opinion/editor
ial
blog post
blog post
news article
blog post
news article

344
N/A
702
59
N/A
42
N/A
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Laws Add Dimension, and Questions, to Breast Cancer
Screening
Cancer Survivor or Victim of Overdiagnosis?

10/25/2012

Yes

Yes

news article

142

11/22/2012

Yes

Yes

N/A

Ignoring the Science on Mammograms
Stress of Cancer Scare May Last Years
The Problem With Pink

11/28/2012
3/22/2013
4/28/2013

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Behind the Cover Story: Peggy Orenstein on Rethinking
Her Stance on Mammograms
Komen Chooses New Leader
ABC Anchor's On-Air Test Found Breast Cancer
Breast Cancer Screenings: What We Still Don't Know

4/29/2013

Yes

Yes

opinion/editor
ial
blog post
blog post
magazine
article
blog post

6/19/2013
11/12/2013
12/30/2013

Yes
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
Yes

N/A
N/A
107

Vast Study Casts Doubts on Value of Mammograms
The Problem With Mammograms
For Women, a More Complicated Choice
Why I Never Got Screened

2/12/2014
2/12/2014
2/12/2014
2/15/2014

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Flips and Spins in Sochi and on Mammograms
Mammography's Limits, Seldom Understood
Look for Cancer, and Find It
Ex-Radiology Tech Filed False Mammogram Results
Former Ga. Technician Falsified Mammogram Reports
Universal Mammograms Show We Don't Understand
Risk
Dense Breasts May Obscure Mammogram Results

2/16/2014
3/14/2014
4/7/2014
4/15/2014
4/27/2014
5/7/2014

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

news article
news article
opinion/editor
ial
news article
blog post
news article
opinion/editor
ial
news article
blog post
blog post
news article
news article
news article

6/16/2014

Yes

Yes

blog post

134

430
25
629
21

645
7
N/A
275
N/A
71
131
N/A
N/A
161
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Mammograms May Cut Breast Cancer Deaths by 28%
3-D Mammogram Scans May Find More Breast Cancer
Study Finds 3-D Mammogram Can Improve Cancer
Detection
Former Adobe Exec's Start-Up Seeks to Improve the
Mammogram Experience
Retesting Breast Cancer Axioms
Next Steps Uncertain for Women With Dense Breasts

6/17/2014
6/24/2014
6/25/2014

No
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

news article
news article
news article

N/A
N/A
N/A

11/3/2014

No

Yes

news article

N/A

11/10/2014
12/8/2014

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

blog post
news article

84
N/A

206

APPENDIX C
EXPERIMENT QUESTIONNAIRE AND PROGRAMMING INSTRUCTIONS
[Note: Text appearing in brackets will not be visible to participants.]
[CONSENT]
Consent Form
The University of Pennsylvania is conducting an online research study on women’s ideas
about mammograms. A mammogram is an x-ray of the breast used to screen for breast
cancer.

The survey will take approximately 15 minutes to complete and you will be compensated
according to your panel’s normal compensation options.

Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you may withdraw at any
time. There are no known risks but if any of the questions make you feel uncomfortable,
you may skip that question or leave the survey. The information you give will be kept
confidential and will not be linked to your name.

The researcher, a doctoral student at the Annenberg School for Communication, will have
access to the anonymous data. This research is funded by a fellowship from The Wharton
School at the University of Pennsylvania. All data will be stored securely at the
Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania.
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As a reminder, this study is meant to be taken on a computer or iPad. Please do not try to
participate in this study from a smart phone.

If you have any questions about the study, you may contact the researcher, Holli Seitz
(hseitz@asc.upenn.edu). This study has been approved by the Institutional Review Board
(IRB) at the University of Pennsylvania. You may contact the IRB at the University of
Pennsylvania if you have any questions or concerns about your rights as a research
participant (215-898-2614).

If you would like to participate in this short survey, please proceed to the next page. We
ask that you please complete the survey in one sitting.

If you would not like to participate, please close the browser now.

[SCREENING QUESTIONS]
[Sex]
[sex] What is your sex? [force answer]
1. Male
2. Female
[page break]
[Age]
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[age] What is your age? [drop-down menu, under 18, ages 18-75 listed individually, over
75; force answer]
[If participant is male and/or not between the ages of 38 and 48 (inclusive), exclude and
send to exclusion text; otherwise, continue to pre-test]
[High risk of breast cancer]
[bchistory] Have you ever had or do you currently have breast cancer (including ductal
carcinoma in situ (DCIS) and lobular carcinoma in situ (LCIS))?
1. No
2. Yes
[brca] Have you ever tested positive for a breast cancer genetic mutation (BRCA1 or
BRCA2)?
1. No
2. Yes
3. Don’t know
[If participant answers yes to either of these questions, send to exclusion text.]
[page break]
[Exclusion text]
Thank you for your willingness to participate. Unfortunately, you are not eligible for this
survey.

For more information about breast cancer prevention, screening, and treatment,

please visit http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/types/breast.
[All participants: PRE-TEST]
[Breast cancer and mammography history]
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[familyhistory] Have any of your first-degree relatives (mother, sister, or daughter) had
breast cancer?
1. No
2. Yes, one first-degree relative has had breast cancer
3. Yes, more than one first-degree relative has had breast cancer
4. Don’t know
[mammohistory] A mammogram is an x-ray of each breast to look for breast cancer.
Have you ever had a mammogram?
1. No
2. Yes
[page break]
[If receiving intervention (all conditions except NoInfo): insert instructions for article]
[All participants: POST-TEST]
[Mammography intentions]
Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements:
[mammint] I intend to have a mammogram in the next two years.
1. strongly disagree
2. disagree
3. somewhat disagree
4. neither agree nor disagree
5. somewhat agree
6. agree
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7. strongly agree
[waitint] I intend to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram.
1. strongly disagree
2. disagree
3. somewhat disagree
4. neither agree nor disagree
5. somewhat agree
6. agree
7. strongly agree
[Perceived breast cancer risk; adapted from Schapira, Davids, McAuliffe, &
Nattinger, 2004]
[5yearfreq] Picture yourself in a room with 99 other women exactly like you. How many
of you will get breast cancer in the next five years?
Please pick any number between 0 and 100. [slider scale from 0-100]
[lifefreq] Picture yourself in a room with 99 other women exactly like you. How many of
you will get breast cancer in your lifetime?
Please pick any number between 0 and 100. [slider scale from 0-100]
[page break]
[5yearpercent] What do you think your personal risk or chance is of getting breast cancer
in the next five years?
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Please answer on a scale of 0% to 100%. For example, 0% means “no risk or chance of
getting breast cancer” and 100% means “completely certain to get breast cancer.” You
can pick any number between 0% and 100%. [slider scale from 0% -100%]
[lifepercent] What do you think your personal risk or chance is of getting breast cancer in
your lifetime?
Please answer on a scale of 0% to 100%. For example, 0% means “no risk or chance of
getting breast cancer” and 100% means “completely certain to get breast cancer.” You
can pick any number between 0% and 100%. [slider scale from 0% -100%]
[Perceived risk of a false-positive mammogram]
A “false positive” happens when a woman has a mammogram that leads to more
screening, tests, or biopsies, but then finds out she does not have breast cancer.
[falseposfreq] Picture yourself in a room with 99 other women exactly like you. If all of
you have a mammogram in the next two years, how many of you will have a false
positive (the need for extra testing that later shows you don’t have cancer)?
Please pick any number between 0 and 100. [slider scale from 0-100]
[falsepospercent] If you have a mammogram in the next two years, what do you think
your personal risk or chance is of having a false positive (the need for extra testing that
later shows you don’t have cancer)?
Please answer on a scale of 0% to 100%. For example, 0% means “no risk or chance of
having a false positive” and 100% means “completely certain to have a false positive.”
You can pick any number between 0% and 100%. [drop-down list from 0% -100%]
[page break]
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[Perceived risk of a positive mammogram]
[posmammfreq] Picture yourself in a room with 99 other women exactly like you. If you
all had a mammogram today, how many of you would have a mammogram that finds
cancer?
Please pick any number between 0 and 100. [slider scale from 0-100]
[posmammpercent] If you had a mammogram today, what do you think your personal
risk or chance is of having a mammogram that finds cancer?
Please answer on a scale of 0% to 100%. For example, 0% means “no risk or chance of
having a mammogram that finds cancer” and 100% means “completely certain to have a
mammogram that finds cancer.” You can pick any number between 0% and 100%.
[slider scale from 0% -100%]
[Transportation; Subset adapted from Green & Brock, 2000; similar subsets used
by Kim, Bigman, Leader, Lerman, & Cappella, 2012 and by Appel, Gnambs,
Richter, & Green, 2015]
[Only asked of conditions receiving comments]
When answering the following questions, think about the comments you read that were
left by other readers. How much do you agree with the following statements?
[trans1] I was mentally involved in the comments while reading them.
Not at

1

2

3

4

all

5

6

7

Very
much

[trans2] The comments affected me emotionally.
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Not at

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very

all

much

[trans3] The comments are relevant to my everyday life.
Not at

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very

all

much

[trans4] After finishing the comments, I found it hard to put them out of my mind.
Not at

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very

all

much

[page break]
[Affect; PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), select additional items used
from the PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1994), adapted to use the “moment
instructions”)]
This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe different feelings and
emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that
word. Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now (that is, at the present moment).
[randomize order in which feelings are presented]
Very

A little

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely

slightly or
not at all
Interested

1

2

3

4

5

Distressed

1

2

3

4

5

Excited

1

2

3

4

5
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Upset

1

2

3

4

5

Strong

1

2

3

4

5

Guilty

1

2

3

4

5

Surprised

1

2

3

4

5

Scared

1

2

3

4

5

Hostile

1

2

3

4

5

Enthusiastic

1

2

3

4

5

Proud

1

2

3

4

5

Irritable

1

2

3

4

5

Alert

1

2

3

4

5

Ashamed

1

2

3

4

5

Inspired

1

2

3

4

5

Nervous

1

2

3

4

5

Determined

1

2

3

4

5

Angry

1

2

3

4

5

Attentive

1

2

3

4

5

Jittery

1

2

3

4

5

Active

1

2

3

4

5

Afraid

1

2

3

4

5

Proud

1

2

3

4

5

Sad

1

2

3

4

5

Happy

1

2

3

4

5
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Calm

1

2

3

4

5

Worried

1

2

3

4

5

Hopeful

1

2

3

4

5

[Note: The Negative Affect subscale is created by averaging scores for “afraid,” “scared,”
“nervous,” “jittery,” “irritable,” “hostile,” “guilty,” “ashamed,” “upset,” and “distressed.”
The Positive Affect subscale is created by averaging scores for “active,” “alert,”
“attentive,” “determined,” “enthusiastic,” “excited,” “inspired,” “interested,” “proud,”
and “strong.” Additional words “angry,” “sad,” “happy,” “calm,” and “surprised” were
added to provide a way to capture hostility, sadness, joviality, serenity, and surprise subscales, respectively. “Proud,” “hopeful,” and “worried” were added to provide additional
measures of affect thought to be related to breast cancer messages.]
[page break]
[Perceived mammography norms; adapted from Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010]
Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements:
[injnormmammo] Most people who are important to me think I should have a
mammogram in the next two years.
1. strongly disagree
2. disagree
3. somewhat disagree
4. neither agree nor disagree
5. somewhat agree
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6. agree
7. strongly agree
[injnormpostpone] Most people who are important to me think I should wait until age 50
to have a mammogram.
1. strongly disagree
2. disagree
3. somewhat disagree
4. neither agree nor disagree
5. somewhat agree
6. agree
7. strongly agree
[descnormmammo] Most women like me will have a mammogram in the next two years.
1. strongly disagree
2. disagree
3. somewhat disagree
4. neither agree nor disagree
5. somewhat agree
6. agree
7. strongly agree
[descnormpostpone] Most women like me will wait until age 50 to have a mammogram.
1. strongly disagree
2. disagree
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3. somewhat disagree
4. neither agree nor disagree
5. somewhat agree
6. agree
7. strongly agree
[page break]
[Self-efficacy to have a mammogram; adapted from Bandura, 2006]
[efficacy] Using the following scale, please rate how certain you are that you could…
Could

Moderately

Highly

not

certain I

certain

do at

could

I

all
…have a

could
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

mammogram
in the next
two years if
you wanted
to.
… wait until
age 50 to
have a
mammogram
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if you
wanted to.

[page break]
[Attitudes toward mammography]
Complete the sentence by marking your selection on the following dimensions.
[attmamm] My having a mammogram in the next two years would be…

Useless

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Useful

Harmful

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Harmless

Bad

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Good

[attwait] My waiting until age 50 to have a mammogram would be…

Useless

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Useful

Harmful

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Harmless

Bad

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Good
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[page break]
[countarg1] In the space listed below, list all of the risks of having mammograms that
you can think of. [open-ended]
[countarg2] In the space listed below, list all of the benefits of having mammograms
that you can think of. [open-ended]
[page break]
[Attitude conviction; selected items from Abelson, 1988]
[conviction] How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly

agree

Agree

Somewh

at agree

Neither

agree nor

Somewh
disagree

at

disagree
Disagree

Strongly

disagree
My beliefs
about
mammograms
express the
real me.

I think about
mammograms
often.

I hold my
views about
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mammograms
very strongly.

[Demographics]
[edu] What is the highest level of education you have completed?
1. less than high school
2. high school graduate or GED
3. some college or technical school
4. college graduate or beyond
[ethnicity] Are you of Hispanic, Latino/a, or Spanish origin?
1. Yes, of Hispanic, Latino/a, or Spanish origin
2. No, not of Hispanic, Latino/a, or Spanish origin
[race] What is your race? (One or more categories may be selected.) [make this check all
that apply]
1. White
2. Black or African American
3. American Indian or Alaska Native
4. Asian
5. Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
[If race is 4 or 5, continue to subrace. Otherwise, skip to children.]
[subrace] What is your sub-race/ethnicity?
1. Chinese
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2. Japanese
3. Filipino
4. Hawaiian
5. Other Pacific Islander
6. Other Asian-American
[Breast Cancer Risk Factors]
Please answer the following questions related to your risk factors for breast cancer.
[children] What was your age at the time of your first live birth of a child?
1. I don’t know
2. no live births
3. younger than 20 years old
4. 20 to 24 years old
5. 25 to 29 years old
6. 30 years old or older
[period] What was your age at the time of your first menstrual period?
1. I don’t know
2. 7 to 11 years old
3. 12 to 13 years old
4. 14 years old or older
[biopsy] Have you ever had a breast biopsy?
1. No
2. Yes
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3. Don’t know

[If no or don’t know, skip to comments. Otherwise, continue.]
[biopsy2] How many breast biopsies (positive or negative) have you had?
1. 1
2. more than 1
[biopsy3] Have you had at least one breast biopsy with atypical hyperplasia? Atypical
hyperplasia is a benign (noncancerous) condition in which cells look abnormal under a
microscope and are increased in number.
1. no
2. yes
3. I don’t know
[Open-ended comments]
[comments] Is there anything else you would like to share with us? (Optional) [text box]
[Debriefing and “thank you” text]
Thank you for your time and participation. This survey was designed to find out what
effects comments appearing with online news articles have on other readers. Some
participants saw an article with comments that may have included personal stories about
mammography, while others did not. The news article you may have read was an edited
version of a news article that originally appeared in the New York Times in 2009. For
current information about breast cancer prevention, screening, and treatment, please visit
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http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/types/breast. If you are interested in learning more
about your personal risk for breast cancer, visit http://www.cancer.gov/bcrisktool/.

If you have any questions about this survey, please feel free to contact Holli Seitz
(hseitz@asc.upenn.edu).

Click the button below (the arrows) to finalize your survey responses and receive credit
for completing the survey.
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APPENDIX D
SAMPLE EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATION

[Information in brackets was not visible to participants.]

[Instructions for NoComm:] On the following page, you will view a newspaper article
about breast cancer screening. Please read it carefully. You will then be asked a series of
questions.

[Instructions for conditions with comments:] On the following pages, you will view a
newspaper article about breast cancer screening and comments submitted by readers.
Please read them carefully. You will then be asked a series of questions.

[Composite News Article]
[Much of this text is taken from “New Guidelines Suggest Cutback in Mammograms,”
New York Times, November 17, 2009, http://nyti.ms/1zjqHEM. It has been edited to
shorten overall length, balance length given to each side of the argument, remove quotes
and exemplars, and update guidelines.]

Breast Cancer: Who Should Be Screened?
According to guidelines released by the United States Preventive Services Task Force
(USPSTF), an independent expert panel, women at average risk for breast cancer
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should start regular breast cancer screening at age 50 and have mammograms every
two years. But other groups disagree. The American Cancer Society advises that
women at average risk for breast cancer start screening annually at age 45, and the
American College of Radiology has said that it will continue to advise women to start
having annual mammograms at age 40.

Over all, the USPSTF says, the modest benefit of mammograms – reducing the breast
cancer death rate by 15 percent – must be weighed against the harms. Though many
women do not think a screening test can be harmful, medical experts say the risks of
mammograms are real. A test can trigger unnecessary further tests, like biopsies. And
mammograms can find cancers that grow so slowly that they would never cause harm
in a woman’s lifetime, resulting in unnecessary treatment. These harms loom larger for
women in their 40s, who are more likely to experience them than women 50 and older
and less likely to have breast cancer, tipping the balance of risks and benefits. The
Task Force says that beginning screening at age 50 and only screening every two years
reduces the risks of unnecessary tests and overtreatment. [137 words for beginning
mammograms at age 50; 2 main arguments: false positives and overdiagnosis]

Despite the USPSTF recommendations, the American Cancer Society and the
American College of Radiology both continue to recommend that women begin routine
annual mammograms before age 50. The cancer society, in a statement, agreed that
mammography had risks as well as benefits. They said that the society’s experts had
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looked at ‘’virtually all’’ the task force and additional data and concluded that the
benefits of annual mammograms starting at age 45 outweighed the risks. These
benefits include early detection, which may result in easier and less invasive
treatments. Benefits also include a small reduction in cancer deaths. One cancer death
is prevented for every 1,904 women ages 40 to 49 who are screened for 10 years. This
reduction in deaths led the American College of Radiology to recommend that women
begin annual screening at age 40. [136 words against waiting until age 50: 2 main
arguments: early detection and reduction in cancer deaths]

Experts agree that different women will weigh the harms and benefits differently.
Faced with these new guidelines, women are advised to talk to their doctors about their
screening decisions.

Sample Comments
Each experimental condition that receives comments first viewed the composite
news article. The next screen presented a series of four comments, which varied in
composition. The sets of comments (samples presented in Table D1) were randomly
drawn from the appropriate banks of comments and randomly ordered prior to the
beginning of the experiment.

227

Table D1
Sample Comments by Condition
Condition
FPNoEx

Sample comment set
DH
6 months ago
I'll bet you ten to one that physicians who own mammography units will be
slower to adopt the new guidelines than those refer out mammograms.
_______________________________________________________________
R.M.

6 months ago

This attitude of many physicians - to continue with mammograms despite the
new recommendations - is a good example of a big problem of American
medicine and why we need health care reform to change the fee-for-service
system. Because doctors a paid a fee for each service, under the current system
they will continue to get paid for the mammograms and for the unnecessary
tests and treatment of patients that will follow false positive tests. No matter
that the tests there will be many more false positive tests than true positive tests
in the age group of women 40-49. In that age group, mammograms are
inefficient both in terms of promoting health and keeping costs down. But
consider what would happen if the payment system were reformed payment so
that doctors would be paid capitation fees for the care of their patients. In that
case, they would lose profit by doing unnecessary tests and procedures. In that
case, doctors would take the time and trouble to explain to their women patients
40-49 why they should not get mammograms. The result would be that fewer
women would be harmed by testing false positive and the health care system
would save a lot of money.
_______________________________________________________________
Anon

6 months ago

Dr. Phillip Strax was one of the early proponents of mammography. He
partnered with HIP in New York City's Research Department in the late 1960's
and early 1970's to study the impact of early detection via mammography on
women. Dr. Strax I was led to believe became an advocate due to a personal
loss to breast cancer in his family. He and HIP tried with all their skills and lots
of funding from the government to show that mammography extended (often
described by the emotional term 'saved') the lives of those women in significant
ways. But as with more recent reports the conclusions at best were inconclusive.
What all these tests come down to is (A) putting the fear of cancer into so-called
high risk people and (B) driving people to take tests as a way to increase patient
and cash flow. Often we hear about the scientific method and its underlying
value to distinguish allopathic medicine from all the alternatives including
wellness, healthy lifestyles and improving the air, water and food we use.
Americans die at alarming rates due to the very medical care received or suffer
medical injury that is less consequential or eventually leads to restricted lives
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and death. Some claim that the number of deaths due to medical care received
runs between 400,000 and 1,000,000 each and every year. More important than
misinforming women about mammography, men about PSA and everyone
about useless, dangerous and expensive testing is the need to start a national
wellness service that increases wellness, healthy life styles and improved air,
water and food. Reduce alcoholic behavior and many diseases would be
reduced or eliminated. Stop smoking and heart, lung and cancer diseases would
drop significantly. Fix our food and how we use it and diabetes, overweight,
obesity, cancers, heart diseases and other conditions would drop also. Introduce
needed supplements and many conditions including arthritis would be less
common. Now do the difficult thing: THINK about wellness.
_______________________________________________________________
swm

6 months ago

One way to get a great 5 year survival rate is to unnecessarily treat healthy
women who would have otherwise been just fine had never been told they had
"cancer." Treating as many patients as we do in the USA, most unnecessarily,
also gives the impression (falsely) that all breast cancer is curable. For those
interested, Lancet Oncology reported in July 2008 that the U S had the highest
national 5 year breast cancer survival rate. Do you think that maybe, somehow,
perhaps this had something to do with an agressive screening program?
BCNoEx

DH

6 months ago

I am always surprised that breast cancer awareness campaigns, and articles
always look at screenings, detection, research into technologies and medications
to "eradicate" the cancer...but they rarely take a strong look at the pollutants in
our world today that are finding their way into women's breast tissue. In my
opinion, campaigns for clean water, clean air, organic food, natural beauty care
products...all of these campaigns should join forces with breast cancer
prevention and awareness - or actually in fact, the other way around - since
women's awareness in this country of the issue of breast cancer is so strong and
the pink-ribbon is so well known, what better way to grab national attention
about the bigger picture of the toxic environment that we live in and raise our
children in than to have the breast cancer organizations start to raise our
awareness of prevention through creating a healthier environment.
_______________________________________________________________
R.M.

6 months ago

And how does our pannel want young women to be screened, to prevent them
from falling through the cracks? What about the 35 year old woman whose
breast cancer races to stage 3 in 6 months because her hormones are
appropriately active?
_______________________________________________________________
Anon

6 months ago
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One thing that is not always taken into account is that advanced breast cancers
are being seen more and more in younger women - who are too young to get a
mammogram. The mammogram could not decrease the number of advanced
cancer diagnosis if those with the cancer are not actually getting mammograms.
Older women may be getting diagnosed early because of the mammogram.
_______________________________________________________________
swm

6 months ago

If I were a female, this news would make me want to continue having
mammography, but instead of reaching for surgery at the first finding of a lump,
I would wait until a later mammography to decide whether the lump required
immediate or deferred action. As a male beyond the age of 40, I'm well aware
that PSA spikes (which I have experienced), may be short lived, and may be
meaningless ... certainly nothing to risk surgery and possible loss of sexual
function over.
FPEx

DH

6 months ago

Women encounter two fears that shake them with regard to the new
recommendations. There is, most obviously, dread of Cancer; the fact that many
cancers may be slow-growing and non-life-threatening does little to ameliorate
that dread. The second fear is that of relegation to second-class citizen. The
inroads made by womens' liberation are not so substantial that there is no
slippery slope. There lurks a sad suspicion that women are still expendable, that
the medical community pays less attention to women than to men and sees less
need to be truly careful of them. Only when both of these perceptions die out
will recommendations of the sort now put forth be regarded with more
rationality than emotion.
_______________________________________________________________
R.M.

6 months ago

After an experience a few years ago, at age 52, during which I was given
several mammograms and two different biopsies, including a surgical one, over
the course of approximately five months I was left traumatized by the
experience. Following the last procedure, I was basically told "never mind".
Even if cancer had been found, it would have been the type that I would "die
with" rather than "die of". Although I was thrilled not to have any cancer, the
fear and anxiety caused by this entire experience was overwhelming. I consider
myself a victim of needless invasive medical malpractice. I no longer have
mammograms nor do I do self-exams and my trust in modern medicine in
general remains greatly diminished.
_______________________________________________________________
Anon

6 months ago
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I'm 57 and have had mammograms every 3- 5 years since I was 40. I have no
family history of breast cancer and none of the other risk factors. Every time I
get the test I have to go back to be tested again. They have never found
anything, but this period of waiting is a big waste of time, causes a great deal of
anxiety and I also worry about the cumulative effects of so much radiation
giving me cancer. 6 months ago when I had my last mammogram the woman
who operated the equipment nearly cried when I told her that I hadn't had the
procedure in 3 years. "Why, why, why did you wait so long?" she looked at me
her eyes tearing. The people who support the mammogram industry act like
they are in a cult. Why isn't breast cancer or any other cancer for that matter
detectable in a blood test?
_______________________________________________________________
swm

BCEx

6 months ago

I am 45 and have had 2 mammograms since I turned 40. After reading a lot of
the research, I decided to have a mammogram only every other year. My 2nd
mammogram experience was a nightmare. The technician who performed the
mammogram was cold, unfriendly, and seemed hurried. The next day, she
called me to say that the result was "suspicious" and I needed to come in as
soon as possible for a follow up. She would not give me any other information;
she wouldn't even tell me which breast was abnormal. Her voice on the phone
was like ice. I was in a complete panic and spent the next 24 hours crying and
thinking that I was going to die. Even though I found some reassuring
information on the internet, I also found a lot that terrified me. So, I went in the
next day and had a diagnostic mammogram. Luckily, this time I got a different
technician. She was much kinder and more patient, and did a thorough job
positioning me in the machine. Waiting there for the radiologist to review my
scans was the longest 15 minutes of my life. The outcome? Negative. The
technician explained to me that probably some tissue had overlapped in my
breast during the first scan, because my breast was not sufficiently compressed.
(The hurried technician...) I have decided I won't have another mammogram
until I'm 50.
DH
6 months ago
The recommendations of not getting mammograms and not doing breast self
exams is completely about the insurance companies saving money. They will
save millions. And then there is us. Well, for one, I would be dead. DEAD. I
am a survivor and it is because of breast self exams and mammograms.
_______________________________________________________________
R.M.

6 months ago

Women are being advised to discuss the pros and cons of having a mammogram
before getting one automatically at age 40. What is so controversial about
having a woman be informed of her choices before making a medical decision?
_______________________________________________________________
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Anon

6 months ago

No family history, never smoked and not overweight, I had a small, but invasive
breast cancer found by an alert doctor screening a mammogram. so here I am,
almost 17 years later...do as you wish and best of luck.
_______________________________________________________________
swm

FPExRem

6 months ago

Bad, bad idea. I was diagnosed at age 46 with a tiny but extremely aggressive
cancer via mammogram; it could not be felt in an examination. My last
mammogram (totally 'clean') had been eighteen months before; now the cancer
had already spread to the lymph nodes. After surgery, chemo, and radiation, my
predicted 10-year survival chances are 92%. If I had waited until age 50...by
that time the cancer would probably had already metastasized and I would be
facing a death sentence. Women, don't die needlessly. Have your first
mammogram at age 40 or below (some doctors recommend starting at age 35)
and keep having them every year. It could save your life. I know it saved mine.
DH
6 months ago
It is far too naive to make a blanket statement that private insurance companies
will continue to support mammography for women under 50 at low risk for
breast cancer. They may do it now as a public relations type move but these
companies, for the most part, bend over backwards to maximize profits. No one
knows what will happen in the future as far as their policies.
_______________________________________________________________
R.M.

6 months ago

Women have been harmed, and I bet they agree with this recommendation.
These women have had radiologists tell them that an abnormality in their
mammogram was"99% probability benign" but still recommend a biopsy. After
weeks of anxiety and unnecessary surgery, they now have permanent titanium
foreign bodies in their breasts from the biopsies and each radiologist and
hospital is several thousand dollars richer. This is not effective use of our
health care dollars. It is CYA medicine.
_______________________________________________________________
Anon

6 months ago

Women have been persuaded to undergo biopsies because mammograms
showed "changes" in micro-calcifications. The biopsies that prove negative
subject these women to invasive surgery, the costs of second opinions, scarred
breasts, and psychological terror over a period of months. These women have
probably decided to have mammograms less often as a result. I am convinced
that while many doctors are quite earnest in their concerns, others are cynically
simply pulling in more fees for the institutions they work for, usually large
hospitals.
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_______________________________________________________________
swm

BCExRem

6 months ago

Yes, I certainly agree with this. Mammograms can cause harm - emotional,
physical, and financial harm. Women may have a mammogram that comes
back with "suspicious calcifications" in one spot. They go back in for more
views, and an ultrasound. They have needle biopsies. Still nothing conclusive.
Some doctors may even suggest that they have the area surgically removed.
Some of these women take the "watch and wait" option instead and nothing
changes over a number of years - in fact, for some, the "suspicious
calcifications" area seems to disappear. They are told that they should feel
lucky and grateful that they didn't have breast cancer after all that. Strangely,
many don't feel lucky; they feel suspicious about the whole medical-industrial
system. For every real microscopic cancer found, how other many hundreds of
women will undergo numerous costly tests and be given unneeded surgery
because of some tiny undefined spot? How about all the emotional and
psychological pain of being put on that medical testing treadmill? It's like they
give you one test, which leads another test, which leads to more tests, or to a
drug, which leads to another drug. It's no wonder our medical system is so
costly.
DH
6 months ago
What one needs to understand with these new guidelines is that it acknowledges
not that screening is useless, but that the tools with which we do screen are not
adequate at this point. Currently there are no good predictive biomarkers that
would stratify women into groups that would and would not benefit from early
mammograms. A large percentage of women diagnosed in the 40s with breast
cancer had no "risk factors" - again meaning that we probably don't understand
risk factors enough. Clinical discoveries, in particular in the area of diagnosis,
are developing rapidly today, as we do understand genetic and genomic risk
factors more readily. The hope could be that in the near future better technology
will make screening more accurate, and stratification more possible.
_______________________________________________________________
R.M.

6 months ago

Bad, bad idea. Women in their 40s can be diagnosed with extremely aggressive
cancer via mammogram; these tumors may not be able to be felt in an
examination. Some of these women may have even had clean mammograms in
the last two years, only to then find cancer that has already spread to the lymph
nodes. After surgery, chemo, and radiation, these women have a predicted 10year survival chances above 90%. If they had waited until age 50...by that time
the cancer would probably had already metastasized and they would be facing a
death sentence. Women, don't die needlessly. Have your first mammogram at
age 40 or below (some doctors recommend starting at age 35) and keep having
them every year. It could save your life. It has saved others.
_______________________________________________________________
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Anon

6 months ago

Good for all of you for whom this is an intellectual exercise. You're lucky. I can
only tell you what happens to women who are diagnosed with cancer. Every
year, women in their late 40s, with no family history and no symptoms, are
being diagnosed with early stage breast cancer after having routine annual
mammograms. They may have to have a lumpectomy and radiation. If these
women waited until they felt a lump, or if their first screening had come at 50, I
doubt their cancer would be found at an early stage. You can manipulate
statistics in many ways...but these women probably have a different viewpoint
and will take the mammograms.
_______________________________________________________________
swm

6 months ago

Breast cancer survivors are probably glad they had yearly mammograms. Some
of these women may have had tumors that were low-grade, well differentiated,
and small. But why would they want to wait until they or another could palpate
the cancer and surgery would require more removal of breast tissue and more
disfigurement.? That counts for something. Waiting could also result in a
greater chance of lymphodema if lymph node dissection is required.. Even mild
lymphodema is a pain. Most breast cancers, I believe 70-80%, break out of the
milk ducts which makes them life threatening at some point. Why wait? It's
not like the majority of prostate cancers which I understand grow so slowly that
most men will die of something else. Survivors WANT to survive and early
detection and treatment is physically and mentally justifiable.

Note. Conditions are as follows: NoInfo = no information control, NoComm = no
comments control, FPNoEx = false-positive comments without exemplars, BCNoEx =
mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx = false-positive
comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with
exemplars, FPExRem = false positive comments with exemplars removed, and
BCExRem = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with exemplars removed.
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APPENDIX E
EXPERIMENTAL COMMENT POOLS

To construct sets of comments with the content and valence needed for each
condition, as outlined in Table 4.1, comments were randomly drawn from seven pools of
comments with 15 comments in each pool: user-generated false positive comments
without exemplars, user-generated false positive comments with exemplars, false positive
comments that were rewritten to remove exemplars but preserve content, length, and
reading level, user-generated mammogram-detected cancer comments without exemplars,
user-generated mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, mammogramdetected cancer comments that were rewritten to remove exemplars but preserve content,
length, and reading level, and neutral comments with no exemplars. These full comment
pools are included below in Tables E1 through E6.
Table E1
User-Generated False-Positive Comments Without Exemplars
Comment text

I recently read (in a book entitled The Estrogen Errors, if you're
interested) that the error rate in interpreting mammograms is
amazingly high. Even if the test itself is theoretically reliable
and useful, the chances it's being read accurately are not that
good.
Consider that every time you get a mammogram you increase
the risk of getting breast cancer by 2 percent so in 10 years
you've increased the risk by 20 percent. Moreover, 70 to 80
percent of all positive mammograms do not, upon biopsy, show

Readability
(Flesch
Kincaid
Length
reading
(in
ease)
words)

39.2

45

50.6

71
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any presence of cancer. Probably more effective in the
prevention of breast cancer is vitamin D3 intake (it is not
actually a vitamin but a hormone).
People need to realize that when they agree to a screening test,
whatever it is, for heart disease, prostate cancer or breast
cancer, the overwhelming likelihood is that it will not help them
as an individual. Screening is like a lottery, there are many
players, but very few "winners." The medical community needs
to communicate better the true risks and gains from screening.
If those who offered screening, that is, doctors, actually paid for
the screening test themselves, I bet we'd see much less
unnecessary screening of dubious benefit.
One way to get a great 5 year survival rate is to unnecessarily
treat healthy women who would have otherwise been just fine
had never been told they had "cancer." Treating as many
patients as we do in the USA, most unnecessarily, also gives the
impression (falsely) that all breast cancer is curable. For those
interested, Lancet Oncology reported in July 2008 that the U S
had the highest national 5 year breast cancer survival rate. Do
you think that maybe, somehow, perhaps this had something to
do with an agressive screening program?
The time has come to take down the tacky pink ribbons and end
Breast Cancer Awareness Month. Early detection does not save
lives -- it leads to overdiagnosis and overtreatment. The
thousands of mammogram screening programs in the US
provide no benefit to women but are a huge source of revenue
for the breast cancer industrial complex. Mammogram
screening programs and the unnecessary treatment of harmless
conditions are a primary reason why our healthcare costs are the
highest in the world but our healthcare outcomes are the lowest
in the developed world. Let us shout from the rooftops that the
emperor has no clothes.
For many treatments, but most especially for topical issues like
breast or prostate cancer, we have allowed "common sense",
strongly held or stated opinion or self-interest to guide
recommendations. Only data should be used. Where the answer
is "we don't know", such should be stated. Fears that this report
will reduce mammograms assumes that mammograms are
beneficial. The plural of anecdote is not data. All screening tests
are a balance of benefit (lifespan or quality of life improved)
and harms (costs, risks, discomfort, anxiety, false negatives or
positives). Let us try to keep personal stories, opinions or
wishes ("It should work!") out of this. What we really need are
more studies (signal) not more media frenzy (noise).

47.7

90

49.5

93

52.9

103

59.8

119
236

The whole point of this discussion is not denying that there are
some cases found that save some peoples lives but that many
many more people undergo unnecessary treatment and often are
harmed by it. In addition the cost of over-screening is large for
the nation as a whole. There is always a balance that has to be
struck, and there will always be some that live or die as a result
of that balance. It is the same in everything we do in life trying
to protect people from threats. The main thing is that
researchers are more and more coming to the conclusion that
mammography is being overused and the trade-offs need to be
discussed openly.
there are a lot of women who use this information to say, well,
I'll just never have a mammogram... which is hardly the
message that one should take --. But this is the message.
Screening mammograms lead to unnecessary followup testing,
higher diagnosis rates of tiny masses of indolent cells that
would never have been a problem, unnecessary invasive
treatments, and most clearly do NOT save lives. At this point,
unfortunately, there is a whole industry of mammography, from
charities raising funds that could have gone to worthwhile
projects to screening clinics to treatment centers. This
juggernaut is difficult to stop, especially when so many people
have careers invested, and when so many women sincerely but
falsely believe that screening saved them.
The more "information you have about your own body" that
comes from someone else, the more likely THEY are to want to
DO THINGS TO YOU. Most of which will do you no good.
Take routine prostate screening. Millions of men have had their
prostates removed, with all the side effects that causes, when
watchful waiting would have likely done just as well. Maybe
some of them were saved from death, but statistically, the death
rate from prostate cancer hasn't changed. In other words, we are
doing more testing, more procedures and surgeries, but we are
not changing the number of people who die from cancer. Just
messing with those who wouldn't have died anyway, and raising
the cost of health care. Same with breast cancer. More breast
irradiation, more tests, more biopsies, not really very many
more women saved. And truthfully, even if you look at the
comments here, you will discover many women, if not most,
find their own tumors when they examine their own breasts.
Not a doctor. Not a machine. YOU.
The data was never very good about annual mammograms.
Medicine often picks up a treatment or technology before
"prime time" because it seems it ought to work. There are many

65.4

120

50.3

122

80.2

177

73.7

186
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therapies and beliefs in medicine that have not held up under
good studies. Why? Because we don't know a lot about the
complex human body. We are better but we don't know
everything. In almost 35 years of medicine I have seen a lot
come and go. We do our best but when we can prove that a
treatment (or an intervention of any sort) does no good or does
harm, we should rethink its use. Not that cost is not a factor in
screening programs. It always has been. But should we spend
100 million dollars a year on 100 people to save one live over a
ten year period? An exaggeration perhaps but it makes the point
that our system has limits. Better to spend the limited money
we have on things that work, like immunization programs and
better delivery of healthcare. There is no need to see a
conspiracy in this.
This attitude of many physicians - to continue with
mammograms despite the new recommendations - is a good
example of a big problem of American medicine and why we
need health care reform to change the fee-for-service system.
Because doctors a paid a fee for each service, under the current
system they will continue to get paid for the mammograms and
for the unnecessary tests and treatment of patients that will
follow false positive tests. No matter that the tests there will be
many more false positive tests than true positive tests in the age
group of women 40-49. In that age group, mammograms are
inefficient both in terms of promoting health and keeping costs
down. But consider what would happen if the payment system
were reformed payment so that doctors would be paid capitation
fees for the care of their patients. In that case, they would lose
profit by doing unnecessary tests and procedures. In that case,
doctors would take the time and trouble to explain to their
women patients 40-49 why they should not get mammograms.
The result would be that fewer women would be harmed by
testing false positive and the health care system would save a
lot of money.
56.6
Heart disease is the number one killer of men and women. Less
is known about how to treat women who suffer from heart
disease (and about how to detect it) because most trials were
conducted on men. While the breast cancer awareness folks
have done an admirable job ensuring we are aware of the risks
of (and spend more money on) breast cancer detection than just
about anything else (including other, more fatal cancers), the
statistics do not support the concept of spending that much time,
effort and funds to save so (relatively) few when they might
more effectively be spent on other health screening that would
40.7
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save more lives. The new breast cancer screening
recommendations say that women with a family history of
breast cancer SHOULD work with their physicians to determine
when it's best to begin mammograms. For some of the rest of
us -- who have faithfully done what we were guided to do and
have endured radiation exposure, angst and painful and invasive
procedures to prove normal calcifications are not in fact cancer
-- the new guidelines make eminent sense. Not to diminish the
fear some women honestly feel about getting breast cancer, how
much of that fear might be attributed to the persistent, alarming,
funds-seeking ways of breast cancer awareness groups?
It's time to reassess not only routine mammogram screening, but
also the universal adoption of expensive, flawed screening tests
that lead to unnecessary procedures and angst. Why were we so
quick to embrace a measure that costs 3.6 billion/yr (with the
unnecessary biopsies, mastectomies, chemo and radiation it's
likely over 4 billion) but provides little measurable benefit? I
don't believe that there is a vast conspiracy in place to bilk
insurers, but mammography (like PSA) screening seems a poor
use of our health care dollars. The problem is complicated.
Women whose family or friends have had breast CA, as well as
survivors concerned about reoccurrence are anxious and
vulnerable. Even after negative biopsies, many patients remain
fearful. Radiation and chemo are terrible to endure. The cost of
a poor screening program is high. Part of the answer may lie in
carefully evaluating the sensitivity and specificity of screening
tests in general populations before universal adoption.
Evaluations must be balanced. Radiologists performing high
volumes of mammograms and survivors convinced that a
mammogram result helped them are not well suited to
objectively evaluate the test. The American Cancer Society
needs to stop acting like a pseudo-scientific lobbying group.
Not all cancer screening is beneficial. PSA demonstrably
wasn't, but it took decades for ACS to drop its support of PSA
screening. How many billions should we invest in
mammography in the next decade?
44.7
I think women need to be very careful with cancer screening.
We get incomplete and biased information, slogans, scare
campaigns and orders, you "should", you "must"...provided by a
toxic mix of vested interests and politics who don't IMO, care
about women. I'm constantly shocked by the
dishonesty/unethical conduct of these programs and the medical
profession. Most programs are not evidence based and are far
more likely to harm us. If women want to test, consider an
51.7
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evidence based program, the Dutch and Finns have evidence
backed cervical screening. The Nordic Cochrane Institute (NCI)
have produced a brochure on, "The Risks and Benefits of
Mammograms", it's at their website. Be very careful accepting
recommendations, especially in countries that engage in nonevidence based screening, who push medical excess, and ignore
informed consent (and even consent itself), like the States and
Australia. Pap testing is not a clinical requirement for the Pill.
The NCI tell us about 50% of screen detected breast cancers are
over-diagnosed and any benefit of screening is wiped away by
women dying from lung cancer/heart attacks after treatment
with radiotherapy/chemo. So, the risks exceed any benefit. The
Dutch will scrap population pap testing and offer instead 5 HPV
primary tests or HPV self-testing at ages 30,35,40,50 and 60
and ONLY the roughly 5% who are HPV+ will be offered a 5
yearly pap test. Most women are having unnecessary pap testing
and risking excess biopsies/over-treatment.
Dr. Phillip Strax was one of the early proponents of
mammography. He partnered with HIP in New York City's
Research Department in the late 1960's and early 1970's to
study the impact of early detection via mammography on
women. Dr. Strax I was led to believe became an advocate due
to a personal loss to breast cancer in his family. He and HIP
tried with all their skills and lots of funding from the
government to show that mammography extended (often
described by the emotional term 'saved') the lives of those
women in significant ways. But as with more recent reports the
conclusions at best were inconclusive. What all these tests come
down to is (A) putting the fear of cancer into so-called high risk
people and (B) driving people to take tests as a way to increase
patient and cash flow. Often we hear about the scientific
method and its underlying value to distinguish allopathic
medicine from all the alternatives including wellness, healthy
lifestyles and improving the air, water and food we use.
Americans die at alarming rates due to the very medical care
received or suffer medical injury that is less consequential or
eventually leads to restricted lives and death. Some claim that
the number of deaths due to medical care received runs between
400,000 and 1,000,000 each and every year. More important
than misinforming women about mammography, men about
PSA and everyone about useless, dangerous and expensive
testing is the need to start a national wellness service that
increases wellness, healthy life styles and improved air, water
and food. Reduce alcoholic behavior and many diseases would
52.2
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be reduced or eliminated. Stop smoking and heart, lung and
cancer diseases would drop significantly. Fix our food and how
we use it and diabetes, overweight, obesity, cancers, heart
diseases and other conditions would drop also. Introduce
needed supplements and many conditions including arthritis
would be less common. Now do the difficult thing: THINK
about wellness.
Average 54.3

157.8

Table E2
User-Generated False-Positive Comments with Exemplars
Comment text

Readability
(Flesch
Kincaid
reading
ease)
71.5

I have had the mandatory mammagrams. Always show lump in
my dense breasts. Then have ultrasound that shows its nothing they think. I then have to make a huge fuss to avoid every
second mammogram because of the protocol that says it comes
first. All that extra radiation for nothing.
I am one of the women who was harmed, and I agree with this.
55.4
My radiologist at Lenox Hill told me I had an abnormality in
my mammogram that was "99% probability benign" but still
recommended a biopsy. Two weeks of anxiety and one
unnecessary surgery later, I now have a permanent titanium
foreign body in my breast and both she and the hospital are
several thousand dollars richer. This is not effective use of our
health care dollars. It is CYA medicine.
15 years ago, I was also persuaded to undergo a biopsy because 39.8
the mammogram showed "changes" in micro-calcifications. The
biopsy proved negative but subjected me to invasive surgery,
the costs of second opinions, a scarred breast, and psychological
terror over a period of nearly two months. I am convinced that
while many doctors are quite earnest in their concerns, others
are cynically simply pulling in more fees for the institutions
they work for, usually large hospitals. I have since restricted my
mammograms to once every 3-4 years.
the whole breast cancer industrial complex is suspicious...all the 58.6
pink, all the walks and runs, all the mammograms, but after all
the billions of dollars it's still as deadly as ever, but with a

Length
(in
words)
50
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89
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strong genetic component. My wife was a faithful screener, but
also very vulnerable to stress, and each year her mammgram put
her through a few weeks of hell, not to mention two useIess
biopsies that scarred her mentally and physically. The many
studies showing the harmful results of stress should get as much
attention as any others.
My last mammogram showed something suspicious. I was
rushed into an ultrasound for better diagnosis. Then a biopsy
and it turned out to be nothing. Nothing except $900 out of my
pocket. Every other year is fine with me. Maybe every second
year even. I blame the insurance companies for pushing all of
the "preventive wellness" testing done. Supposedly to save them
money - which is untrue. My grandmother refused
mammograms. She also refused to have a mole removed from
her face that the doctors told her would soon become cancerous
if not removed. My beloved grandma passed away at the age of
92, with the mole intact and never a mammogram.
Years ago I had a false alarm from a routine screening
mammogram. It took a month to learn that the technician had
not done the mammogram correctly -- a month of pure hell for
me. I was in my early 40s and had elementary school- age
children. Ironically, the several compounded mistakes that
delayed the " all-clear" ultimately were chalked up to the fact
that my initial screening and subsequent, delayed diagnostic
exam were performed during October, "Breast Cancer
Awareness" month. The clinics had hired badly trained
temporary workers to handle the additional women who came
in during the "awareness" month. These badly trained workers
made several mistakes in my case that weren't uncovered until
my ordeal finally ended.
No one mentioned the impact the refusal of women to get
regular mammograms would have on the income of doctors and
imaging clinics. It would be devastating for them. I noticed
many years ago that my mammograms always had to be
repeated after a proper period of sleepless nights. Nevertheless,
I had mammograms because my doctor would not let me have
the hormone replacement therapy she told me I could not live
without until I had that mammogram first. I no longer take
advise from doctors, I am 72 and I am doing what kept my
relatives alive and healthy in to their 80s and 90s - I stay away
from doctors unless I have a broken bone or an open wound..
After an experience a few years ago, at age 52, during which I
was given several mammograms and two different biopsies,
including a surgical one, over the course of approximately five
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months I was left traumatized by the experience. Following the
last procedure, I was basically told "never mind". Even if cancer
had been found, it would have been the type that I would "die
with" rather than "die of". Although I was thrilled not to have
any cancer, the fear and anxiety caused by this entire experience
was overwhelming. I consider myself a victim of needless
invasive medical malpractice. I no longer have mammograms
nor do I do self-exams and my trust in modern medicine in
general remains greatly diminished.
I'm 57 and have had mammograms every 3- 5 years since I was 71.3
40. I have no family history of breast cancer and none of the
other risk factors. Every time I get the test I have to go back to
be tested again. They have never found anything, but this period
of waiting is a big waste of time, causes a great deal of anxiety
and I also worry about the cumulative effects of so much
radiation giving me cancer. 6 months ago when I had my last
mammogram the woman who operated the equipment nearly
cried when I told her that I hadn't had the procedure in 3 years.
"Why, why, why did you wait so long?" she looked at me her
eyes tearing. The people who support the mammogram industry
act like they are in a cult. Why isn't breast cancer or any other
cancer for that matter detectable in a blood test?
So, OK -- mammograms don't work. We've been sold a bill of
79.6
goods, billions down the drain for no protection. And before
that, self-exams -- pushed EXTREMELY for DECADES by
doctors, nurses, hospitals, advertising, cancer organizations -all a waste of time. Even when done by a doctor. How many
times did my OB-GYN yell at me -- do your self exams...get
your mammogram....so I did. Faithfully. Since age 35. It did
find a couple of small benign tumors in the first one at 35 -- had
them removed -- never came back. So, I'm onto 20 years of
having mammograms, all but the first "clean" -- I guess they did
no good. How much radiation have I had unnecessarily????
And the worst thing, not mentioned here: this was all sold to
American women with the idea that we could SAVE OUR
OWN LIVES by early detection and prevention....how'd that
work out? Epic fail. Now that means -- THERE IS NOTHING,
absolutely nothing, YOU CAN DO TO PREVENT BREAST
CANCER. Just sit there...wait until you get it....then
die.Thanks, Medical Establishment, for nothing.
I have learned that in many instances, the medical establishment 46.6
often provides conflicting advice, almost guess-like. I also have
declined mammograms, having had only two by age 56, both
required before an overseas posting. I get annual reminders
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which go ignored as there has been no breast cancer in my
family and a sister underwent a frightening month before a false
positive biopsy determination. I have also taken the same
approach to physicals, typically getting one every five years or
so, usually when required by overseas postings. While I haven't
needed to do much medical research into specific conditions, I
have done lots of research into nutrition after seeing Food,Inc.
and have been stunned by the wealth of misinformation bandied
about by the government and corporations on which the medical
establishment is mostly silent, even though nutrition affects the
most basic standard of health. Since moving to a whole food,
plant-based diet, my family hasn't even suffered a cold in three
years. I wish we could get a break on health insurance that we
do as safe drivers from auto insurers, since we rarely use it....
Yes, I can certainly relate to (and agree with) this.
62.8
Mammograms can cause harm - emotional, physical, and
financial harm. It's been about 12 years now for me; I had a
mammogram that came back with "suspicious calcifications" in
one spot. I went back in for more views, and an ultrasound. I
had needle biopsies. Still nothing conclusive. I remember a
doctor suggesting that I have the area surgically removed. I
took the "watch and wait" option instead. I've been waiting
now for 12 years and nothing has changed - in fact the
"suspicious calcifications" area seems to have disappeared. I'm
told that I should feel lucky and grateful that I didn't have breast
cancer after all that. Strangely I don't feel lucky; I feel
suspicious about the whole medical-industrial system. For
every real microscopic cancer found, how other many hundreds
of women will undergo numerous costly tests and be given
unneeded surgery because of some tiny undefined spot? How
about all the emotional and psychological pain of being put on
that medical testing treadmill? It's like they give you one test,
which leads another test, which leads to more tests, or to a
drug, which leads to another drug. It's no wonder our medical
system is so costly.
I am 45 and have had 2 mammograms since I turned 40. After
68.6
reading a lot of the research, I decided to have a mammogram
only every other year. My 2nd mammogram experience was a
nightmare. The technician who performed the mammogram
was cold, unfriendly, and seemed hurried. The next day, she
called me to say that the result was "suspicious" and I needed to
come in as soon as possible for a follow up. She would not give
me any other information; she wouldn't even tell me which
breast was abnormal. Her voice on the phone was like ice. I
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was in a complete panic and spent the next 24 hours crying and
thinking that I was going to die. Even though I found some
reassuring information on the internet, I also found a lot that
terrified me. So, I went in the next day and had a diagnostic
mammogram. Luckily, this time I got a different technician.
She was much kinder and more patient, and did a thorough job
positioning me in the machine. Waiting there for the radiologist
to review my scans was the longest 15 minutes of my life. The
outcome? Negative. The technician explained to me that
probably some tissue had overlapped in my breast during the
first scan, because my breast was not sufficiently compressed.
(The hurried technician...) I have decided I won't have another
mammogram until I'm 50.
I was a victim of an over zealous system designed to over
64.8
diagnose breast cancer and profit from the measures necessary
to treat it. In 2006, at age 43 had my first mammogram. I was
subsequently called back to have a 2nd screening done based on
something that looked abnormal. After the 2nd level of
screening, was told I needed a biopsy. I first had a radiologist
insert a needle gun into my breast and inject a small pea size
metal pellet at the exact site of the abnormal looking breast
tissue. This was done as a marker for the biopsy and to pull out
a very small amount of tissue to send to the lab. Long story
short, the very small biopsy was inconclusive, but the
experience was dreadful. The radiologist hit an artery and I lost
a lot of blood there on the table. It left the whole right side of
my chest bruised. Next, I scheduled my "biopsy" which I
thought would be a simple procedure in-office. However, I
found out what they were calling "biopsy" was actually referred
to by surgeons as a lumpectomy. This required it be done in a
hospital under general anesthesia. When all was said and done,
the diagnosis was not cancer, but rather a fibro-adenoma. In
other words, nothing to be concerned with. As a result, I now
have a permanent scar on my right breast and I no longer have
symmetry, which has been very disturbing to me and has eroded
my confidence.
I have been baffled at the volume of physicians who came out
55.8
with knee-jerk reactions to this study--a surprising antiintellectual response. I think there are two things operating
there: 1) many physicians took the minimum statistics required,
and forgot most of it, and do not have a very good
understanding of probability and statistics, and 2) there's a wellknown psychological bias that causes people to overestimate the
likelihood of an event if they have had a personal experience of
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that event. Hence, the "it happened to one of my patients so it
must be something everyone should be concerned about"
attitude. General public has this problem too. The "my
mother/sister/aunt/friend/teacher had this happen, so I need to
be concerned about it as well"•. If we're going to use this as a
rationale for potentially invasive screening, we should be
getting routine lumbar punctures to screen for MS, or having
routine EKGs to screen for potential heart problems. I think
there's a case to be made for "enough". And yes, I know people
who have met an untimely end to breast cancer. They all were
either in a population that doesn't get screened at all (20s) or
had been having mammograms routinely that nevertheless
didn't uncover the cancer until it was too late. I had a false
positive on my first mammo, and my second, and my third. I
did a pile of research and arrived at the conclusion that
fibrocystic breasts were much more likely than any cancerous
condition. And I resisted and will continue to resist a biopsy. I
have also concluded that even if this "suspicous"• mass in my
breast IS cancer, I will not do anything about it-- it hasn't been
changing for years, and if it is cancer, it's clearly one of the
super slow-moving and possibly never a problem cancers. The
personal costs of getting it treated well outweigh any shreds of
concern I might have over it.
Average 59.8

158.2

Table E3
False-Positive Comments (from Table E2) Rewritten to Remove Exemplars but Preserve
Content
Comment text

Some women have had the mandatory mammagrams that then
show lumps in their dense breasts. Then they have ultrasounds
that show its nothing - the doctors think. Then women have to
make a huge fuss to avoid every second mammogram because
of the protocol that says it comes first. All that extra radiation
for nothing.

Readability
(Flesch
Kincaid
Length
reading
(in
ease)
words)
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Women have been harmed, and I bet they agree with this
recommendation. These women have had radiologists tell them
that an abnormality in their mammogram was"99% probability
benign" but still recommend a biopsy. After weeks of anxiety
and unnecessary surgery, they now have permanent titanium
foreign bodies in their breasts from the biopsies and each
radiologist and hospital is several thousand dollars richer. This
is not effective use of our health care dollars. It is CYA
medicine.
Women have been persuaded to undergo biopsies because
mammograms showed "changes" in micro-calcifications. The
biopsies that prove negative subject these women to invasive
surgery, the costs of second opinions, scarred breasts, and
psychological terror over a period of months. These women
have probably decided to have mammograms less often as a
result. I am convinced that while many doctors are quite
earnest in their concerns, others are cynically simply pulling in
more fees for the institutions they work for, usually large
hospitals.
the whole breast cancer industrial complex is suspicious...all the
pink, all the walks and runs, all the mammograms, but after all
the billions of dollars it's still as deadly as ever, but with a
strong genetic component. Some women are faithful screeners,
but also very vulnerable to stress, and each year their
mammgrams put them through a few weeks of hell, not to
mention useless biopsies that scar them mentally and
physically. The many studies showing the harmful results of
stress should get as much attention as any others.
Some women have a mammogram that shows something
suspicious and are rushed into an ultrasound for better
diagnosis. Then a biopsy and it turns out to be nothing. Nothing
except $900 out of their pocket. Every other year is fine. Maybe
every second year even. I blame the insurance companies for
pushing all of the "preventive wellness" testing done.
Supposedly to save them money - which is untrue. There are
women who have refused mammograms. They may have also
refused things like having pre-cancerous moles removed. These
women then go on to live to old ages, with suspicious moles
intact and having never had a mammogram.
Women can have false alarms from routine screening
mammograms. In some cases, it's because technicians have not
done the mammogram correctly, but it can take a month to
figure this out -- a month of pure hell. Some of these women
are in their early 40s and have elementary school- age children.
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Ironically, sometimes the mistakes that delay the " all-clear" can
be chalked up to the fact that many screenings and diagnostic
exams are performed during October, "Breast Cancer
Awareness" month. The clinics hire badly trained temporary
workers to handle the additional women who come in during
the "awareness" month. These badly trained workers can make
mistakes that may not be discovered until much later.
No one mentioned the impact the refusal of women to get
regular mammograms would have on the income of doctors and
imaging clinics. It would be devastating for them. I've noticed
that for some women, mammograms always have to be repeated
after a proper period of sleepless nights. Nevertheless, these
women have mammograms because their doctors have told
them they have to for one reason or another. These women may
want to no longer take advise from doctors, but instead may do
what keeps people alive and healthy in to their 80s and 90s stay away from doctors unless they have a broken bone or an
open wound..
59.7
Women in their early 50s can have experiences where they are
given several mammograms and multiple biopsies, including
surgical ones, over the course of several months. These women
are left traumatized by their experiences. Then, following these
procedures, they are basically told "never mind". Even if cancer
had been found, it would have been the type that they would
"die with" rather than "die of". Although these women are
probably thrilled not to have any cancer, the fear and anxiety
caused by this entire experience is overwhelming. I consider
these women victims of needless invasive medical malpractice.
These experiences probably lead them to no longer have
mammograms or do self-exams and their trust in modern
medicine in general likely remains greatly diminished.
50.8
There are some women who are in their late 50s and have had
mammograms every 3- 5 years since they were 40. They have
no family history of breast cancer and none of the other risk
factors, yet every time they get the test they have to go back to
be tested again. The radiologists never find anything, but this
period of waiting is a big waste of time, causes a great deal of
anxiety and I also worry about the cumulative effects of so
much radiation giving these women cancer. I've heard of
women being asked by technicians with tears in their eyes why
they haven't had the procedure in several years , "Why, why,
why did you wait so long?" The people who support the
mammogram industry act like they are in a cult. Why isn't
60.5
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breast cancer or any other cancer for that matter detectable in a
blood test?
So, OK -- mammograms don't work. We've been sold a bill of
goods, billions down the drain for no protection. And before
that, self-exams -- pushed EXTREMELY for DECADES by
doctors, nurses, hospitals, advertising, cancer organizations -all a waste of time. Even when done by a doctor. How many
times are women yelled at by their OB-GYNs -- do your self
exams...get your mammogram....so they do. Faithfully. Some
since their mid-30s. Some of these women have had small
benign tumors removed that never came back. So, they're onto
20 years of having mammograms, most of them "clean" -- I
guess they did no good. How much radiation have they had
unnecessarily???? And the worst thing, not mentioned here:
this was all sold to American women with the idea that we
could SAVE OUR OWN LIVES by early detection and
prevention....how'd that work out? Epic fail. Now that means -THERE IS NOTHING, absolutely nothing, YOU CAN DO TO
PREVENT BREAST CANCER. Just sit there...wait until you
get it....then die.Thanks, Medical Establishment, for nothing.
78.5
I have learned that in many instances, the medical establishment
often provides conflicting advice, almost guess-like. Some
women have declined mammograms, or have maybe had only a
couple when they were required for some reason. They may
choose to ignore annual reminders because they have no breast
cancer in their family or they know someone who has had a
frightening false positive biopsy determination. Some women
have also taken the same approach to physicals, typically
getting one every five years or so, usually when required for
work . While I haven't needed to do much medical research
into specific conditions, I have done lots of research into
nutrition after seeing Food,Inc. and have been stunned by the
wealth of misinformation bandied about by the government and
corporations on which the medical establishment is mostly
silent, even though nutrition affects the most basic standard of
health. People who move to a whole food, plant-based diet,
have families that are healthier and suffer from colds less
frequently. They should get a break on health insurance like
safe drivers do from auto insurers, since they rarely use it....
48
Yes, I certainly agree with this. Mammograms can cause harm
- emotional, physical, and financial harm. Women may have a
mammogram that comes back with "suspicious calcifications"
in one spot. They go back in for more views, and an ultrasound.
They have needle biopsies. Still nothing conclusive. Some
60

181

188

203
249

doctors may even suggest that they have the area surgically
removed. Some of these women take the "watch and wait"
option instead and nothing changes over a number of years - in
fact, for some, the "suspicious calcifications" area seems to
disappear. They are told that they should feel lucky and
grateful that they didn't have breast cancer after all that.
Strangely, many don't feel lucky; they feel suspicious about the
whole medical-industrial system. For every real microscopic
cancer found, how other many hundreds of women will undergo
numerous costly tests and be given unneeded surgery because
of some tiny undefined spot? How about all the emotional and
psychological pain of being put on that medical testing
treadmill? It's like they give you one test, which leads another
test, which leads to more tests, or to a drug, which leads to
another drug. It's no wonder our medical system is so costly.
Some women in their mid-40s may have only had a couple of
mammograms since turning 40. After reading a lot of the
research, they have decided to have a mammogram only every
other year. For some, the mammogram experience is a
nightmare. I have heard of some women who have experienced
mammogram technicians who were cold, unfriendly, and
seemed hurried. Then they get a call from an icy technician to
say that the result was "suspicious" and they need to come in as
soon as possible for a follow up. They may not even be given
any other information, like which breast was abnormal. These
women then spend the time until their follow-up in a complete
panic, crying and thinking that they are going to die. Even
though they can find some reassuring information on the
internet, they will also find a lot that will terrify them. So, then
they go in and have a diagnostic mammogram. If they are
lucky, they might get a different technician who is kinder, more
patient, and thorough. Even still, waiting there for the
radiologist to review their scans seems like the longest 15
minutes of their lives. The outcome? Negative. These women
are then told that probably some tissue had overlapped in their
breast during the first scan, because the breast was not
sufficiently compressed. No wonder many of these women
decide not to have another mammogram until they're 50.
65.1
There are women who are victims of an over zealous system
designed to over diagnose breast cancer and profit from the
measures necessary to treat it. These women have their first
mammograms in their 40s and are subsequently called back to
have a 2nd screening done based on something that looks
abnormal. After the 2nd level of screening, they are told they
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need a biopsy. First they have a radiologist insert a needle gun
into their breast and inject a small pea size metal pellet at the
exact site of the abnormal looking breast tissue. This is done as
a marker for the biopsy and to pull out a very small amount of
tissue to send to the lab. Long story short, the very small
biopsy may be inconclusive, but the experience can be dreadful.
Sometimes, women can lose a lot of blood there on the table
and have complications that leave the whole side of their chest
bruised. Then, they schedule "biopsies," which one might think
would be a simple procedure in-office. However, what they
call a "biopsy" is actually referred to by surgeons as a
lumpectomy. This is required to be done in a hospital under
general anesthesia. When all is said and done, the diagnosis
may not even be cancer, but rather something like a fibroadenoma. In other words, nothing to be concerned with. As a
result, some of these women now have permanent scars on their
breasts and may no longer have symmetry, which can be very
disturbing and erode their confidence.
I have been baffled at the volume of physicians who came out
with knee-jerk reactions to this study--a surprising antiintellectual response. I think there are two things operating
there: 1) many physicians took the minimum statistics required,
and forgot most of it, and do not have a very good
understanding of probability and statistics, and 2) there's a wellknown psychological bias that causes people to overestimate the
likelihood of an event if they have had a personal experience of
that event. Hence, the "it happened to one of my patients so it
must be something everyone should be concerned about"
attitude. General public has this problem too. The "my
mother/sister/aunt/friend/teacher had this happen, so I need to
be concerned about it as well"•. If we're going to use this as a
rationale for potentially invasive screening, we should be
getting routine lumbar punctures to screen for MS, or having
routine EKGs to screen for potential heart problems. I think
there's a case to be made for "enough". And yes, I know people
who have met an untimely end to breast cancer. They all were
either in a population that doesn't get screened at all (20s) or
had been having mammograms routinely that nevertheless
didn't uncover the cancer until it was too late. Some women
have false positives on their first mammo, and their second, and
their third. After doing a pile of research, they arrive at the
conclusion that fibrocystic breasts are much more likely than
any cancerous condition. Some of these women have resisted
and will continue to resist a biopsy. They may have even
55.4

342
251

concluded that if the "suspicous"• mass in their breast IS
cancer, they will not do anything about it-- if it hasn't been
changing for years, and it is cancer, it's clearly one of the super
slow-moving and possibly never a problem cancers. The
personal costs of getting it treated may well outweigh any
shreds of concern they have.
Average 57.5

155.1

Table E4
User-Generated Mammogram-Detected Cancer Comments without Exemplars

Comment text
And how does our pannel want young women to be screened,
to prevent them from falling through the cracks? What about
the 35 year old woman whose breast cancer races to stage 3
in 6 months because her hormones are appropriately active?
Early detection not only saves lives, it may lead to
discovering earlier cancers and lead to more breastconserving therapy. clearly as chemo gets better, the benefit
of any screening will be lessened. We should continue to
improve treatment for more advanced disease. Saving 18000
lives with screening seems like a good thing to me.
Thank you for this information. But how can anyone imagine
it would be ethical to dissuade women from looking for (and
treating) tumors until there is some way to tell which ones are
"harmless." It would be like telling kids it is ok to cross the
road with their eyes closed, since they probably won't get hit
by a truck anyway.
One thing that is not always taken into account is that
advanced breast cancers are being seen more and more in
younger women - who are too young to get a mammogram.
The mammogram could not decrease the number of advanced
cancer diagnosis if those with the cancer are not actually
getting mammograms. Older women may be getting
diagnosed early because of the mammogram.
But when the opponents of regular screening say that
mammograms find many small tumors that would never
become life-threatening they admit--if they are honest--that
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they cannot say for certain which these cases are. Is it their
contention that no lives are ever saved by treating small
localized tumors found in regular screening and that none of
these tumors if ignored would become life-threatening?
I am shocked at how easily human lives are treated as just
units of statistics. In my opinion, if (and this is a very big IF:
a true scientific, fully independent analysis is necessary)
saving even a single LIFE calls for testing 1900 women in 10
years it is worth doing it. Lives are reduced to statistics in
authoritarian regimes. In our democratic society every life
must be considered sacred.
I've never read a more contradictory or rediculous premise as
that forwarded in this article. The panel recommends a
change, yet admits that the death rate from breast cancer is
REDUCED when mammography is performed regularly from
age 40 onwards. Having witnessed my radiologist spouse
diagnose breast cancer in young women time and time again,
I can only say--don't let number crunchers make medical
decision. Statistics can be terribly deceiving.
Are they out of their minds? Have you gone to the forums at
the cancer boards and read the forums. A lot more women
under 40 are getting breast cancer on a daily basis. Cutting
back on mammograms might work for some people, but do
you want to wait 2 years before you next one and then find
out you have a stage IV cancer instead of a stage One? Get a
grip on reality folks. People are dying from cancer, not from
'overtreatment'
If I were a female, this news would make me want to
continue having mammography, but instead of reaching for
surgery at the first finding of a lump, I would wait until a
later mammography to decide whether the lump required
immediate or deferred action. As a male beyond the age of
40, I'm well aware that PSA spikes (which I have
experienced), may be short lived, and may be meaningless ...
certainly nothing to risk surgery and possible loss of sexual
function over.
Maybe it's all about the coming government health care.
They keep telling us that THEY are going to make "health
care" cheaper. Fewer mammograms will definitely cut costs,
but will the true costs be seen in more radical surgery to
rectify not catching the cancer earlier with mammograms in
the first place. About the only thing that this NEW health
care is going to afford for women is an abortion...those we
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will be able to have, but no early breast cancer detection.
That's government for you.....stupid, stupid.
I agree with the Harvard Professor of Medicine who said in
this morning's Times, "This is crazy." I know of women who
have been helped or who are dying from breast cancer.
Without those mammograms what of the ones saved? Why
are we doing to the women in health care what sounds so
severe. Men determine whether abortions can be obtained
with government funds. Now we have a panel that tells them
about their breasts. How many women on the panel have
suffered or had problems? This is exactly what the tea
baggers and the Republicans and Fundamentalists and the
Limbaughs and Becks want to hear.
As a radiologist/mammographer I am astonished by the
recommendations. Anxiety generated from a negative biopsy
is nowhere near equivalent to missing a cancer. And why
shouldn't women perform breast self examination? Granted it
is a crude test, but it costs nothing and what is the alternative?
Doing nothing? Treating a person is different than treating a
population. I have diagnosed too many women in their 40's
with aggressive cancer, caught early to agree with the
conclusions of this study. This basically says that let's not try
and detect breast cancer in women in their 40's, it costs too
much, both emotionally and financially. Good luck, we'll help
you when you get to 50, maybe!
Women please, please, please do not stop getting your
screening mammograms! The death rate from breast cancer
had been unchanged for 50 years until mammography
screening began in the mid-1980's. Soon after the death rate
began to fall. Each year there are now more than 30% fewer
deaths each year as a result of early detection. Therapy has
improved, but therapy saves lives when breast cancers are
found early. The data clearly show that screening women
beginning at the age of 40 saves the most lives and the most
years of life lost to breast cancer. It is completely cost
effective. The arguments against screening such as massive
overdiagnosis have been fabricated. Mammography is not
perfect, but it is saving thousands of lives each year. We
need to move away from poor peer review and back to
science based practice. Annual mammography screening is
the best advice that we can provide to women.
Being of a suspicious nature, I tend to think this is another
trick on women's health care. Another way for the insurance
companies to spend less, kill more. But, beyond all this, it is

75.5

107

57.2

120

71.9

155

73.9

162
254

odd that these (are they doctors?) people in the federal
government have decided to confuse and worry the issue of
breast cancer. It doesn't take much to see that mammograms
do detect breast cancer and do stop women from dying. Andwhat is really astounding is the discrediting of self-exams.
What the!? If a woman has no insurance, she doesn't get a
yearly physical. Therefore she does not get a breast exam by
a doctor. If she has not been told to use breast self exams,
how will she know if she has cancer until too late. It is
another insane political game using women's health rights to
smoke screen the real danger which is NO HEALTH CARE
REFORMATION, NO UNIVERSAL SINGLE PLAYER.
The recommendations, issued Monday by a federal advisory
panel, reversed widely promoted guidelines and were
intended to reduce overtreatment. Issued by a federal
advisory panel....hmmmm. My prediction is that this will be
the first of many "federal advisory" panels to come. Let's see
next it will be heart screenings, prostate sreenings, blood
tests, etc. I mean really it's only 1 life in 2000.... come on
now folks it really isn't that big of a deal. This is the
beginning of rationing. If you think medicine is all about
money now wait until the government takes over. Sorry but I
still trust my doctor more then any politician or "federal
advisory" board to tell me what I should and shouldn't do.
Unfortunately I've known too many people who have gotten
cancer but luckily enough were saved by early discovery.
Until something better comes along the recommendations
should remain the same. If this is change we can believe in
you can keep it.
63.1
Average 64.3
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User-Generated Mammogram-Detected Cancer Comments with Exemplars

Comment text
No family history, never smoked and not overweight, I had a
small, but invasive breast cancer found by an alert doctor
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screening a mammogram. so here I am, almost 17 years
later...do as you wish and best of luck.
The recommendations of not getting mammograms and not
doing breast self exams is completely about the insurance
companies saving money. They will save millions. And then
there is us. Well, for one, I would be dead. DEAD. I am a
survivor and it is because of breast self exams and
mammograms.
At age 39, a tumor too small to be felt was found by
mamography, removed, and today I am alive and cancer free.
Statistically speaking, yes, it may be seem that doing
screening tests on younger women isn't worth the effort and
price tag .... UNLESS IT IS YOUR LIFE THAT IS
SAVED!!! Patients are not statistics, they are individuals.
A mammogram at the age of 41 found suspicious sites that
later turned out to be LCIS, DCIS and an invasive carcinoma
(stage zero). After much agonizing (and a lumpectomy), I
decided to have a mastectomy. There has been no recurrence
since (I am now 50). So far as I am concerned, the
mammogram detected cancer early enough to save my life.
I can only tell this: I am one of the millions of women all
over the world that are still alive thanks to a mammography
at 4O. I had breast cancer two years ago with 41. I imagine
my no future if the doctors and the authorities heard to this
panel. Please, be careful with such recommendations. We are
talking about life and death.
I had a "routine" mammogram and they discovered a golf ball
sized aggressive cancer. Without the mammogram I would
not have known. I have finished my treatments and I would
encourage women over 40 be screened because I felt great
and had no idea I had cancer. No a mammogram is not a cure
but it does help us find out something is wrong. How dare
you say otherwise
This has nothing to do with the statistics, but mammography
detected a very small lump for me (undetectable from the
outside), and, after a lumpectomy, spurred a genetic test that
revealed that I was BRCA positive. Now, after a double
mastectomy and a hysterectomy, my risks for breast and
ovarian cancers are lower than average. My mother and my
aunt died of ovarian and breast cancer. That mammogram
definitely saved my life.
My daughter was diagnosed with breast cancer detected by a
mammogram when she was 43. It was not palpable and
fortunately had not spread to the lymph nodes. She had a
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lumpectomy and radiation, but did not require chemo. She is
now a 15 year survivor and I am grateful that it was caught
early. Mammograms use much less radiation than they did
years ago. I am an advocate of early detection with
mammography in conjunction with self examination.
I had dinner tonight with a friend who like me was shocked
and angered by this news alert. I had my first mammogram at
age 44 and cancer was discovered. Had I waited until 50 I
never would have seen my 50th birthday. My friend lost a
sister at age 40 to breast cancer ! I hope and expect this news
will spark a huge outrage as it should. I am furious and I
suspect this is a financial decision rather than a medical one.
this is just the beginning of medicine by statistics. aka
obama-pelosi care. i know three woman today in their 40's
battling breast cancer of an aggressive type. if not for the
mammograms these would be unnoticed and untreated for a
few more years..no wait you can you treat cancer after the
patient is dead right?it wont' belong before the statisticians
information will filter to the provider and we will see a
resurgence of breast cancer deaths. if i am not mistaken
england has a miserable survival rate!!
Good for all of you for whom this is an intellectual exercise.
You're lucky. I can only tell what happened to me. This year
at 48, with no family history and no symptoms, I was
diagnosed with a stage 1 invasive ductal carcinoma after my
routine annual (digital) mammogram. I had a lumpectomy
and radiation. If I waited until I felt a lump, or if my first
screening had come at 50, I doubt my cancer would have
been stage one. You can manipulate statistics in many
ways...but I assure you...if it's your breast and your cancer,
you have a different viewpoint. I'll take the mammograms,
thank you.
Bad, bad idea. I was diagnosed at age 46 with a tiny but
extremely aggressive cancer via mammogram; it could not be
felt in an examination. My last mammogram (totally 'clean')
had been eighteen months before; now the cancer had already
spread to the lymph nodes. After surgery, chemo, and
radiation, my predicted 10-year survival chances are 92%. If
I had waited until age 50...by that time the cancer would
probably had already metastasized and I would be facing a
death sentence. Women, don't die needlessly. Have your first
mammogram at age 40 or below (some doctors recommend
starting at age 35) and keep having them every year. It could
save your life. I know it saved mine.
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As an eight year survivor I am really glad I had yearly
mammograms. My tumor was low-grade, well differentiated,
and small. But my breasts were also small. Why would I
want to wait until I or another could palpate the cancer and
surgery would require more removal of breast tissue and
more disfigurement.? That counts for something. Waiting
could also result in a greater chance of lymphodema if lymph
node dissection is required.. I have mild lymphodema and
even that is a pain. Most breast cancers, I believe 70-80%,
break out of the milk ducts which makes them life
threatening at some point. Why wait? It's not like the
majority of prostate cancers which I understand grow so
slowly that most men will die of something else. As a
survivor you WANT to survive and early detection and
treatment is physically and mentally justifiable.
66.7
these recommendations are primitive, phallo-centric, absurd,
cruel, stastically immoral and the work of fools. i turned 50
this year. in 2006, if not for mammography and highlytrained, vigilant radiologists, i would be extremely ill now,
my life most likely unrecoverable. after a hx of normal
screenings, i missed ONE mammography in '05 because i
was caregiving a dying parent. the tumor was not palpabable
by the way and it was already a stage 1. breast cancers do not
discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, class, whether
pre-menopausal or post-menopausal, motherhood or lifestyle.
there are many women who are in high-risk categories and
many women who develop breast cancers who have no
known risk at all. if this is part of the assignment of "health
care reform", then American women face very serious trouble
in achieving an enduring worthiness and equality in this
society.
46
My mother received regular mammograms starting at 50.
She was diagnosed with stage 4 breast cancer at 54. At that
time, she'd gone about eight months between mammograms.
While she had been a smoker and had some other risk factors
for various types of cancer, she was not in a high risk group
for breast cancer. She died this August of breast cancer,
which had come back in her bones after six cancer-free years.
I am not an oncologist and do not know how her cancer
would have progressed untreated if, as recommended now,
she had received a mammogram every two years. But her
cancer was aggressive, and it seems likely to me that, had she
received mammograms less frequently, her doctor would not
have caught it until it was even further advanced. I think my 66.5
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mother would have been deprived of ten years of life, during
which she traveled, became a grandmother (twice over), and
saw her middle child married. Having lost my mother before
she was even eligible for Social Security, I do not intend to
follow this guideline.
Average 67.1

92.3

Table E6
Mammogram-Detected Cancer Comments (from Table E5) Rewritten to Remove
Exemplars but Preserve Content

Comment text
Women with no family history, who have never smoked and
are not overweight can have small, invasive breast cancer
found by alert doctors and screening mammograms. These
women can then go on to live for many years...do as you wish
and best of luck.
The recommendations of not getting mammograms and not
doing breast self exams is completely about the insurance
companies saving money. They will save millions. And then
there is us women. Many women would be dead. DEAD.
There are survivors and it is because of breast self exams and
mammograms.
Some women in their late 30s can have tumors too small to
be felt found by mamography, have them removed, and
continue to live cancer free. Statistically speaking, yes, it may
be seem that doing screening tests on younger women isn't
worth the effort and price tag .... UNLESS IT IS YOUR LIFE
THAT IS SAVED!!! Patients are not statistics, they are
individuals.
Women in their early 40s can have mammograms that find
suspicious sites that later turn out to be LCIS, DCIS or
invasive carcinomas. I could imagine that after much
agonizing (and maybe a lumpectomy), some of these women
then decide to have a mastectomy. If there is no recurrence,
so far as I am concerned, the mammogram detected cancer
early enough to save their lives.
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I can only tell this: millions of women all over the world are
still alive thanks to a mammography at 4O. Women have
breast cancer in their early 40s. I imagine their no future if
the doctors and the authorities heard to this panel. Please, be
careful with such recommendations. We are talking about life
and death.
Women can have "routine" mammograms where they
discover a golf ball sized aggressive cancer. Without the
mammogram they would not have known. I would
encourage women over 40 be screened because people can
feel great and have no idea they have cancer. No a
mammogram is not a cure but it does help find out something
is wrong. How dare you say otherwise
This has nothing to do with the statistics, but mammography
can detect very small lumps (undetectable from the outside).
After having a mammogram that detects a lump and possibly
a lumpectomy, some women go on to have genetic tests that
reveal they are BRCA positive. If these women have a double
mastectomy and a hysterectomy, their risks for breast and
ovarian cancers are lower than average. Those mammograms
definitely saved their lives.
Some women are diagnosed with breast cancer detected by a
mammogram in their early 40s. Some of these lumps may
not be palpable, and, if women are fortunate, may be caught
before cancer spreads to the lymph nodes. Such tumors may
require lumpectomy and radiation and possibly chemo.
These women are survivors and I am grateful that their
cancer can be caught early. Mammograms use much less
radiation than they did years ago. I am an advocate of early
detection with mammography in conjunction with self
examination.
I had dinner tonight with a friend who like me was shocked
and angered by this news alert. Women can have cancer
discovered by mammogram in their mid-40s. Had they
waited until 50 they never would have seen their 50th
birthdays. Some women even die of breast cancer in their
early 40s! I hope and expect this news will spark a huge
outrage as it should. I am furious and I suspect this is a
financial decision rather than a medical one.
this is just the beginning of medicine by statistics. aka
obama-pelosi care. There are woman today in their 40's
battling breast cancer of an aggressive type. if not for the
mammograms these would be unnoticed and untreated for a
few more years..no wait you can you treat cancer after the
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patient is dead right?it wont' belong before the statisticians
information will filter to the provider and we will see a
resurgence of breast cancer deaths. if i am not mistaken
england has a miserable survival rate!!
Good for all of you for whom this is an intellectual exercise.
You're lucky. I can only tell you what happens to women
who are diagnosed with cancer. Every year, women in their
late 40s, with no family history and no symptoms, are being
diagnosed with early stage breast cancer after having routine
annual mammograms. They may have to have a lumpectomy
and radiation. If these women waited until they felt a lump, or
if their first screening had come at 50, I doubt their cancer
would be found at an early stage. You can manipulate
statistics in many ways...but these women probably have a
different viewpoint and will take the mammograms.
64.7
Bad, bad idea. Women in their 40s can be diagnosed with
extremely aggressive cancer via mammogram; these tumors
may not be able to be felt in an examination. Some of these
women may have even had clean mammograms in the last
two years, only to then find cancer that has already spread to
the lymph nodes. After surgery, chemo, and radiation, these
women have a predicted 10-year survival chances above
90%. If they had waited until age 50...by that time the cancer
would probably had already metastasized and they would be
facing a death sentence. Women, don't die needlessly. Have
your first mammogram at age 40 or below (some doctors
recommend starting at age 35) and keep having them every
year. It could save your life. It has saved others.
67.4
Breast cancer survivors are probably glad they had yearly
mammograms. Some of these women may have had tumors
that were low-grade, well differentiated, and small. But why
would they want to wait until they or another could palpate
the cancer and surgery would require more removal of breast
tissue and more disfigurement.? That counts for something.
Waiting could also result in a greater chance of lymphodema
if lymph node dissection is required.. Even mild
lymphodema is a pain. Most breast cancers, I believe 7080%, break out of the milk ducts which makes them life
threatening at some point. Why wait? It's not like the
majority of prostate cancers which I understand grow so
slowly that most men will die of something else. Survivors
WANT to survive and early detection and treatment is
physically and mentally justifiable.
61.9
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these recommendations are primitive, phallo-centric, absurd,
cruel, stastically immoral and the work of fools. some
women turning 50 this year have already had an experience
with breast cancer. if not for mammography and highlytrained, vigilant radiologists, they would be extremely ill
now, their lives most likely unrecoverable. after a hx of
normal screenings, and missing even one mammography,
some of these women were diagnosed with tumors that may
not have even been palpabable. breast cancers do not
discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, class, whether
pre-menopausal or post-menopausal, motherhood or lifestyle.
there are many women who are in high-risk categories and
many women who develop breast cancers who have no
known risk at all. if this is part of the assignment of "health
care reform", then American women face very serious trouble
in achieving an enduring worthiness and equality in this
society.
40.8
Even women who receive regular mammograms starting at
50 may be diagnosed with late-stage breast cancer in their
50s. Sometimes these cancers are found in between annual
mammograms. While some of these women may be smokers
and have other risk factors for various types of cancer, they
may not be in a high risk group for breast cancer. A number
of these women may go on to die of breast cancer which can
come back in another part of their body after the woman has
been cancer-free for a number of years. I am not an
oncologist and do not know how these cancers would have
progressed untreated if, as recommended now, these women
had received a mammogram every two years. But when their
cancer is aggressive, it seems likely to me that, had they
received mammograms less frequently, their doctors would
not have caught it until it was even further advanced. I think
these women would have been deprived of additional years of
life, during which they could have been traveling, becoming
grandmothers, and seeing their children get married. I do not
intend to follow this guideline.
61.2
Average 63.5
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Table E7
Neutral or Balanced Nonexemplar Comments
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Comment text
I'll bet you ten to one that physicians who own
mammography units will be slower to adopt the new
guidelines than those refer out mammograms.
Women are being advised to discuss the pros and cons of
having a mammogram before getting one automatically at
age 40. What is so controversial about having a woman be
informed of her choices before making a medical decision?
A problem with the mammography screening studies is their
end-points: number of false positives vs number of deaths
averted. Very few studies look at another endpoint morbidity from chemotherapy. How many cancers could be
treated by just surgery or surgery and radiation vs
chemotherapy?
Hopefully, what will eventually evolve from the current
debate is a serious discussion between every woman and her
physician regarding the risks and benefits of yearly screening.
Of course, we will have to wait until all of the irrational
screaming stops to get to that point.
It is far too naive to make a blanket statement that private
insurance companies will continue to support mammography
for women under 50 at low risk for breast cancer. They may
do it now as a public relations type move but these
companies, for the most part, bend over backwards to
maximize profits. No one knows what will happen in the
future as far as their policies.
I wish instead of telling women not to get screened that
science would direct more effort to distinguishing which noninvasive cancers are dangerous and which aren't. Dying of
breast cancer isn't pleasant, for that matter neither is systemic
therapy. A woman with a history of breast cancer -personal or
familial- is not overzealous in wanting to avoid dying or even
being treated in a major way for the disease. Right now the
tools for distinguishing life threatening cancers from those
that aren't are non-existent. Progress would be appreciated.
It has been the norm in Canada for many years for women to
begin having mammograms at the age of 50. The extra
anxiety that women in the US have been experiencing with
early breast screening,for the most part, has not been a part of
Canadian women's lives. Obviously, in some individual
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cases, early screening has been life-saving and in Canada
women with cause for concern do receive the necessary
mammograms and further testing. It would be interesting to
know more about the health policies and statistics regarding
mammograms in other countries.
This appears to be a recession/depression problem, that is, a
recession happens to a population whereas a depression
happens to a person. The decision is set based on the
cost/benefits of screening a population but the consequences
are terrible if that one person in 1-10,000 who is not saved is
you. After people get used to the new standards or a new
generation of women who get used to screening at 50 replace
the current group, I would predict that there will be no
difference in people's reactions to the new threshold as
compared to the old.
What I find interesting is how free some of the MD's feel to
use their own subjective judgment on treatment
recommendations. MD's are not machines, nor should they
be, but it seems that the medical profession could do a better
job of training MD's to use science and consensus-based
recommendations. Not just with this screening example, but
how large of a role do emotions and subjective judgement
play in choosing one prescription drug over another (think
pharmaceutical rep influence)or in choosing when a cesarean
delivery is necessary? My hunch is the medical profession
could use a change in culture.
Women encounter two fears that shake them with regard to
the new recommendations. There is, most obviously, dread of
Cancer; the fact that many cancers may be slow-growing and
non-life-threatening does little to ameliorate that dread. The
second fear is that of relegation to second-class citizen. The
inroads made by womens' liberation are not so substantial
that there is no slippery slope. There lurks a sad suspicion
that women are still expendable, that the medical community
pays less attention to women than to men and sees less need
to be truly careful of them. Only when both of these
perceptions die out will recommendations of the sort now put
forth be regarded with more rationality than emotion.
What one needs to understand with these new guidelines is
that it acknowledges not that screening is useless, but that the
tools with which we do screen are not adequate at this point.
Currently there are no good predictive biomarkers that would
stratify women into groups that would and would not benefit
from early mammograms. A large percentage of women
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diagnosed in the 40s with breast cancer had no "risk factors" again meaning that we probably don't understand risk factors
enough. Clinical discoveries, in particular in the area of
diagnosis, are developing rapidly today, as we do understand
genetic and genomic risk factors more readily. The hope
could be that in the near future better technology will make
screening more accurate, and stratification more possible.
A very difficult situation. We grew up, as physicians, to
recommend mammograms almost as dogma, at least from the
standpoint of legal exposure, heavens forbid this study was
skipped and cancer developed later on (in a given patient).
The fact is that a mammogram may indeed help diagnose
cancer a bit earlier, perhaps allowing earlier treatment. The
question remains as to its benefit to make a difference in
prognosis, to catch the disease before it spreads, when it is
performed on all women, independent of known factors that
increase the incidence (i.e. family history). The
recommendation for the routine mammogram on a yearly
basis may not change as long as it is recommended by
professional specialties, is covered by Insurance and the
feared Liability hangs in the equation.
44.5
I am always surprised that breast cancer awareness
campaigns, and articles always look at screenings, detection,
research into technologies and medications to "eradicate" the
cancer...but they rarely take a strong look at the pollutants in
our world today that are finding their way into women's
breast tissue. In my opinion, campaigns for clean water,
clean air, organic food, natural beauty care products...all of
these campaigns should join forces with breast cancer
prevention and awareness - or actually in fact, the other way
around - since women's awareness in this country of the issue
of breast cancer is so strong and the pink-ribbon is so well
known, what better way to grab national attention about the
bigger picture of the toxic environment that we live in and
raise our children in than to have the breast cancer
organizations start to raise our awareness of prevention
through creating a healthier environment.
32.5
Screening and treatment are important pieces of the
conversation about breast cancer in the US, but what's
missing from so many discussions is prevention. (And I don't
mean early detection, which is what screening can provide,
albeit with the crucial caveats). What we spend on
prevention, both in terms of research and actual programs,
pales in comparison to investments in detection and
41.9
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152
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treatment. And yet, robust prevention efforts could
potentially save more lives than anything else, and at a
fraction of the cost to the health care system and society atlarge. What we do know about breast cancer prevention,
especially the importance of diet and exercise, is not given
the attention or budget necessary for implementation. Nor are
the lifestyle recommendations we lackadaisically prescribe
currently feasible for many of the women who are most at
risk of death from breast cancer. Scaling up our meager
investments in healthy, unprocessed food for everyone,
especially the poor, as well as the creation of environments
suitable for exercise in all communities would be a good
start.
Screening mammograms help some women, but not as many
as if often believed. New recommendations suggest women
stop annual screening and 40 and wait until 50 to start every
other year screening until 74. Based on numerous studies, this
small shift will dramatically reduce false positive but will not
increase breast cancer mortality. Right now, 60% of breast
cancers are found through screening, which means that 40%
of cancers are found another way. Women find lumps in a
number of ways. Breast self exam is not recommended
because larges studies show it's not effective. However,
women do inadvertently feel lumps while bathing (or a
woman's partner might feel a lump while touching her.) Some
women notice physical changes in the mirror. A woman
might feel discomfort as she fastens her bra or she might feel
pain in her breast that leads her to touch it or see a doctor.
Finally, a lump might be detected during a physical exam by
a doctor. The fact that screening is recommended only every
other year after 50 and breast self exams are not
recommended, does not mean women should do nothing if
they suspect something is wrong.
62.7
Average 47.0
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APPENDIX F
DETAILED RESULTS OF MEDIATION ANALYSES
The following tables summarize the details of mediational analyses conducted in Chapters 5 and 6.
Table F1
Transportation as a Mediator of the Effects of Exemplars on Intentions to Have Mammogram in Next Two Years

Model paths
FPEx vs. FPNoEx
 transportation

Constant,
Coeff.
(SE)
4.313
(0.111)***

Effect of X
Effect of M
(condition) on (transportation)
Effect of X
M
on Y
(condition) on
(transportation),
(intention),
Y (intention),
Coeff. (SE)
Coeff. (SE)
Coeff. (SE)
-0.000 (0.165)

__

__

R2

F (df), p

0.000

0.000 (1,
289), p =
.998

Indirect effect
of X on Y
through M,
Coeff.
(bootstrapped
bias-corrected
95% CI)
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Transportation 
intention; FPEx vs.
FPNoEx intention
FPEx vs. FPExRem
 transportation
Transportation 
intention; FPEx vs.
FPExRem
intention
BCEx vs. BCNoEx
 transportation

5.086
(0.368)***

__

0.087 (0.078)

-0.255 (0.219)

0.009

1.291 (2,
288), p =
.277

4.294
(0.136)***

0.019 (0.191)

__

__

0.000

0.010 (1,
256), p =
.921

5.196
(0.378)***

__

-0.012 (0.079)

0.062 (0.240)

0.000

0.046 (2,
255), p =
.955

0.003

0.681 (1,
253), p =
.410

0.019

2.483 (2,
252), p =
.086

0.007

2.017 (1,
270), p =
.157

4.390
(0.131)***

Transportation 
intention; BCEx vs.
BCNoEx 
intention

4.845
(0.409)***

BCEx vs.
BCExRem 
transportation

4.292
(0.123)***

0.145 (0.176)

__

0.244 (0.171)

__

0.187 (0.084)*

__

__

0.001 (0.236)

__

0.000 (-0.044,
0.044)

0.000 (-0.039,
0.032)

0.027 (-0.028,
0.133)
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Transportation 
intention; BCEx vs.
BCExRem 
intention

4.488
(0.374)***

__

0.217 (0.079)**

0.222 (0.223)

0.033

4.561 (2,
269), p =
.011

0.053 (-0.010,
0.172)

Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx = falsepositive comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, FPExRem = false positive
comments with exemplars removed, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars removed.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
Table F2

Transportation as a Mediator of the Effects of Exemplars on Intentions to Wait until Age 50 to Have Mammogram

Model paths

Constant,
Coeff.
(SE)

Effect of X
Effect of M
(condition) on (transportation)
Effect of X
M
on Y
(condition) on
(transportation),
(intention),
Y (intention),
Coeff. (SE)
Coeff. (SE)
Coeff. (SE)

R2

F (df), p

Indirect effect
of X on Y
through M,
Coeff.
(bootstrapped
bias-corrected
95% CI)
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FPEx vs. FPNoEx
 transportation
Transportation 
intention; FPEx vs.
FPNoEx intention
FPEx vs. FPExRem
 transportation
Transportation 
intention; FPEx vs.
FPExRem
intention
BCEx vs. BCNoEx
 transportation
Transportation 
intention; BCEx vs.
BCNoEx 
intention

4.313
(0.112)***

0.000 (0.165)

__

__

0.000

0.000 (1,
289), p =
.998

1.971
(0.335)***

__

0.088 (0.071)

0.193 (0.200)

0.009

1.24 (2,
288), p =
.291

0.000

0.010 (1,
256), p =
0.921

4.294
(0.136)***

0.019 (0.191)

__

__

2.501
(0.334)***

__

-0.008 (0.069)

0.077 (0.212)

0.001

0.073 (2,
255), p =
.930

4.390
(0.131)***

0.145 (0.176)

__

__

0.003

0.681 (1,
253), p =
.410

3.067
(0.337)***

__

-0.211 (0.069)**

-0.025 (0.194)

0.036

4.670 (2,
252), p =
0.010

0.000 (-0.043,
0.041)

0.000 (-0.033,
0.027)

-0.031 (-0.138,
0.033)
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BCEx vs.
BCExRem 
transportation

4.292
(0.123)***

0.244 (0.171)

__

__

0.007

2.017 (1,
270), p =
.157

Transportation 
intention; BCEx vs.
BCExRem 
intention

3.101
(0.318)***

__

-0.205 (0.067)**

-0.086 (0.189)

0.036

4.949 (2,
269), p =
.008

-0.050 (-0.154,
0.011)

Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx = falsepositive comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, FPExRem = false positive
comments with exemplars removed, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars removed.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table F3
Attitude toward Mammography as a Mediator of the Effects of Exemplars on Intentions to Have Mammogram in Next Two Years

Model paths

Constant,
Coeff.
(SE)

Effect of X
(condition) on
M (attitude),
Coeff. (SE)

Effect of M
(attitude) on Y
(intention),
Coeff. (SE)

Effect of X
(condition) on
Y (intention),
Coeff. (SE)

R2

F (df), p

Indirect effect
of X on Y
through M,
Coeff.
(bootstrapped
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bias-corrected
95% CI)
FPEx vs. FPNoEx 
attitude

5.409
(0.127)***

-0.081 (0.189)

__

__

0.001

0.182 (1,
290), p =
0.670

Attitude  intention;
FPEx vs. FPNoEx
intention

2.493
(0.350)***

__

0.551
(0.060)***

-0.224 (0.193)

0.230

43.050 (2,
289), p < .001

FPEx vs. FPExRem
 attitude

4.875
(0.150)***

0.453 (0.211)*

__

__

0.018

4.639 (1,
259), p =
0.032

Attitude  intention;
FPEx vs. FPExRem
intention

2.414
(0.331)***

__

0.561
(0.610)***

-0.200 (0.208)

0.249

42.695 (2,
258), p < .001

BCEx vs. BCNoEx
 attitude

5.464
(0.156)***

0.075 (0.208)

__

__

0.001

0.129 (1,
251), p = .720

Attitude  intention;
BCEx vs. BCNoEx
 intention

3.34
(0.399)***

__

0.427
(0.067)***

-0.021 (0.220)

0.141

20.591 (2,
250), p < .001

BCEx vs. BCExRem
 attitude

5.280
(0.138)***

0.259 (0.192)

__

__

0.007

1.82 (1, 270),
p = .178

-0.044 (-0.245,
0.168)

0.254 (0.026,
0.521)

0.032 (-0.147,
0.215)
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Attitude  intention;
BCEx vs. BCExRem
 intention

2.976
(0.376)***

__

0.463
(0.066)***

0.141 (0.207)

0.161

25.779 (2,
269), p < .001

0.120 (-0.049,
0.310)

Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx = falsepositive comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, FPExRem = false positive
comments with exemplars removed, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars removed.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table F4

Attitude toward Delaying Mammography as a Mediator of the Effects of Exemplars on Intentions to Wait until Age 50 to Have
Mammogram

Model paths

Constant,
Coeff.
(SE)

Effect of X
(condition) on
M (attitude),
Coeff. (SE)

Effect of M
(attitude) on Y
(intention),
Coeff. (SE)

Effect of X
(condition) on
Y (intention),
Coeff. (SE)

R2

F (df), p

Indirect effect
of X on Y
through M,
Coeff.
(bootstrapped
bias-corrected
95% CI)
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FPEx vs. FPNoEx 
attitude

3.459
(0.135)***

0.001
(0.201)**

__

__

0.000

0.000 (1,
289), p = .998

Attitude  intention;
FPEx vs. FPNoEx
intention

0.820
(0.220)***

__

0.448
(0.053)***

0.159 (0.180)

0.202

36.377 (2,
288), p < .001

FPEx vs. FPExRem
 attitude

3.354
(0.147)***

0.105 (0.206)

__

__

0.001

2.759 (1,
258), p = .609

Attitude  intention;
FPEx vs. FPExRem
intention

0.800
(0.229)***

__

0.502
(0.056)***

-0.007 (0.185)

0.240

40.567 (2,
257), p < .001

BCEx vs. BCNoEx
 attitude

3.254
(0.168)***

-0.232 (0.226)

__

__

0.004

1.062 (1,
252), p = .304

Attitude  intention;
BCEx vs. BCNoEx
 intention

1.311
(0.222)***

__

0.255
(0.053)***

0.017 (0.189)

0.086

11.733 (2,
251), p < .001

BCEx vs. BCExRem
 attitude

3.333
(0.152)***

-0.312 (0.211)

__

__

0.008

2.195 (1,
270), p = .140

Attitude  intention;
BCEx vs. BCExRem
 intention

0.980
(0.211)***

__

0.368
(0.051)***

0.008 (0.176)

0.165

26.553 (2,
269), p < .001

0.000 (-0.191,
0.177)

0.053 (-0.154,
0.255e)

-0.059 (-0.196,
0.048)

-0.115 (-0.300,
0.030)
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Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx = falsepositive comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, FPExRem = false positive
comments with exemplars removed, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars removed.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table F5

Norms Related to Having Mammogram in Next Two Years as a Mediator of the Effects of Exemplars on Intention to Have
Mammogram

Model paths
FPEx vs.
FPNoEx 
injunctive norm

Constant,
Coeff.
(SE)

Effect of X
(condition)
on M
(norm),
Coeff. (SE)

Effect of M
(injunctive
norm) on Y
(intention),
Coeff. (SE)

Effect of M
(descriptive
norm) on Y
(intention),
Coeff. (SE)

Effect of X
(condition) on
Y (intention),
Coeff. (SE)

R2

4.838
(0.137)***

0.035
(0.204)

__

__

__

0.000

Indirect
effect of X on
Y through M,
Coeff.
(bootstrapped
biascorrected
F (df), p
95% CI)
0.029
(1, 291),
p = .865

0.0138 (0.154, 0.170)
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FPEx vs.
FPNoEx 
descriptive norm

4.888
(0.129)***

-0.226
(0.191)

__

__

__

0.005

1.401
-0.029 (-0.141,
(1, 291),
0.010)
p = .238

Injunctive norm,
descriptive norm
 intention;
FPEx vs.
FPNoEx
intention

2.909
(0.357)***

__

0.398
(0.064)***

0.1295
(0.069)

-0.2503
(0.197)

0.196

23.506
(3, 289),
p < .001

4.516
(0.149)***

0.357
(0.209)

__

__

__

0.011

2.907
(1, 259),
p=
0.089

FPEx vs.
FPExRem
descriptive
norm

4.945
(0.136)***

-0.284
(0.190)

__

__

__

0.009

2.220
-0.050 (-0.183,
(1, 259),
0.007)
p = .138

Injunctive norm,
descriptive norm
 intention;
FPEx vs.
FPExRem
intention

2.160
(0.391)***

__

0.467
(0.069)***

0.178
(0.076)*

0.244

27.715
(3, 257),
p < .001

FPEx vs.
FPExRem 
injunctive norm

-0.062 (0.210)

0.167 (-0.019,
0.387)
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BCEx vs.
BCNoEx 
injunctive norm
BCEx vs.
BCNoEx 
descriptive norm
Injunctive norm,
descriptive norm
 intention;
BCEx vs.
BCNoEx 
intention
BCEx vs.
BCExRem 
injunctive norm
BCEx vs.
BCExRem 
descriptive
norms

4.974
(0.163)***

4.914
(0.137)***

-0.086
(0.219)

__

-0.040
(0.184)

__

3.524
(0.431)***

__

0.297
(0.077)***

4.758
(0.147)***

0.131
(0.204)

4.894
(0.129)***

-0.020
(0.179)

__

__

__

__

0.123 (0.091)

__

__

__

__

0.126 (0.224)

__

__

0.001

0.154
(1, 257), -0.026 (-0.164,
p=
0.106)
0.695

0.000

0.0465
(1, 257), -0.005 (-0.093,
p=
0.039)
0.829)

0.113

10.875
(3, 255),
p<
0.001

0.002

0.410
(1, 273),
p=
0.522

0.000

0.012
(1, 273), -0.006 (-0.112,
p=
0.098)
0.912

0.044 (-0.087,
0.195)
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Injunctive norm,
descriptive norm
 intention;
BCEx vs.
BCExRem 
intention

2.453
(0.369)***

__

0.340
(0.073)***

0.278
(0.083)***

0.229 (0.197)

0.234

27.527
(3, 271),
p < .001

Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx = falsepositive comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, FPExRem = false positive
comments with exemplars removed, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars removed.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table F6

Norms Related to Waiting Until Age 50 to Have Mammograms as a Mediator of the Effects of Exemplars on Intention to Have
Mammogram

Model paths

Constant,
Coeff.
(SE)

Effect of X
(condition)
on M
(norm),
Coeff. (SE)

Effect of M
(injunctive
norm) on Y
(intention),
Coeff. (SE)

Effect of M
(descriptive
norm) on Y
(intention),
Coeff. (SE)

Effect of X
(condition) on
Y (intention),
Coeff. (SE)

R2

Indirect
effect of X on
Y through M,
Coeff.
(bootstrapped
F (df), p
bias278

corrected
95% CI)
FPEx vs.
FPNoEx 
injunctive norm
FPEx vs.
FPNoEx 
descriptive norm
Injunctive norm,
descriptive norm
 intention;
FPEx vs.
FPNoEx
intention
FPEx vs.
FPExRem 
injunctive norm
FPEx vs.
FPExRem
descriptive
norm

2.706
(0.119)***

0.001
(0.177)

3.300
(0.127)***

0.001
(0.189)

__

__

0.3122
(0.211)

__

0.526
(0.064)***

0.193
(0.060)**

2.930
(0.134)***

3.227
(0.133)***

-0.223
(0.188)

0.074
(0.187)

__

__

__

__

__

__

0.000

0.000
(1, 291),
p = .998

0.000 (-0.182,
0.188)

__

0.000

0.000
(1, 291),
p=
0.997

0.000 (-0.072,
0.084)

0.166 (0.163)

0.344

50.420
(3,289),
p < .001

0.005

1.409
(1, 259), -0.102 (-0.288,
p=
0.062)
0.236

0.001

0.158
(1, 259),
p=
0.691

__

__

__

0.021 (-0.082,
0.144)
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Injunctive norm,
descriptive norm
 intention;
FPEx vs.
FPExRem
intention

0.209
(0.238)

__

BCEx vs.
BCNoEx 
injunctive norm

2.757
(0.145)***

-0.218
(0.195)

__

__

BCEx vs.
BCNoEx 
descriptive norm

3.052
(0.145)***

0.409
(0.194)*

__

__

Injunctive norm,
descriptive norm
 intention;
BCEx vs.
BCNoEx 
intention
BCEx vs.
BCExRem 
injunctive norm

0.786
(0.232)***

__

2.689
(0.126)***

-0.151
(0.174)

0.459
(0.066)***

0.298
(0.067)***

__

0.289
(0.067)***

0.171
(0.068)**

__

0.339

43.911
(3, 257),
p < .001

__

0.005

1.246
-0.065 (-0.213,
(1, 256),
0.039)
p = .265

__

0.017

4.445
(1, 256),
p = .036

0.172

17.630
(3, 254),
p<
.0010

0.003

0.749
(1, 273), -0.049 (-0.178,
p=
0.061)
0.388

0.138 (0.173)

-0.052 (0.182)

__

0.070 (0.008,
0.190)
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BCEx vs.
BCExRem 
descriptive
norms

3.265
(0.137)***

Injunctive norm,
descriptive norm
 intention;
BCEx vs.
BCExRem 
intention

0.627
(0.226)**

0.1-0.096
(0.189)

__

__

__

0.325
(0.072)***

0.218
(0.066)**

__

-0.122 (0.171)

0.004

1.077
(1, 273),
p=
0.300

0.212

24.279
(3, 271),
p<
0.001

0.043 (-0.178,
0.061)

Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx = falsepositive comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, FPExRem = false positive
comments with exemplars removed, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars removed.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table F7

Self-Efficacy as a Mediator of the Effects of Mammogram-Detected Breast Cancer Exemplars on Intentions to Have Mammogram in
Next Two Years
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Effect of X
(condition) on
M (selfefficacy),
Coeff. (SE)

Effect of M
(self-efficacy)
on Y
(intention),
Coeff. (SE)

Effect of X
(condition) on
Y (intention),
Coeff. (SE)

R2

F (df), p

0.239 (0.375)

__

__

0.002

0.406 (1,
256), p = .525

Model paths

Constant,
Coeff.
(SE)

BCEx vs. BCNoEx
 self-efficacy

8.565
(0.279)***

Self-efficacy 
intention; BCEx vs.
BCNoEx 
intention

4.758
(0.379)***

__

0.099 (0.039)*

0.067 (0.236)

0.025

3.271 (2,
255), p =
0.040

BCEx vs. BCExRem
 self-efficacy

8.296
(0.249)***

0.509 (0.345)

__

__

0.008

2.169 (1,
273), p = .142

Self-efficacy 
intention; BCEx vs.
BCExRem 
intention

3.533
(0.339)***

__

0.229
(0.037)***

0.151 (0.210)

0.131

20.405 (2,
272), p < .001

Indirect
effect of X on
Y through M,
Coeff.
(bootstrapped
biascorrected
95% CI)

0.024 (-0.044,
0.124)

0.116 (-0.032,
0.305)
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Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, BCEx =
mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars
removed.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table F8

Negative Affect as a Mediator of the Effects of Mammogram-Detected Breast Cancer Exemplars on Perceived Five-Year Risk of
Breast Cancer (Measured as a Frequency)

Model paths
BCEx vs. BCNoEx
 negative affect

Constant,
Coeff.
(SE)

Effect of X
(condition) on
M (negative
affect), Coeff.
(SE)

1.794
-0.038 (0.0953)
(0.071)***

Effect of M
(negative
affect) on Y
(perceived
risk), Coeff.
(SE)

Effect of X
(condition) on
Y (perceived
risk), Coeff.
(SE)

R2

F (df), p

__

__

0.001

0.1586 (1,
256), p =
0.691

Indirect
effect of X on
Y through M,
Coeff.
(bootstrapped
biascorrected
95% CI)
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Negative affect 
perceived risk;
BCEx vs. BCNoEx
 perceived risk

13.644
(3.602)***

__

9.961
(1.697)***

-5.547 (2.589)*

0.135

19.855 (2,
255), p < .001

BCEx vs. BCExRem
 negative affect

1.819
(0.072)***

-0.063 (0.100)

__

__

0.002

0.401 (1, 271)

Negative affect 
perceived risk;
BCEx vs. BCExRem
 perceived risk

15.485
(3.163)***

__

6.566
(1.455)***

-1.428 (2.395)

0.072

10.480 (2,
270), p < .001

-0.378 (-2.415,
1.39)

-0.416 (-1.926,
0.831)

Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, BCEx =
mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars
removed.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table F9

Negative Affect as a Mediator of the Effects of Mammogram-Detected Breast Cancer Exemplars on Perceived Lifetime Risk of Breast
Cancer (Measured as a Frequency)
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Model paths
BCEx vs. BCNoEx
 negative affect

Constant,
Coeff.
(SE)

Effect of X
(condition) on
M (negative
affect), Coeff.
(SE)

Effect of M
(negative
affect) on Y
(perceived
risk), Coeff.
(SE)

Effect of X
(condition) on
Y (perceived
risk), Coeff.
(SE)

R2

F (df), p

1.794
(0.071)***

-0.038 (0.095)

__

__

0.001

0.159 (1,
256), p =
0.691

Negative affect 
perceived risk;
BCEx vs. BCNoEx
 perceived risk

25.147
(3.702)***

__

6.476
(1.744)***

-0.673 (2.661)

0.052

6.958 (2,
255), p = .001

BCEx vs. BCExRem
 negative affect

1.819
(0.072)***

-0.063 (0.100)

__

__

0.002

0.401 (1,
271), p = .527

Negative affect 
perceived risk;
BCEx vs. BCExRem
 perceived risk

28.304
(3.470)***

__

4.378
(1.596)**

-0.146 (2.627)

0.027

3.774 (2,
270), p = .024

Indirect effect
of X on Y
through M,
Coeff.
(bootstrapped
bias-corrected
95% CI)

-0.246 (-1.669,
0.907)

-0.277 (-1.409,
0.507)
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Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, BCEx =
mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars
removed.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table F10

Negative Affect as a Mediator of the Effects of Mammogram-Detected Breast Cancer Exemplars on Perceived Five-Year Risk of
Breast Cancer (Measured as a Percentage)

Effect of X
(condition) on
M (negative
affect), Coeff.
(SE)

Effect of M
(negative
affect) on Y
(perceived
risk), Coeff.
(SE)

Effect of X
(condition) on
Y (perceived
risk), Coeff.
(SE)

R2

F (df), p

Model paths

Constant,
Coeff.
(SE)

BCEx vs. BCNoEx
 negative affect

1.794
(0.071)***

-0.038 (0.095)

__

__

0.001

0.159 (1,
256), p = .691

Negative affect 
perceived risk;

2.298
(3.771)

__

12.277
(1.776)***

-0.303 (2.710)

0.158

23.927 (2,
255), p < .001

Indirect
effect of X on
Y through M,
Coeff.
(bootstrapped
biascorrected
95% CI)

-0.466 (-2.855,
1.836)
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BCEx vs. BCNoEx
 perceived risk
BCEx vs. BCExRem
 negative affect

1.812
(0.073)***

-0.057 (0.100)

__

__

0.001

0.318 (1,
270), p = .573

Negative affect 
perceived risk;
BCEx vs. BCExRem
 perceived risk

7.826
(3.558)*

__

9.608
(1.64)***

-1.145 (2.699)

0.114

17.356 (2,
269), p < .001

-0.543 (-2.535,
1.388)

Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, BCEx =
mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars
removed.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table F11

Negative Affect as a Mediator of the Effects of Mammogram-Detected Breast Cancer Exemplars on Perceived Lifetime Risk of Breast
Cancer (Measured as a Percentage)

Model paths

Constant,
Coeff.
(SE)

Effect of X
(condition) on
M (negative

Effect of M
(negative
affect) on Y

Effect of X
(condition) on
Y (perceived

R2

F (df), p

Indirect
effect of X on
Y through M,
287

affect), Coeff.
(SE)

(perceived
risk), Coeff.
(SE)

risk), Coeff.
(SE)

Coeff.
(bootstrapped
biascorrected
95% CI)

BCEx vs. BCNoEx
 negative affect

1.794
(0.071)***

-0.038 (0.095)

__

__

0.001

0.159 (1,
256), p = .691

Negative affect 
perceived risk;
BCEx vs. BCNoEx
 perceived risk

9.197
(4.000)*

__

11.480
(1.884)***

-0.223 (2.875)

0.127

18.584 (2,
255), p < .001

1.812
(0.073)***

-0.057 (0.100)

__

__

0.001

0.318 (1,
270), p =
0.573

14.821
(3.700)***

__

8.555
(1.705)***

-0.710 (2.806)

0.086

12.674 (2,
269), p < .001

BCEx vs. BCExRem
 negative affect
Negative affect 
perceived risk;
BCEx vs. BCExRem
 perceived risk

-0.436 (-2.661,
1.704)

-0.480 (-2.262,
1.186)

Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, BCEx =
mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars
removed.
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*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table F12

Negative Affect as a Mediator of the Effects of Mammogram-Detected Breast Cancer Exemplars on Perceived Risk of Having a
Positive Mammogram (Measured as a Frequency)

Effect of X
(condition) on
M (negative
affect), Coeff.
(SE)

Effect of M
(negative
affect) on Y
(perceived
risk), Coeff.
(SE)

Effect of X
(condition) on
Y (perceived
risk), Coeff.
(SE)

R2

F (df), p

Model paths

Constant,
Coeff.
(SE)

BCEx vs. BCNoEx
 negative affect

1.794
(0.071)***

-0.037 (0.096)

__

__

0.001

0.149 (1,
255), p = .700

Negative affect 
perceived risk;
BCEx vs. BCNoEx
 perceived risk

8.650
(3.249)**

__

7.970
(1.530)***

-1.971 (2.338)

0.100

14.033 (2,
254), p < .001

Indirect
effect of X on
Y through M,
Coeff.
(bootstrapped
biascorrected
95% CI)

-0.294 (-2.039,
1.120)
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BCEx vs. BCExRem
 negative affect

1.819
(0.072)***

-0.062 (0.100)

__

__

0.001

0.385 (1,
270), p = .536

Negative affect 
perceived risk;
BCEx vs. BCExRem
 perceived risk

13.056
(2.938)***

__

5.931
(1.352)***

-2.794 (2.228)

0.073

10.638 (2,
269), p < .001

-0.369 (-1.819,
0.736)

Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, BCEx =
mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars
removed.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table F13

Negative Affect as a Mediator of the Effects of Mammogram-Detected Breast Cancer Exemplars on Perceived Risk of Having a
Positive Mammogram (Measured as a Percentage)

Model paths

Constant,
Coeff.
(SE)

Effect of X
(condition) on
M (negative
affect), Coeff.
(SE)

Effect of M
(negative
affect) on Y
(perceived

Effect of X
(condition) on
Y (perceived
risk), Coeff.
(SE)

R2

F (df), p

Indirect
effect of X on
Y through M,
Coeff.
(bootstrapped
290

risk), Coeff.
(SE)

biascorrected
95% CI)

BCEx vs. BCNoEx
 negative affect

1.794
(0.071)***

-0.037 (0.096)

__

__

0.001

0.149 (1,
255), p = .700

Negative affect 
perceived risk;
BCEx vs. BCNoEx
 perceived risk

2.931
(3.136)

__

10.261
(1.477)***

-3.313 (2.257)

0.167

25.477 (2,
254), p < .001

BCEx vs. BCExRem
 negative affect

1.819
(0.072)***

-0.062 (0.100)

__

__

0.001

0.385 (1,
270), p = .536

Negative affect 
perceived risk;
BCEx vs. BCExRem
 perceived risk

9.068
(3.130)**

__

7.130
(1.440)***

-3.947 (2.373)

0.094

13.976 (2,
269), p < .001

-0.378 (-2.434,
1.461)

-0.443 (-2.154,
0.891)

Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, BCEx =
mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars
removed.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table F14
291

Negative Affect as a Mediator of the Effects of False-Positive Mammogram Exemplars on Perceived Risk of Having a False-Positive
Mammogram (Measured as a Frequency)

Effect of X
(condition) on
M (negative
affect), Coeff.
(SE)

Effect of M
(negative
affect) on Y
(perceived
risk), Coeff.
(SE)

Effect of X
(condition) on
Y (perceived
risk), Coeff.
(SE)

R2

F (df), p

Model paths

Constant,
Coeff.
(SE)

FPEx vs. FPNoEx 
negative affect

1.733
(0.073)***

0.132 (0.109)

__

__

0.005

1.474 (1,
291), p = .226

Negative affect 
perceived risk;
FPEx vs. FPNoEx
perceived risk

17.923
(2.916)***

__

6.232
(1.365)***

1.555 (2.541)

0.070

10.867 (2,
290), p < .001

FPEx vs. FPExRem
 negative affect

1.819
(0.078)***

0.046 (0.109)

__

__

0.001

0.176 (1,
258), p = .675

Negative affect 
perceived risk;

31.485
(3.413)***

__

2.482 (1.545)

-5.016 (2.707)

0.022

2.93 (2, 257),
p = .055

Indirect
effect of X on
Y through M,
Coeff.
(bootstrapped
biascorrected
95% CI)

0.824 (-0.377,
2.584)

0.114 (-0.299,
1.304)

292

FPEx vs. FPExRem
perceived risk
Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: FPNoEx = false-positive comments without exemplars, FPEx = false-positive comments
with exemplars, and FPExRem = false positive comments with exemplars removed.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table F15

Negative Affect as a Mediator of the Effects of False-Positive Mammogram Exemplars on Perceived Risk of Having a False-Positive
Mammogram (Measured as a Percentage)

Model paths

Constant,
Coeff.
(SE)

FPEx vs. FPNoEx 
negative affect

1.733
(0.073)***

Effect of X
(condition) on
M (negative
affect), Coeff.
(SE)

Effect of M
(negative
affect) on Y
(perceived
risk), Coeff.
(SE)

Effect of X
(condition) on
Y (perceived
risk), Coeff.
(SE)

R2

F (df), p

0.132 (0.109)

__

__

0.005

1.474 (1,
291), p = .226

Indirect
effect of X on
Y through M,
Coeff.
(bootstrapped
biascorrected
95% CI)
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Negative affect 
perceived risk;
FPEx vs. FPNoEx
perceived risk

13.971
(3.217)***

__

7.845
(1.506)***

0.581 (2.803)

0.087

13.74 (2,
290), p < .001

FPEx vs. FPExRem
 negative affect

1.819
(0.078)***

0.046 (0.109)

__

__

0.001

0.176 (1,
258), p = .675

Negative affect 
perceived risk;
FPEx vs. FPExRem
perceived risk

29.916
(3.979)***

__

2.908 (1.802)

-6.157 (3.156)

0.024

3.125 (2,
257), p = .046

1.037 (-0.500,
3.068)

0.133 (-0.382,
1.449)

Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: FPNoEx = false-positive comments without exemplars, FPEx = false-positive comments
with exemplars, and FPExRem = false positive comments with exemplars removed.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table F16

Perceived Five-Year Risk of Breast Cancer (Measured as a Frequency) as a Mediator of the Effects of Exemplars on Intentions to
Have Mammogram in Next Two Years
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Effect of X
(condition) on
M (perceived
risk), Coeff.
(SE)

Effect of M
(perceived
risk) on Y
(intention),
Coeff. (SE)

Effect of X
(condition) on
Y (intention),
Coeff. (SE)

R2

F (df), p

Model paths

Constant,
Coeff.
(SE)

FPEx vs. FPNoEx 
perceived risk

25.169
(1.806)***

-0.364 (2.681)

__

__

0.000

0.019 (1,
291), p = .892

Perceived risk 
intention; FPEx vs.
FPNoEx intention

5.271
(0.189)***

__

0.008 (0.005)

-0.263 (0.217)

0.014

2.121 (2,
290), p = .122

FPEx vs. FPExRem
 perceived risk

24.492
(1.883)***

0.312 (2.638)

__

__

0.000

0.014 (1,
259), p = .906

Perceived risk 
intention; FPEx vs.
FPExRem
intention

5.001
(0.217)***

__

0.006 (0.006)

0.053 (0.237)

0.005

0.609 (2,
258), p = .544

BCEx vs. BCNoEx
 perceived risk

31.362
-5.775 (2.744)*
(2.039)***

__

__

0.017

4.430 (1,
257), p = .036

Indirect
effect of X on
Y through M,
Coeff.
(bootstrapped
biascorrected
95% CI)

-0.003 (-0.066,
0.040)

0.002 (0.0345, 0.062)
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Perceived risk 
intention; BCEx vs.
BCNoEx 
intention

5.300
(0.243)***

__

0.010 (0.005)

0.152 (0.238)

0.013

1.704 (2,
256), p = .184

BCEx vs. BCExRem
 perceived risk

27.568
(1.774)***

-1.981 (2.460)

__

__

0.002

0.648 (1,
273), p = .421

Perceived risk 
intention; BCEx vs.
BCExRem 
intention

5.260
(0.221)***

__

0.006 (0.006)

0.280 (0.223)

0.010

1.365 (2,
272), p = .257

-0.056 (-0.183,
0.004)

-0.012 (-0.091,
0.014)

Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx = falsepositive comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, FPExRem = false positive
comments with exemplars removed, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars removed.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table F17

Perceived Lifetime Risk of Breast Cancer (Measured as a Frequency) as a Mediator of the Effects of Exemplars on Intentions to Have
Mammogram in Next Two Years
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Effect of X
(condition) on
M (perceived
risk), Coeff.
(SE)

Effect of M
(perceived
risk) on Y
(intention),
Coeff. (SE)

Effect of X
(condition) on
Y (intention),
Coeff. (SE)

R2

F (df), p

Model paths

Constant,
Coeff.
(SE)

FPEx vs. FPNoEx 
perceived risk

32.025
(1.727)***

-0.130 (2.564)

__

__

0.000

0.003 (1,
291), p = .960

Perceived risk 
intention; FPEx vs.
FPNoEx intention

5.112
(0.215)***

__

0.011 (0.005)*

-0.264 (0.216)

0.022

3.284 (2,
290), p = .039

FPEx vs. FPExRem
 perceived risk

30.516
(1.870)***

1.379 (2.619)

__

__

0.001

0.277 (1,
259), p = .600

Perceived risk 
intention; FPEx vs.
FPExRem
intention

4.844
(0.240)**

__

0.010 (0.006)

0.041 (0.236)

0.012

1.618 (2,
258), p = .200

BCEx vs. BCNoEx
 perceived risk

36.853
(2.017)***

-1.007 (2.715)

__

__

0.001

0.138 (1,
257), p = .711

Indirect
effect of X on
Y through M,
Coeff.
(bootstrapped
biascorrected
95% CI)

-0.001 (-0.072,
0.057)

0.014 (-0.029,
0.101)
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Perceived risk 
intention; BCEx vs.
BCNoEx 
intention

5.198
(0.266)***

__

0.011 (0.005)*

0.107 (0.236)

0.017

2.14 (2, 256),
p = .120

BCEx vs. BCExRem
 perceived risk

36.205
(1.905)***

-0.358 (2.641)

__

__

0.000

0.018 (1,
273), p = .892

Perceived risk 
intention; BCEx vs.
BCExRem 
intention

5.325
(0.245)**

__

0.003 (0.005)

0.269 (0.223)

0.007

0.885 (2,
272), p = .414

-0.011 (-0.101,
0.043)

-0.001 (-0.048,
0.024)

Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx = falsepositive comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, FPExRem = false positive
comments with exemplars removed, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars removed.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table F18

Perceived Five-Year Risk of Breast Cancer (Measured as a Percentage) as a Mediator of the Effects of Exemplars on Intentions to
Have Mammogram in Next Two Years
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Effect of X
(condition) on
M (perceived
risk), Coeff.
(SE)

Effect of M
(perceived
risk) on Y
(intention),
Coeff. (SE)

Effect of X
(condition) on
Y (intention),
Coeff. (SE)

R2

F (df), p

Model paths

Constant,
Coeff.
(SE)

FPEx vs. FPNoEx 
perceived risk

20.786
(1.844)***

1.958 (2.732)

__

__

0.002

0.514 (1,
290), p = .474

Perceived risk 
intention; FPEx vs.
FPNoEx intention

5.272,
0.174)***

__

0.011 (0.005)*

-0.315 (0.215)

0.025

3.685 (2,
289), p = .026

FPEx vs. FPExRem
 perceived risk

23.750
(2.080)***

-1.006 (2.914)

__

__

0.001

0.119 (1,
259), p = .730

Perceived risk 
intention; FPEx vs.
FPExRem
intention

4.811
(0.205)***

__

0.014
(0.005)**

0.069 (0.234)

0.031

4.092 (2,
258), p = .018

BCEx vs. BCNoEx
 perceived risk

24.259
(2.180)**

-0.706 (2.934)

__

__

0.000

0.058 (1,
257), p = .810

Indirect
effect of X on
Y through M,
Coeff.
(bootstrapped
biascorrected
95% CI)

0.021 (-0.030,
0.106)

-0.014 (-0.115,
0.059)
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Perceived risk 
intention; BCEx vs.
BCNoEx 
intention

5.289
(0.212)***

__

0.013
(0.005)**

0.105 (0.235)

0.026

3.457 (2,
256), p = .033

BCEx vs. BCExRem
 perceived risk

25.626
(2.058)***

-2.074 (2.849)

__

__

0.002

0.530 (1,
272), p = .467

Perceived risk 
intention; BCEx vs.
BCExRem 
intention

5.296
(0.202)***

__

0.005 (0.005)

0.282 (0.224)

0.010

1.319 (2,
271), p = .269

-0.009 (-0.102,
0.064)

-0.011 (-0.088,
0.012)

Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx = falsepositive comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, FPExRem = false positive
comments with exemplars removed, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars removed.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table F19

Perceived Lifetime Risk of Breast Cancer (Measured as a Percentage) as a Mediator of the Effects of Exemplars on Intentions to Have
Mammogram in Next Two Years
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Effect of X
(condition) on
M (perceived
risk), Coeff.
(SE)

Effect of M
(perceived
risk) on Y
(intention),
Coeff. (SE)

Effect of X
(condition) on
Y (intention),
Coeff. (SE)

R2

F (df), p

Model paths

Constant,
Coeff.
(SE)

FPEx vs. FPNoEx 
perceived risk

26.413
(1.861)***

2.738 (2.762)

__

__

0.003

0.983 (1,
291), p = .322

Perceived risk 
intention; FPEx vs.
FPNoEx intention

5.224
(0.190)***

__

0.009 (0.005)*

-0.291 (0.217)

0.019

2.781 (2,
290), p = .064

FPEx vs. FPExRem
 perceived risk

28.422
(2.100)***

0.729 (2.941)

__

__

0.000

0.061 (1,
259), p = .805

Perceived risk 
intention; FPEx vs.
FPExRem
intention

4.780
(0.219)***

__

0.013
(0.005)**

0.045 (0.234)

0.026

3.453 (2,
258), p = .033

BCEx vs. BCNoEx
 perceived risk

29.931
(2.274)***

-0.798 (3.060)

__

__

0.000

0.068 (1,
257), p = .794

Indirect
effect of X on
Y through M,
Coeff.
(bootstrapped
biascorrected
95% CI)

0.025 (-0.018,
0.112)

0.009 (-0.069,
0.098)
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Perceived risk 
intention; BCEx vs.
BCNoEx 
intention

5.115
(0.223)***

__

0.016
(0.005)***

0.109 (0.232)

0.045

6.036 (2,
256), p = .003

BCEx vs. BCExRem
 perceived risk

30.626
(2.104)***

-1.493 (2.913)

__

__

0.001

0.263 (1,
272), p = .609

Perceived risk 
intention; BCEx vs.
BCExRem 
intention

5.100
(0.214)***

__

0.011 (0.005)*

0.288 (0.222)

0.025

3.445 (2,
271), p = .033

-0.013 (-0.121,
0.082)

-0.016 (-0.102,
0.043)

Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx = falsepositive comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, FPExRem = false positive
comments with exemplars removed, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars removed.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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APPENDIX G
This appendix includes additional moderation results that were not included in the main
text.

Perceived risk of false positive, frequency
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35
30
25
FPEx
20

FPExRem
average of NoComm

15
10
5
0
Reading time ok

Reading time low

Figure G1. Reading time as a moderator of the effect of FPEx (vs. FPExRem) on
perceived risk of a false positive, measured as a frequency. Reading time groups were
created by dividing participants into those with an abnormally brief reading time (less
than half of the median reading time for their respective condition) and those with a
reading time equal to or greater than half the median.

303
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Perceived risk of false positive, %

35
30
25
FPEx
20

FPExRem
average of NoComm

15
10
5
0
Reading time ok

Reading time low

Figure G2. Reading time as a moderator of the effect of FPEx (vs. FPExRem) on
perceived risk of a false positive, measured as a percentage. Reading time groups were
created by dividing participants into those with an abnormally brief reading time (less
than half of the median reading time for their respective condition) and those with a
reading time equal to or greater than half the median.
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